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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
In future cases in the Fourth Circuit which involve alleged denials
of procedural due process, courts can look to Christhilf for guidelines
to determine whether a hearing is required and, if required, how it
should be conducted. It is less certain, however, to what extent the
Fourth Circuit will continue to apply liberally the under-color-of-
state-law requirement to entities which are arguably private.
L.D.S.
IV. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. Search and Seizure
1. Comment: Limitations Upon the Scope of the Plain View Doc-
trine and Application of the Automobile Exception
Despite the warrant requirement of the fourth amendment,' war-
rantless seizures of evidence or contraband' found in automobiles are
often allowed by the courts. The justification for such seizures is
usually based on one of two alternate theories: the plain view doc-
trine,3 which applies to objects visible without a search; and the
automobile exception,4 which allows warrantless searches of vehicles
Barrett also cited cases illustrating a split among the circuits on the specific
question of whether Hill-Burton funding, see note 13 supra, is effectively state action.
376 F. Supp. at 800-01 & nn.40-46, citing Bricker v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hosp. 339
F. Supp. 234, 237 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972) (yes); Sams v. Ohio
Valley Gen. Hosp. Ass'n, 413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969) (yes); Citta v. Delaware Valley
Hosp., 313 F. Supp. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (yes); Jackson v. Norton-Children's Hosp.,
Inc., 487 F.2d 502 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 1000 (1974) (no); Doe v. Bellin
Memorial Hosp., 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1973) (no); Ward v. St. Anthony Hosp., 476
F.2d 671 (10th Cir. 1973) (no).
'U.S. CONST. amend. IV states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
2 Early decisions distinguished between searches involving contraband and
searches involving private property which might be used as evidence. The logic of the
distinction was that, since private citizens had no right to the possession of contra-
band, its seizure did not constitute an invasion of a legitimate privacy interest. See
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1886). The distinction was removed by
the Supreme Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See note 59 infra.
3See text accompanying notes 20-46 infra.
'See text accompanying notes 47-70 infra. The "automobile exception" has been
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on the open road. The plain view doctrine is a judicially created rule
under which a police officer who is lawfully in a position to observe
an object may seize that object without a warrant.' The doctrine
typically applies to the situation in which an officer, questioning a
motorist, sees evidence or contraband inside the car.8 The automobile
exception, on the other hand, results from both the legislative' and
judicial recognition that an officer may physically search an automo-
bile when he has probable cause to believe that he will find evidence
or contraband.9 However, some courts have held that the automobile
exception does not apply unless certain exigent circumstances compel
an immediate warrantless search.10 Whether such exigent circum-
referred to variously as the "moving vehicle exception," "movable object exception,"
and the "exigent circumstances exception." Because the decision to be discussed
herein deals with an automobile, the term "automobile exception" will be used. For a
discussion of the doctrine's applicability to all movable objects, see Note, Mobility
Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine to Movable Items, 58 IOWA L. REv. 1134
(1973).
'See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.234, 236 (1968). See also text accompa-
nying note 26 infra.
'See United States v. Allen, 472 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1973) (officer acting on a citizen
tip stopped the petitioners' car and found a sawed-off shotgun lying on the floor);
United States v. Bourassa, 411 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1969) (officer stopped the petitioner
for speeding and noticed counterfeit money on the front seat of the car); United States
ex rel. Nash v. Anderson, 360 F. Supp. 866 (D. Del. 1973) (officers approached peti-
tioner's parked car to investigate possible intoxication of occupants and noticed a box
on the front seat which appeared to contain a weapon but which in fact contained
heroin).
7See note 51 infra.
'See text accompanying notes 50 and 51 infra.
'The Supreme Court, in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), described
probable cause as it relates to automobile searches and seizures as "a belief, reasonably
arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other
vehicle contains that which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. . . " Id. at
149. The Court later interpreted its decision in Carroll as holding that "a valid search
of a vehicle moving on a public highway may be had without a warrant, but only if
probable cause for the search exists." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 164
(1949). Searches of automobiles incident to the arrest of the occupants do not always
require probable cause. For a discussion of the latter exception, see Comment, Search
Incident to Arrest for Minor Traffic Violations, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 801 (1973).
DIn Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), a plurality of the Supreme
Court rejected the automobile exception where "there was probable cause, but no
exigent circumstances justified the police in proceeding without a warrant." Id. at 464.
For a detailed discussion of the Coolidge case, including an explanation of the plurality
decision, see note 56 infra and accompanying text.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with the automobile exception in its
statement that "[t]he validity of... any search without a warrant is subject to the
existence of probable cause plus exigent circumstances." United States v. Chapman,
474 F.2d 300, 302 (5th Cir. 1973).
The following cases have all involved automobile searches which were ruled un-
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stances are necessary for application of the automobile exception
and, if so, exactly what circumstances suffice to permit non-use of the
warrant are questions which have caused considerable confusion in
the courts." The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals recently resisted
efforts to expand the scope of the plain view doctrine and the applica-
tion of the automobile exception in the case of United States v.
Bradshaw."
In Bradshaw, a federal revenue agent accompanied by two state
liquor agents had been looking for a still in a wooded area near the
petitioner's home in a rural section of North Carolina. During the
course of their investigation, the agents approached the front door of
the petitioner's house to question him about an abandoned car
parked near his property. The agents knocked repeatedly at the front
door but could obtain no response from within the house. In a further
attempt to locate the petitioner, the federal agent walked toward the
back door passing a parked truck from which the aroma of moonshine
whisky emanated. His suspicion aroused, the agent approached the
truck and peered through a crack in the rear of the vehicle. Several
bottles of moonshine whiskey were visible. As a result of this discov-
ery, the petitioner was arrested and convicted for possession of non-
tax-paid whiskey in violation of federal law. 3
The sole issue on appeal was whether the liquor was discovered
as a result of a warrantless and illegal search of the truck"4 and thus
should have been excluded from admission as evidence." The Fourth
constitutional for want of exigent circumstances: United States v. Young, 489 F.2d 714
(6th Cir. 1974) (vehicle had been stationary for several days and was being used by
the petitioner as a residence rather than for transportation); Stidham v. Wingo, 452
F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1971) (petitioner was stopped for a minor traffic violation and, while
he was stopped, police received information establishing probable cause for the
search); United States v. Payne, 429 F.2d 169 (9th Cir. 1970) (federal park official
conducted a search of petitioner's automobile at park campsite after petitioner was
asleep).
"In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, acknowledged that: "While [the] general principles are easily stated, the
decisions of this Court dealing with the constitutionality of warrantless searches,
especially when those searches are of vehicles, suggest that this branch of the law is
something less than a seamless web." Id. at 440.
"2490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974).
326 U.S.C. §§ 5205(a), 5604(a) (1970).
"Brief for appellant at 10, United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir.
1974).
"The exclusionary rule was described in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Referring to its previous decision in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960), the
Supreme Court stated that, "[t]he Court concluded . . . that all evidence obtained
by an unconstitutional search and seizure was inadmissable in a federal court regard-
less of its source," and added that, "[w]e hold that all evidence obtained by searches
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Circuit held that the agent's actions constituted a search,"6 rather
than a seizure of contraband which was in plain view. The court
found that although probable cause to search existed when the agent
smelled the moonshine vapors coming from the truck, a warrantless
search was not justified under the automobile exception to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement." In so holding, the court placed
definite limitations on the application of both the plain view doctrine
and the automobile exception.
The plain view doctrine allows the warrantless seizure of evidence
or contraband 9 which is discovered without an intrusion into a citi-
zen's constitutionally protected zone of privacy. 0 This general doc-
and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissable
in a state court." 367 U.S. at 654, 655. For a general discussion of the rule, see Note,
The Exclusionary Rule of Illegally Obtained Evidence: Its Development and
Application, 35 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 64 (1961).
"Perhaps the most workable definition of "search" is that promulgated by the
Fifth Circuit in Haerr v. United States, 240 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1957): "A search implies
an examination of one's premises or person with a view to the discovery of contraband
or evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal action. The term implies
exploratory investigation or quest." Id. at 535.
"The court stated:
We hold that where, in the course of an initially justifiable intrusion,
an officer discovers facts which give him reason to believe that evi-
dence of crime will be found by a further intrusion beyond the scope
of the original intrusion, the "plain view" doctrine is inapplicable
unless there is independent justification for such further intrusion.
490 F.2d at 1101.
"The court held that:
[S]ince two of the agents could have guarded the truck smelling of
moonshine whiskey while the third obtained a warrant without signifi-
cant risk of loss of evidence, the search and seizure in this case vio-
lated the fourth amendment and the ruits thereof should be sup-
pressed.
Id. at 1103-04.
"2See note 2 supra.
The measure of fourth amendment protections is the individual's right to pri-
vacy. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Justice Bradley, writing for the
Court, sought to determine what constituted a violation of fourth amendment rights
and stated:
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rumaging of his drawers,
that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property. . ..
116 U.S. at 630. The scope of the zone of privacy is indefinite. As far as the automobile
is concerned, the Supreme Court may be moving toward the elimination of any privacy
interest. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973). In Dombrowski, Wisconsin
police had arrested a Chicago police detective for drunken driving. The arresting
officers were unable to find the detective's revolver. Believing that"Chicago police
officers were required to carry their service revolvers at all times, the arresting officers
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trine was first developed by the Supreme Court in Hester v. United
States,2' which involved a dispute over the admissibility into evi-
dence of a whiskey jug dropped by the defendant and found by the
police during an open-field chase. The Court held that there was no
constitutional bar to the admission of such evidence since "the spe-
cial protection accorded by the fourth amendment to the people in
their 'persons, houses, papers and effects' is not extended to the open
fields."22 The essence of the decision was that no search had oc-
curred.? This rationale has been extended to permit seizure of evi-
dence which is within a constitutionally protected zone but which is
visible from outside the protected area. 2 Thus the doctrine simply
provides that when police are present in connection with a legitimate
purpose, they may seize contraband or evidence which is clearly in
view.
opened the trunk of the impounded car in an effort to locate the revolver. This was
done to prevent the possibility of someone entering the parking lot to which the car
had been towed and obtaining the weapon. In the trunk the officers found evidence
which led to the trial and conviction of the detective on charges of murder.
Justice Rehnquist characterized the actions of the arresting officers as "com-
munity caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or
acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute." 413 U.S. at 441.
The activity of the police thus constituted what might be called an "administrative
intrusion" in the course of which incriminating evidence was found. The Court refused
to rule on whether this intrusion constituted a search. 413 U.S. at 442 & n. Instead,
the majority stated that the police were justified in opening the trunk because their
actions were reasonable in light of their "caretaking function."
By placing the privacy interests of the individual below the general needs of the
police, Dombrowski casts doubt on whether any privacy interest attaches to automo-
biles which daily come in contact with police. However, no Supreme Court case has
yet removed the privacy interest in automobiles which are parked on private property.
For discussion of the nature of the privacy interest, see Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J.
475 (1968). See also Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, Part III,
87 HRv. L. RaV. 835 (1974).
21265 U.S. 57 (1924).
22M. at 59.
nThe Court noted that the jug was found on land owned by the petitioner's father.
Id. at 58. Thus, the rationale for the decision arose not from the public nature of the
land on which the jug was found, but from the fact that the jug was visible to the
general public.
2 The Hester rule was applied to contraband placed inside an open boat in United
States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927). The justification for the discovery came from the
fact that, "[flor aught that appears, the cases of liquor were on deck and, like the
defendant, were discovered before the motor boat was boarded." 274 U.S. at 563.
In Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), police had legitimately entered an apart-
ment pursuant to an arrest. While standing in an interior hallway, they saw contra-
band in an adjoining room. A majority of the Court held that when police are present
in connection with a legitimate purpose, they can seize that which is clearly in view.
Id. at 43.
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The Supreme Court first applied the plain view doctrine to the
seizure of evidence from an automobile in Harris v. United States. 5
The petitioner in Harris had been arrested for robbery, and his car
had been impounded as evidence. A police officer opened a door of
the impounded car in order to roll up the window and found a regis-
tration card which was later introduced at the petitioner's trial. The
Court upheld the admission of the card into evidence, stating that,
"[i]t has long been settled that objects falling into plain view of an
officer who has the right to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be introduced in evidence." 6 The readily observable portion of
the interior of an individual's car, then, is not normally within the
constitutionally protected zone.
A major criterion necessary for the application of the plain view
doctrine that arose from the decisions in Hester and Harris is that the
officer must have been lawfully in a position to observe the contra-
band or evidence. When an officer is standing on a public street, as
in the typical traffic confrontation, the legitimacy of the officer's
presence is manifest. However, when an officer enters onto private
property and discovers evidence or contraband, the legitimacy of his
presence must be established by some independent doctrine such as
invitation," hot pursuit,2 or a valid warrant for arrest.
29
-390 U.S. 234 (1968).
"Id. at 236.
2In Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301 (9th Cir. 1964), police officers had been
invited into the petitioner's home by his eight year old daughter. Once inside, they saw
marijuana lying in a wastebasket. The court upheld the subsequent seizure of the
marijuana, stating: "This case is distinguished ...by the entirely peaceful and in-
vited entry into the home, with no search or intent to search in the minds of the officers
upon entry." Id. at 305.
In a recent case, the California Court of Appeals upheld the seizure of contraband
discovered after enforcement officers had tricked the petitioner into inviting them into
his apartment where he was giving a party. Willis v. California, (unpublished decision,
Jan. 16, 1974), noted in 43 U.S.L.W. 3110 (U.S. Aug. 27, 1974), cert. denied, 43
U.S.L.W. 3212 (Oct. 15, 1974).
1In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), police pursued a holdup suspect into
his house and, while trying to locate the suspect or accomplices, found evidence which
was later used to convict the petitioner of armed robbery. The Court upheld the
discovery stating that, "Neither the entry without warrant to search for the robber,
nor the search for him without warrant was invalid. Under the circumstances of this
case, 'the exigencies of the situation made the course imperative.' "Id. at 298, quoting
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
An analogous situation occurs when police discover evidence of a crime while
responding to an emergency situation. In United States v. Barone, 330 F.2d 543 (2nd
Cir.) cert. denied, 377 U.S. 1004 (1964), police forced entry into the petitioner's apart-
ment after hearing screams from within.
The court held that the discovery of the evidence was valid under the plain view
doctrine because: "The right of the police to enter and investigate in an emergency
without the accompanying intent to either search or arrest is inherent in the very
nature of their duties as peace officers and derives from the common law." Id. at 545.
"See United States v. Thweatt, 433 F.2d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which the court
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In Bradshaw, failure to establish the legitimacy of the agent's
presence rendered application of the plain view doctrine improper.
The Fourth Circuit found that the agent was physically intruding
into the petitioner's constitutionally protected zone of privacy when
he saw the moonshine and that his actions therefore constituted a
search." The court examined each stage of the officer's movements
and decided that up to and including the moment when the federal
agent smelled the liquor, his presence was justified pursuant to a
legitimate effort to question the petitioner regarding a suspicious
vehicle in the nearby woods .3 The court determined, however, that
after he smelled the liquor and altered his course in order to peer
inside the truck, he could no longer rely upon the original reason for
his entry to justify his presence. The agent's action in deviating from
the path directly to the rear door of the house and instead moving
deliberately toward the truck was viewed as an intrusion unrelated
to his attempt to question the petitioner.
Judge Winter, writing for the majority, noted that the liquor had
been placed in the back of the truck where it could not be seen unless
"special pains" were taken to find it.31 In other words, the liquor had
been hidden intentionally.3 The court implied that if the liquor had
held that:
[I]t is well within the criteria of existing cases for the police to seize
fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of crime which they recognize to
be of importance to the prosecution of the arrestee when the items
involved are in the plain view of the police when they enter the prem-
ises to make the arrest ... armed with an arrest warrant, as in the
present case ....
Id. at 1232.
3The majority stated: "[W]e believe that when Agent Williams looked through
the crack between the closed rear doors of the truck, he 'searched' the truck within
the meaning of the fourth amendment." 490 F.2d at 1101.
3The court stated that:
They were clearly entitled to go onto defendant's premises in order to
question him concerning the abandoned vehicle near his property.
Furthermore, we cannot say that Agent Williams exceeded the scope
of his legitimate purpose for being there by walking around to the back
door when he was unable to get an answer at the front door.
It follows that Agent Williams got within smelling range of the
truck in which the liquor was found without unjustifiably intruding
into the defendant's fourth amendment zone of privacy.
Id. at 1100.
1Judge Winter stated that: "Objects lying on the bed of the truck could not be
seen except by someone who took special pains to look through the crack." Id. at 1101.
3The very fact that an individual tries to conceal an object arguably establishes
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been concealed in a truck on a public street the agent's actions might
have been justified. The court emphasized, however, that since the
petitioner's truck was parked adjacent to his house, his expectation
of privacy against visual intrusion was reasonable." An examination
of the truck beyond the unavoidable contact with smell was therefore
unjustifiable under the plain view doctrine. 5
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Widener maintained that it was not
necessary to examine the agent's action in approaching and examin-
ing the truck. Instead he contended that the plain view doctrine was
satisfied when the agent smelled the moonshine liquor." While the
majority had held that smelling the liquor constituted mere probable
a constitutionally protected privacy interest. See note 17 supra. One commentator,
noting the general assumption among automobile users that what goes on inside a car
is private, argues that a search of a car violates a "social expectation of secrecy." Note,
Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HAv. L. Rzv. 835, 840-41
(1974).
31The majority found that: "The truck was parked on defendant's property very
near to his residence. Under such circumstances, the defendant had a reasonable
expectation that the contents of his truck would remain unknown to the general pub-
lic." 490 F.2d at 1101.
nOne test of the plain view doctrine which the Fourth Circuit chose not to consider
was the inadvertence test. In Coolidge v. United States, 403 U.S. 443 (1970), Justice
Stewart stated that, "the discovery of evidence in plain view must be inadvertant."
Id. at 469. Only three other Justices concurred with Justice Stewart on this point,
however. See note 56 infra. Therefore, the inadvertance test is far from being settled
law. The Bradshaw majority noted that the circuits are split on the application of this
potential requirement. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the use of the
inadvertance requirement in Martinez v. Turner, 461 F.2d 261 (10th Cir. 1972), in
which police went to the petitioner's house ostensibly to question him but clearly with
the intention of obtaining a coat which they "discovered" during the course of the
questioning.
The District of Columbia Circuit has taken the opposite approach. In United
States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971), police had probable cause to believe
that a certain garage contained a stolen automobile engine. To confirm their suspi-
cions, the police approached the garage and, shining a flashlight through a narrow
crack in the doors, observed evidence of the crime. Citing its earlier decision in Dorsey
v. United States, 372 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1967), the court upheld the plain view
argument, stating: "If policemen are to serve any purpose of detecting and preventing
crime by being out on the streets at all, they must be able to take a closer look at
challenging situations as they encounter them." 449 F.2d at 1357. Similarly, United
States v. McMillon, 350 F. Supp. 593 (D.D.C. 1972) involved the confiscation of home-
grown mhrijuana. In order to observe the contraband, the police had to climb a neigh-
bor's porch and lean out around a dividing wall. The court upheld the plain view
argument. The majority stated that it did not have to consider the inadvertance test
since the police had not physically intruded onto the defendant's property. Id. at 596.
See also 490 F.2d at 1101 n.3.
"Judge Widener stated that: "ITihe evidence was lawfully seized under the plain
view exception, or as phrased by this circuit without mentioning plain view, 'probable
cause for the search complained of.'" 490 F.2d at 1104.
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cause for a search,37 Judge Widener contended that olfactory detec-
tion was essentially the same as discovery.
38
The majority specifically held that the identification of the odor
did not rise to the level of discovery. Noting that olfactory detection
was not within the traditional concept of "plain view," Judge Winter
held that the sense of smell could not be substituted for the sense of
sight. Central to the court's reasoning was the fact that recognition
of an odor does not conclusively establish the existence of the object,
particularly a movable object. The majority observed that moonshine
whiskey could recently have been removed.from the truck, leaving
only the lingering aroma.39 The court reasoned that before the contra-
37he majority ruled that:
The liquor was certainly not in "plain view" within the ordinary
meaning of that phrase, when Agent Williams first detected the odor
emanating from the truck. Nor did he, at that point, have any basis
on which to conclude, with certainty, that liquor was actually present
in the truck. . . . Agent Williams thus had no more than a reasonable
ground to infer the presence of liquor at this point.
Id. at i101.
38Judge Widener agreed with the government that the primary act of discovery was
the smelling of the contraband and that the visual inspection was a mere confirmatory
gesture. Brief for Appellee, United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974).
Judge Widener approached the question of discovery from a "totality of facts and
circumstances" standpoint which had earlier been used by the Fourth Circuit in
United States v. Gills, 357 F.2d 299 (4th Cir. 1965). In Gills, police had stopped the
petitioner, whom they suspected of using a legally closed highway to transport moon-
shine liquor. The agents smelled moonshine emanating from the trunk of the peti-
tioner's car and the court held that this, along with the petitioner's attempt to run
away, gave probable cause to search the car.
However, Judge Widener's reliance both on Gills and on the totality of facts and
circumstances test is seemingly misplaced. In Gills, the totality of facts and circum-
stances was not the test of discovery or of the applicability of the plain view exception
but, rather, of the existence of probable cause to search. 357 F.2d at 302. The court in
Gills recognized that a search had taken place, and upheld the search under the
automobile exception. Id.
A totality of circumstances test is inappropriate for application of the plain view
doctrine. Unlike a doctrine such as the automobile exception, which involves a choice
between competing interests, see cases cited at note 64 infra, the plain view doctrine
does no more than admit the existence of a particular fact; that the officer has, without
intruding upon a citizen's privacy, come within plain view of contraband or evidence.
Therefore it is unnecessary to look at a totality of circumstances in order to judge the
worth of the competing interests. Rather, the court must determine the applicability
of the plain view doctrine to the single instant when discovery took .place. Judge
Widener's totality of circumstances test was unworkable as a determinant of plain
view.
,The facts of the case bear out the majority's observation. The abandoned auto-
mobile, situated outside the petitioner's property, which had prompted the entry onto
the petitioner's property because it smelled like whiskey was in fact bereft of liquor,
as the agents discovered upon their return.
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band could be discovered, the agent had to confirm its presence vis-
ually.
Although the court in Bradshaw did not cite any precedent for its
decision regarding smell, the Supreme Court reached a similar result
in Taylor v. United States.45 In that case, federal prohibition officers
smelled the aroma of liquor emanating from boxes stored in a garage.
The officers tore the boxes open, revealing numerous cases of whis-
key. The court rejected the use of the contraband as evidence: "Prohi-
bition officers may rely on a distinctive odor as a physical fact indica-
tive of possible crime; but its presence alone does not strip the owner
of a building of constitutional guarantees against unreasonable
search."'" The Fourth Circuit's decision thus reflects a traditional
approach to the importance of smell in searches and seizures.
Judge Widener's contention that plain view can be established by
olfactory discovery is somewhat novel, yet the identification of a par-
ticular odor, especially when made by a qualified individual, can be
the basis for probable cause to search, as the majority determined in
Bradshaw.42 Indeed, it is often possible that an officer can identify a
substance more accurately on the basis of smell than on the basis of
sight.4 3 The positive nature of certain olfactory determinations has
led some courts in the past to elevate these determinations to a level
higher than probable cause, justifying the visual searches for detected
items as mere confirmatory gestures.4
40286 U.S. 1 (1932).
4 Id. at 6.4 lThe majority stated: "We have no doubt that, at the point at which Agent
Williams smelled the distinctive oder of moonshine whiskey emanating from the truck,
he had probable cause to believe that the truck contained contraband." 490 F.2d at
1101.
'3This argument is put forth vigorously in the government's petition for certiorari
which states that:
[A] visual observation may be mistaken: the clear liquid in the jugs
might have turned out to be water. The frustration of the evidence of
the senses is unlikely in either case, but it is possible in both. Confir-
mation (also by the senses) is needed in either case: the smell was
confirmed by a sighting, just as sighting is commonly confirmed by a
smelling or tasting. If anything, the sense of smell is more reliable
than sight in identifying the presence of whiskey, for it is easy to
imagine ways in which one might be mistaken in a sighting, but the
smell by an experienced law enforcement officer was conclusive proof
that there was some whiskey present, if only in a vapor state.
(Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8-9), United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th
Cir. 1974).
"In the case of United States v. Lopez-Ortiz, 492 F.2d 109 (5th Cir. 1974), the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals found the plain view doctrine applicable where an officer's
sense of smell indicated that marijuana was present inside several gunnysacks. In
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
The majority in Bradshaw nevertheless rejected such a result,
finding that the need for confirmation proved the speciousness of the
plain smell argument." The Fourth Circuit's decision was thus com-
pelled by a close analysis of the two modes of perception. The preci-
sion of the olfactory sense was unimportant to the court, which rea-
soned that while sight yielded absolute proof of the existence of an
object in a particular place, smell did not. Thus in the majority's
opinion, detection of an aroma, like information from a reliable in-
formant," does no more than increase the probability that an illegal
substance may be found. Discovery-that confrontation which auto-
matically removes the protection of the fourth amendment-does not
take place until the object or substance is actually seen. An opposite
holding would overlook the physical limitations of the sense of smell
and create widespread abuse of olfactory detection in such places as
hotels, dormitories, and other locations where the actual source of an
odor may be difficult to determine. In Bradshaw, then, the integrity
of the plain view doctrine was preserved by limiting its application.
Having decided that the plain view doctrine was inapplicable and
that the agent's activity therefore constituted a search, the court
considered the second justification for the agent's actions-the auto-
mobile exception." The automobile exception is one of a few narrowly
defined doctrines allowing circumvention of the fourth amendment
warrant requirement.48 The exception provides that if probable cause
Johnson v. United States, 162 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1947), the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals upheld the warrantless entry onto the petitioner's premises, and the subse-
quent arrest of the petitioner, on the grounds that the arresting officers had smelled
opium coming from her apartment. This decision was later reversed by the Supreme
Court in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). In Taylor v. United States, 55
F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1932), the Fourth Circuit upheld the seizure of evidence discovered
by smell alone stating that: "It is too well determined to require argument that know-
ledge of a crime may be acquired through the sense of smell alone." Id. at 59, quoting,
DePazer v. United States, 34 F.2d 275, 276 (4th Cir. 1929). Taylor was reversed by the
Supreme Court as well. See text accompanying notes 40 to 41 supra.
' The majority stated that: "Agent Williams thus had no more than a reasonable
ground to infer the presence of liquor at this point. A further visual observation was
necessary to confirm the hypothesis." 490 F.2d at 1101.
"See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
"See note 49 infra.
4"The text of the fourth amendment is divided into two parts. See note 1 supra.
The first part establishes the standard of reasonableness for all searches, while the
second part requires that all warrants be specific and be issued only upon probable
cause. The amendment does not state that all searches and seizures must be accompa-
nied by a warrant.
The general necessity of a warrant for any search of private property predates the
Constitution, see Seymore's Case, 5 Coke's Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604),
and therefore implicitly lies behind the amendment. Nonetheless, the structure of the
19751
460 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXII
exists, an automobile may be searched in certain circumstances with-
out a warrant.49 Historically, the greatest difficulty in applying the
automobile exception has been the identification of those certain
circumstances.
The automobile exception was created by the Supreme Court in
Carroll v. United States." In that case, federal prohibition agents had
stopped a suspected bootlegger on a major highway and had con-
ducted an immediate warrantless search of his car. The Court upheld
the search stating that warrantless searches of automobiles, if
founded upon probable cause, did not violate the fourth amendment.
The Court based its ruling primarily on legislative precedent' and
amendment leaves open the question of whether a search must be accompanied by a
warrant in order to be reasonable, or whether a search which is inherently reasonable
is constitutional despite the lack of a warrant. For a summary of this problem, see
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE CONSTITO'trON OF THE UNITED STATES, 1041
(1973). In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) the Supreme Court ruled that:
[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior ap-
proval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established
and well delineated exceptions.
Id. at 357.
"9The Supreme Court stated in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924) that:
On reason and authority the true rule is that if the search and seizure
without a warrant are made upon probable cause, that is, upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
officer, that an automobile ... contains that which by law is subject
to seizure and destruction, the search and seizure are valid.
Id. at 149.
-267 U.S. 132 (1924).
" tThe search in Carroll was carried out pursuant to the National Prohibition Act
of 1919, ch. 85, § 26, 41 Stat. 315, which provided:
When the commissioner, his assistants, inspectors, or any officer of
the law shall discover any person in the act of transporting in violation
of the law, intoxicating liquors in any wagon, buggy, automobile,
water or air craft, or other vehicle, it shall be his duty to seize any...
intoxicating liquors found therein being transported contrary to law.
The Sherman Amendment to the National Prohibition Act, ch. 134, § 6, 42 Stat. 223
(1921), provided by implication for the warrantless search of moving vehicles. The Act
stated in pertinent part:
[A]ny officer, agent, or employee of the United States engaged in the
enforcement of this Act, or the National Prohibition Act, or any other
law of the United States, who shall search any private dwelling ...
without a warrant directing such search, or who while so engaged shall
without a search warrant, maliciously and without reasonable cause
search any other building or property, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor. ...
(emphasis added). During the shuttling of changes between houses of Congress in the
passage of this Act, the House Committee in charge of the Amendment refused to
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did not consider the scope of the exception that it was creating.
Nonetheless, the facts of the case and the Court's statement that "in
cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable it
must be used" indicated that there were limitations to the Carroll
rule.
Subsequent Supreme Court decisions attempted to define these
limitations in order to facilitate application of the automobile excep-
tion.52 As a result, the exception has been limited to those situations
in which warrantless searches are necessitated by the presence of
"exigent circumstances.""3 Although exigency is a rather ambiguous
broaden the liability of police to include searches of non-dwellings. The language used
by the committee was specific:
The Constitution does not forbid search, as some parties contend, but
it does forbid unreasonable search. [A warrant requirement for all
searches] will make it impossible to stop the rum-running automo-
biles engaged in like illegal traffic. It would take from the officers the
power that they absolutely must have to be of any service, for if they
cannot search for liquor without a warrant they might as well be
discharged. It is impossible to get a warrant to stop an automobile.
Before a warrant could be secured the automobile would be beyond
the reach of the officer with its load of illegal liquor disposed of.
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 146 (1924). Noting that the Act contemplated
warrantless searches of non-dwellings, the Court in Carroll surveyed previous legisla-
tion and concluded that certain warrantless searches of vehicles in transit had been
approved by acts of Congress ever since the signing of the Bill of Rights. Faced with
the alternative of overruling 150 years of legislative precedent, the Court held that
warrantless searches of automobiles were constitutional. Id. at 149.
5In Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931), officers, acting on a tip, staked
out an unoccupied car until the petitioner and two companions arrived and entered
the vehicle. The officers immediately ordered the occupants to get out, after which the
officers searched the car, finding illegal liquor. The Court cited Carroll for the simple
proposition that "[t]he Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the search, without
warrant, of an automobile, for liquor illegally transported or possessed, if the search is
upon probable cause," 282 U.S. at 700, but found it necessary to justify searching after
enough time had elapsed to obtain a warrant by noting that there existed a risk of loss
of evidence. The Court stated that:
The search was not unreasonable, because, as petitioners'argue, suffi-
cient time elapsed between the receipt by the officer of the informa-
tion and the search of the car to have enabled him to procure a search
warrant. He could not know when Husty would come to the car or how
soon it would be removed. In such circumstances, we do not think the
officers should be required to speculate upon the chances of success-
fully carrying out the search, after the delay and withdrawal from the
scene of one or more officers which would have been necessary to
procure a warrant.
Id. at 701. Similarly, in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the Court
interpreted Carroll as applying specifically to cars moving on an open highway.
5Exigency was first acknowledged as a prerequisite to a search in Preston v.
United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964). In that case, police searched an impounded car
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test, the concept was clarified somewhat by the Court's decision in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire.4 In Coolidge the petitioner had been
arrested peacefully in his home after having been under suspicion for
three weeks in connection with a local murder. The petitioner's car
was seized at the time of the arrest and taken to the police station
where it was searched.5 The Court held that the circumstances sur-
rounding the search could not justify the application of the automo-
bile exception. Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality of the Court,56
examined the facts of Carroll in an effort to find the true rule of that
case and listed certain exigent circumstances which justified the ap-
plication of the Carroll exception. Those circumstances included: (1)
an alerted criminal; (2) a fleeting opportunity to search; (3) the pres-
ence of contraband or stolen goods or weapons; (4) nearby confeder-
ates; or, (5) the inconvenience of posting a police detail to guard the
automobile while a warrant was obtained.57 While these circumstan-
ces were not characterized as absolute tests, their complete absence
in Coolidge precluded the use of the automobile exception. However,
after arresting its occupants for vagrancy. The search produced evidence which eventu-
ally led to convictions on charges of conspiracy to rob a federally insured bank. The
Court held that the search was invalid because it was removed from the time and place
of the arrest. Although the greater portion of the opinion dealt with the "arrest excep-
tion," the Court ruled that Carroll could not apply because there was no danger that
the vehicle would be driven out of the jurisdiction. 376 U.S. at 368. The Court dealt
with the automobile as a means by which the suspect could thwart the efforts of law
enforcement officials.
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), police stopped the petitioner's car
on suspicion of armed robbery. Finding that the petitioner and two of the three other
occupants of the car fit eyewitness descriptions of suspected felons, the police arrested
all four men and impounded the car. Incriminating evidence was found during a
warrantless search of the impounded vehicle. The Court held that something more
than probable cause was required to justify the search. The additional element which
would justify pre-emption of the judicial process was framed in terms of exigency:
In enforcing the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, the Court has insisted upon probable cause
as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the
Constitution. As a general rule, it has also required the judgment of a
magistrate on the probable-qause issue and the issuance of a warrant
before a search is made. Only in exigent circumstances will the judg-
ment of the police as to probable cause serve as a sufficient authoriza-
tion for a search.
399 U.S. at 51.
043 U.S. 443 (1971).
"Id. at 447-48.
"Justice Stewart wrote the opinion of the Court in which Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan, and Marshall concurred. Justice Harlan concurred in the result but dissented
from most of Justice Stewart's opinion including those portions dealing with plain view
and with the automobile exception.
11403 U.S. at 462.
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the plurality gave no indication whether the presence of only one or
two of the requirements would justify a warrantless search.
In Bradshaw the Fourth Circuit was faced with the problem of
deciding which of the Coolidge circumstances would have to be pres-
ent before the automobile exception could apply. After reviewing the
facts, the majority held that only two of the five circumstances men-
tioned in Coolidge were present: the object of the search was contra-
band; and the officers would have been inconvenienced by the need
to obtain a warrant." One of those two requirements was of no im-
portance since the Supreme Court had rejected the distinction be-
tween contraband and evidence as far as searches were concerned.5 9
Therefore, the only circumstance in Bradshaw which might have con-
stituted exigency was the inconvenience to which the agents would
be subjected while a warrant was being obtained.
The Fourth Circuit did not doubt that the necessity of obtaining
a warrant would have created inconvenience for the agents." With
the petitioner in the area, one or more of the agents would have had
to stand guard to prevent the removal of the automobile while the
warrant was obtained. Indeed, the inconvenience of posting a guard
would be present in virtually all searches of automobiles." The court
refused to find exigency in so common a situation, reasoning that if
mere inconvenience could justify the application of the automobile
exception, then the Coolidge exigent circumstances test was essen-
tially meaningless. 2 Thus the court abandoned a simplistic reliance
11490 F.2d at 1102.
51In Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) the Court stated that:
Nothing in the language of the Fourth Amendment supports the dis-
tinction between "mere evidence" and instrumentalities, fruits of
crime, or contraband. On its face, the provision assures the "right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
*. . ," without regard to the use to which any of these things are
applied. This "right of the people" is certainly unrelated to the "mere
evidence" limitation. Privacy is disturbed no more by a search di-
rected ... to an instrumentality, fruit, or contraband .... Nothing
in the nature of property seized as evidence renders it more private
than property seized, for example, as an instrumentality; quite the
opposite may be true. Indeed, the distinction is wholly irrational. ...
Id. at 301-02.
uJudge Winter stated that "the guarding of the truck by two of the officers while
the third went to obtain a warrant would have involved some inconvenience." 490 F.2d
at 1102.
'The court stated that: "In the first place, the inconvenience of standing guard
over a vehicle while another officer obtains a warrant is likely to be present in most
automobile searches." Id.
2The majority noted that "[i]t is unlikely that the plurality thought that they
were authorizing warrantless searches in such a large proportion of possible
cases. . . ." Id.
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on the mere presence of inconvenience and chose instead to analyze
the importance of the inconvenience. In so doing, the majority scruti-
nized the underlying purpose of the five-fold Coolidge test in order
to determine whether the nature of the inconvenience in Bradshaw
would satisfy that purpbse.
The majority found that the five facts considered by the Coolidge
plurality were basically indicators of risk. Individually and collec-
tively, the factors pointed to the presence or absence of a threat that
the contraband would be removed if the search was not conducted
immediately. Thus the court determined that the underlying purpose
of the automobile exception was to prevent the loss of contraband or
evidence. 3 Indeed, the Supreme Court's discussion in Coolidge re-
veals a pervasive concern with the question of risk and with those
circumstances which create a potential for removal of the contraband
or evidence." Recognizing this concern, the Bradshaw majority
adopted a risk of loss standard as the test of exigency65 and held that
inconvenience alone did not constitute an exigent circumstance.
The Bradshaw court took a large step in extracting the risk of loss
standard from Coolidge. Although it appears that avoiding such risk
has long been the silent purpose underlying the application of the
automobile exception by the Supreme Court, the Coolidge plurality
refrained from outright reliance on that standard. Recent decisions
in other circuits, as Judge Winter noted, have held that inconveni-
ence alone is enough to justify application of the automobile excep-
tion.6 Nonetheless, the majority found risk of loss to be the touch-
stone of the Coolidge test and was unable to find sufficient justifica-
tion for deviating from this general rationale in reliance upon any
single Coolidge factor.
In apparent conflict with the Fourth Circuit's resolution in
Bradshaw, four recent decisions have held that inconvenience consti-
tuted sufficient exigency to warrant the application of the automobile
exception. 7 Of those cases, the most significant is the Ninth Circuit's
decision in United States v. Connally.6" In Connally, federal agents
61The court stated that "we are not persuaded that this [Carroll, Coolidge] line
of cases has been abandoned or overruled. Therefore, we are constrained to conclude
that this search was invalid." Id. at 1103.
"See 403 U.S. at 458-61.
'lhe majority found that, "it is clear that [the Supreme Court's] conception of
the rationale underlying the exception is based on the risk of loss of evidence." 490 F.2d
at 1102.
"People v. Dumas, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 9 Cal.3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208 (1974); United
States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Connolly, 479 F.2d
930 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Bukoski, 41 Mich. App. 498, 200 N.W.2d 373 (1972).
"See cases cited at note 66 supra.
"479 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1973).
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who had staked out the petitioner's home arrested the petitioner as
he was leaving his car. An immediate, warrantless search of the vehi-
cle resulted in the discovery of four ounces of cocaine. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit held that the enforcement officials were not required
to post guard in order to obtain a warrant." Judge Winter noted in
Bradshaw, that "the Connally case flatly holds that the inconveni-
ence of posting a guard is an exigent circumstance that justifies dis-
pensing with the warrant requirement."7 Connally is distinguishable
from Bradshaw, however, in that it involved a high risk of loss. The
police knew that the petitioner was about to meet an accomplice. The
whereabouts of the accomplice were unknown, but his imminent ar-
rival was certain. The Ninth Circuit found that the accomplice posed
a severe threat to the success of the police efforts. Thus Connally is
not diametrically opposed to Bradshaw, but represents a case involv-
ing the present threat of loss as contemplated by the Supreme Court's
decision in Coolidge.
Although the inconvenience factor was emphasized in the
Connally case, the rationale of the decision was the prevention of the
risk of loss. The other cases mentioned by the Bradshaw majority
reveal the same concern despite their use of inconvenience as a label
for justification.7 1 In each case, the underlying consideration of the
court was focused on the possibility of loss of the evidence or harm
to the police. This preoccupation with risk, which inheres in all Su-
preme Court cases dealing with automobile searches, 7 indicates that
Bradshaw's reliance on the risk of loss standard is not as novel as it
might initially appear. Rather, Bradshaw has drawn forth the grava-
men of the automobile exception argument.
"In Connolly the court held that, "under Chambers, the police are not required
to post a guard around the car in such circumstances." 479 F.2d at 935.
11490 F.2d at 1103.
"In People v. Bukoski, 41 Mich. App. 498, 200 N.W.2d 373 (1972) police had
probable cause to believe that the trunk of the petitioner's car contained stolen over-
coats. After finding and arresting the petitioner, the police searched the car without a
warrant. In upholding the search, the court held that the presence of the petitioner in
the vicinity of the car warranted the use of the automobile exception. In fact, the court
held that Bukoski on its facts was indistinguishable from Carroll and Chambers.
People v. Dumas, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 512 P.2d 1208 (1973), involved a
search of an apartment pursuant to a valid warrant which led to a warrantless search
of the petitioner's car. Once again, the need to obtain a warrant would have created
more than mere inconvenience. A companion of the petitioner was found in his apart-
ment and could not be arrested under the warrant. The court stated that the presence
of the companion created a real threat of loss of evidence had the car not been searched
immediately. Similarly, in United States v. Bozada, 473 F.2d 389 (8th Cir. 1973) the
police staked out a house-trailer and conducted a warrantless search when the peti-
tioner arrived. The ready mobility of the trailer and the presence of confederates were
the circumstances which persuaded the court that the search was legitimate.
72See notes 51-55 supra and accompanying text.
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The innovative aspect of the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Bradshaw is the articulation of, and manifest reliance on, the risk of
loss standard. Coincident with this innovation, the Fourth Circuit
has abandoned a direct reliance on the five factors listed in Coolidge.
Bradshaw has rejected a pidgeon-holing technique and made the risk
of loss standard an over-all principle for independent interpretation
of the facts in a given case.
Although the Bradshaw majority concerned itself only with the
inconvenience factor, it is likely that, in subsequent decisions in the
Fourth Circuit, the presence of elements satisfying the other require-
ments of Coolidge may not justify the application of the automobile
exception if those elements fall short of indicating the existence of
risk. For instance, the presence of confederates may not suffice to
trigger the exception if it would be impossible for those confederates
actually to enter the car. The presence of an alerted criminal may be
insufficient if he would be physically incapable of removing the vehi-
cle. While the existence of circumstances satisfying the five-fold
Coolidge test may create a presumption of exigency, it will not sup-
port the application of the automobile exception unless those circum-
stances are such as to imply the risk of loss.
In short, the Fourth Circuit has enunciated the underlying ration-
ale of Coolidge, revealing the true rule of warrantless automobile
searches: that they are justified by the presence of an actual threat
to the success of the police efforts, particularly a risk that some per-
son or persons will remove or destroy the evidence before a warrant
can be obtained. The reasoning in Bradshaw effectively rejects the
five criteria mentioned by Coolidge as factors independently estab-
lishing exigency. While they are indications that exigency may exist,
they should not, in and of themselves, be conclusive. Bradshaw has
replaced the Coolidge criteria with the broader question of risk, which
more precisely reflects the purpose of the automobile exception.
Thus, in the future, the Fourth Circuit will analyze the totality
of the circumstances in a given case in order to decide whether the
searching officers were faced with a situation threatening the evi-
dence or the officers themselves. If such a threat existed, the exigency
test will have been met. If such a threat did not exist, the presence
of factors satisfying one or more of the Coolidge criteria will not alter
the consequent failure of the exigency requirement. Certainly incon-
venience alone will never be cause for the application of the automo-
bile exception. Where there is no reason to suspect that someone will
attempt to remove or destroy the evidence, a warrant will have to be
obtained prior to searching an automobile. If the posting of a guard
is all that stands between an immediate search and a warrant, a
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guard must be posted. Otherwise the search, conducted without a
warrant, is unconstitutional and the fruits thereof are inadmissable
as evidence. 3
Conclusion
In Bradshaw, the Fourth Circuit held that the disputed evidence
was the fruit of an unconstitutional intrusion into the petitioner's
zone of privacy. The majority held that the agent's actions, in ap-
proaching the truck and peering between the rear doors, constituted
a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment since he had
gone beyond the legitimate purpose of his entry onto the petitioner's
land. In arriving at its decision, the court faced and rejected the
argument that the whiskey was in the plain view of the agent when
he detected its aroma. Had the olfactory detection constituted dis-
covery, the subsequent seizure of the evidence would have been justi-
fied under the plain view doctrine.
Thus, the court recognized a constitutional difference between the
senses of sight and smell for purposes of the fourth amendment. Not-
ing that sight provides indisputable evidence of the existence of an
object within an otherwise protected zone, the court held that detec-
tion by smell alone cannot justify an intrusion onto personal property
to seize evidence believed to be present. Such a narrow construction
of the rule is clearly warranted. If the court accepted the contention
that "there should be no constitutional priority among the senses""
the plain view doctrine would metastasize to the point where it would
threaten a broad range of fourth amendment safeguards. Instead,
Bradshaw has limited the plain view doctrine to situations involving
visual observation.
7 5
13Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
7'Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 8, United States v. Bradshaw, 490 U.S. 1097
(4th Cir. 1974).
7'In the recent Fourth Circuit case of United States v. Sifuentes, 504 F.2d 845
(4th Cir. 1974), Judge Butzner, writing for the court, relied heavily on the accuracy of
olfactory discovery in upholding the search of several cartons under the plain view
doctrine. In Sifuentes, police who legitimately entered a truck which the petitioner was
renting were able to smell marijuana vapors emanating from several cartons sitting
inside the truck. They immediately opened the cartons finding a quantity of marijuana
therein.
Sifuentes is clearly distinguishable from Bradshaw however. In Sifuentes, the
police did not enter the petitioner's zone of privacy on the basis of an identifiable odor.
When they smelled the marijuana they were already legitimately inside the petitioner's
truck, and they saw containers of a size which indicated with some certainty that the
source of the odor was contained within. Thus, the police did not discover the mari-
juana on the basis of smell alone but by sight as well, just as they might "see"
moonshine whiskey inside opaque jugs.
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The Fourth Circuit also held that the search could not be justified
on the basis of the automobile exception. The court based its rejec-
tion on the absence of exigent circumstances that would justify the
application of the exception. In analyzing the question of exigency,
the Fourth Circuit examined the Supreme Court's attempts to define
the exigency requirement. In Coolidge the Court had offered five
factual criteria indicating the presence of exigency. Looking beyond
these five criteria, the Bradshaw majority found that the essence of
the exigent circumstances requirement involved the risk of loss of the
evidence or harm to the police.
The Fourth Circuit adopted the general standard of risk of loss,
rather than pidgeon-holing the facts under one of the Coolidge cri-
teria. Consequently, none of the Coolidge criteria will, in and of
themselves, sustain the application of the automobile exception in
the future. The direct result of abandoning a literal interpretation of
Coolidge has been to eliminate inconvenience as a justification for
application of the automobile exception. Instead, Bradshaw has in-
sured that the by-pass of the judicial process will be a matter of need
rather than a matter of preference on the part of the police.
For now, two avenues of encroachment upon the protections of the
fourth amendment, common to situations involving automobiles,
have been blocked off. The plain view doctrine will not extend beyond.
actual visual contact with the object or objects seized. The automo-
bile exception will apply only where a risk of loss compels its applica-
tion. These clear limitations contributed by the decision in United
States v. Bradshaw are a sign that the Fourth Circuit may be moving
toward greater clarity in the application of the fourth amendment.
S.G.B.
2. Application of Automobile Exception and Plain View Doc-
trine to Justify Warrantless Seizure of Evidence Inside Car
Parked in Public Place-Smith v. Slayton, 484 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir.
1973).
The fourth amendment specifically forbids unreasonable searches
and seizures.' Generally, the Supreme Court has ruled that every
The text of the fourth amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall isue, but upon probable cause,
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search without a warrant is unreasonable per se. 2 However, the Court
has permitted limited exceptions to this per se rule. Most of these
exceptions have a single rationale: only when the necessities of a
particular situation make procuring a warrant impracticable can evi-
dence properly be seized without a warrant.3 Thus, the exceptions to
the fourth amendment's warrant requirement generally rest on the
premise that "exigent circumstances"' are present.
The fourth amendment also provides that a warrant shall not
issue "but upon probable cause."5 The combination of probable cause
and exigent circumstances produces several, situations in which the
Supreme Court has ruled that a warrantless search is reasonable.
First, a search may be conducted without a warrant if pursuant to a
lawful arrest, provided that the search is properly restricted.6 Second,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
The cases in which the Supreme Court has announced exceptions to the fourth
amendment's warrant requirement have reiterated the point that police must obtain
a warrant if reasonably practicable. Indeed, while defining one of the first exceptions
to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement, the Court was careful to stress that
"where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be used." Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925). In the same year, the Court reaffirmed thc
warrant requirement, noting that probable cause alone is never enough to dispense
with a search warrant. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925). That mere
inconvenience and delay entailed in obtaining a warrant could not overcome the war-
rant requirement was established in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
The Court has consistently held that the warrant requirement can be waived only
where "exigent circumstances" exist which make obtaining a warrant impossible. Tru-
piano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705-08 (1948); McDonald v. United States, 335
U.S. 451, 454-56 (1948). See also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 295-96 (1973); Chimel
v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 759-61 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968); Katz
v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-58 (1967), cf. Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964);
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961). In addition, the Court has indicated
that "the burden is on those seeking [an] exemption [from the warrant requirement]
to show the need for it ... " United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951) (citation
omitted).
Coolidge v. New Hampshirc, 403 U.S. 443, 470-71 (1971); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
The Supreme Court has accepted the constitutional validity of at least two excep-
tions to the warrant requirement where exigent circumstances are not found. The first
is that police may seize abandoned property without a warrant. Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217, 240-41 (1960). Second, a warrant is not required if the party against
whom the evidence is admitted consented to the search. Bumper v. North Carolina,
391 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1968) (consent must be freely and voluntarily given).
'U.S. CONST. amend IV. See note 1 supra.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
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when evidence of a crime is in "plain view" it may be lawfully seized
without a warrant.7 Third, when a policeman reasonably believes that
752 (1969). In Robinson, the Court pointed out that a search incident to lawful arrest
includes the right to search the area within the arrestee's control and a full search of
the arrestee's person. 414 U.S. at 224.
7 An early expression of the "plain view" doctrine was in United States v. Lee,
274 U.S. 559 (1927). In that case, coast guard officers, without first obtaining a war-
rant, seized cartons of illegal whiskey which they had observed on the deck of a ship.
The contraband was admitted as evidence on the theory that the coast guard had not
really searched the defendant's ship at all and that the mobile nature of the ship.
demanded that the evidence be seized immediately. Id. at 563. See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Rios v. United
States, 364 U.S. 253 (1960); Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
The typical case to which the Supreme Court has applied the plain view doctrine
seems to have two essential characteristics. First, the police are in a place where they
have a lawful right to be when they sense the presence of incriminating evidence. This
dispenses with the fourth amendment's requirement of a warrant before undertaking
a search, since the courts have ruled that when evidence is in plain view there is no
search for fourth amendment purposes. Gil v. Beto, 440 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1971);
Walker v. Beto, 437 F.2d 1018 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Marshall v. United States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970); Ponce v.
Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969); Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (lst Cir.
1965). Cf. United States v. Hanahan, 442 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971). For a case which
excludes olfactory sensations from the "plain view" exception see United States v.
Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3225 (Oct. 22, 1974)
which is discussed at Note, 32 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv. 449 (1975).
The second element which is usually present in cases applying the plain view
doctrine is that the circumstances necessitate immediate seizure of the evidence. The
fourth amendment not only proscribes unreasonable searches, it also forbids unreason-
able seizures. The typical plain view situation usually makes examination of this latter
constitutional mandate unnecessary. To be within the police's plain view, incriminat-
ing evidence is usually in an exposed position where there is danger that it will be
destroyed or removed if not seized immediately. Thus, most plain view situations
present the "exigent circumstances" required before the guarantees of the fourth
amendment concerning unreasonable seizures may be disregarded. See note 5 supra.
Both characteristics of the typical situation to which the plain view doctrine has
been applied-lawful police action and exigent circumstances-are seen in the doc-
trine's three most common manifestations. First, evidence may be said to enter the
realm of plain view when law enforcement officers have a valid warrant to search for
specified evidence of one crime and unexpectedly come across evidence of another
crime. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Steele v.
United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925).
Second, the plain view rule may cover those incriminating observations legiti-
mately made in the course of a hot pursuit. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967);
Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
Third, during a properly restricted search incident to lawful arrest, officers may
gather evidence admissible under the plain view rule. United States v. Robinson, 414
U.S. 218 (1974); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), Mr. Justice Stewart suggested
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a crime is being committed, or is about to be committed, and that
the suspected criminal is armed, he may stop and frisk the suspect
without first obtaining a warrant.8 Finally, in certain circumstances
the Supreme Court has excepted automobiles from the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement.' In Smith v. Slayton,'" the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals added a new dimension to the special status
accorded automobiles by the Supreme Court under the fourth
amendment.
The special status of automobiles under the fourth amendment
was first established in Carroll v. United States." Traditionally, the
automobile's mobile nature justified this exemption; 12 the gist of the
that the essence of all situations to which the plain view rule may properly be applied
is the inadvertency of the officer's discovery. In Mr. Justice Stewart's view, any evi-
dence inadvertently discovered by police while acting lawfully may be admitted under
the plain view doctrine. Since only a plurality of the Court agreed with Mr. Justice
Stewart's opinion in Coolidge, it is not binding as law.
However, regardless of how the plain view doctrine is formulated, or to what
situation it is applied, Mr. Justice Stewart did articulate a vital qualification to it:
The limits on the [plain view] doctrine are implicit in the state-
ment of its rationale. The first of these is that plain view alone is never
enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence. This is simply a
corollary of the familiar principle discussed above, that no amount of
probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure absent "exi-
gent circumstances." Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an
incriminating object is on premises belonging to a criminal suspect
may establish the fullest possible measure of probable cause. But even
where the object is contraband, this Court has repeatedly stated and
enforced the basic rule that the police may not enter and make a
warrantless seizure. Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1; Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10; McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451;
Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 497-498; Chapman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 610; Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699.
403 U.S. at 368 (footnote omitted). Thus, the rule is clear. Without exigent circumstan-
ces rendering the procurement of a warrant impracticable, the plain view doctrine
alone does not justify the warrantless seizure of evidence.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
10 484 F.2d 1188 (4th Cir. 1973).
" 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
22 Id. See Note, 32 WASH. & LEE L. Rxv. 449 (1975). Carroll v. United States,
supra, was the genesis of the automobile's special status under the fourth amendment.
Carroll's facts and ultimate holding are closely intertwined with the Prohibition era.
In an area notorious for smuggling, federal officers stopped the car of a known bootleg-
ger and seized contraband liquor without a warrant. Mr. Chief Justice Taft, writing
for the Court, found that the contraband was properly admitted as evidence. Two
grounds justified the warrantless search in Carroll. First, Mr. Chief Justice Taft in-
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rationale for excepting automobiles from the fourth amendment's
warrant requirement was that the automobile's mobility is an inher-
ferred that Congress intended to make a distinction between houses and cars for
purposes of the search warrant requirement. The Stanley Amendment to the Volstead
Act provided that an officer who made a warrantless search of a "dwelling" for contra-
band liquor was guilty of a misdemeanor. Act of Nov. 23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 222.
When the Stanley Amendment was first introduced, it created the misdemeanor of-
fense for the warrantless search of any "property." Because the law was amended to
include only the warrantless searches of "dwellings," Mr. Chief Justice Taft concluded
that Congress specifically excluded automobiles from the scope of the Stanley Amend-
ment. 267 U.S. at 147. Mr. Chief Justice Taft further accepted the constitutional
validity of what he inferred to be Congress' intended distinction between automobiles
and houses. Id.
Mr. Chief Justice Taft's second ground for ruling that the contraband liquor was
properly admitted also established the constitutionality of the distinction between
automobiles and houses for fourth amendment purposes. The Carroll Court analyzed
various statutes passed contemporaneously with the fourth amendment and found that
they exempted ships, horses and other mobile instrumentalities from the warrant
requirement. While the Court in Carroll did not specifically state that mobility was
the heart of the automobile exception, this premise was clearly implied. The Court
declared that "where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must be
used." 267 U.S. at 156. Because the mobility of Carroll's car was the only reason it
was impracticable to obtain a search warrant, one may infer that the car's mobility
was the only exigent circumstance that justified the warrantless search. See, Note,
Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine to Movable Items, 58 IOWA L.
REV. 1134, 1137 (1973).
The Carroll doctrine survived Prohibition. In Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694
(1931), the Supreme Court upheld the admission of evidence obtained in a Carroll
situation without the support of the Volstead Act. Accord, Brinegar v. United States,
338 U.S. 160 (1949).
In Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), the Supreme Court again reaffirmed
and, in fact, actually expanded Carroll. Unlike Carroll, the warrantless search in
Chambers did not take place until the car was already at the police station. The Court
discussed two reasons for admitting evidence obtained from the Chambers search.
First, the police had probable cause to arrest the owner of the car and probable cause
to think that evidence of a robbery was inside the car. Thus it was the combination of
probable cause and exigent circumstances which justified the warrantless search of the
car in Chambers. Mr. Justice White, writing for the Court, held the circumstances
which justify the warrantless search of a car also justify seizing the car without a
warrant until it can be searched at a more convenient time or place. Id. at 42. Or, as
one commentator rather pithily phrased it: " . . . Chambers is Carroll after arrest, at
the station house." Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HAiv.
L. REv. 835, 845 (1974) (footnote omitted).
The Court drew a fine distinction in Chambers between the automobile and the
search incident to lawful arrest exceptions. The search in Chambers was not acceptable
under a search incident to lawful arrest theory. A search at a different time and a
different place than the arrest is not incident to that arrest. Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364, 368 (1964). That a similar result was achieved under the automobile
exception did not trouble the Court. Significantly, the Court in Chambers also reaf-
firmed the requirement of exigent circumstances. 399 U.S. at 51.
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ently exigent circumstance. However, this principle has been modi-
fied in recent years. In fact, the United States Supreme Court has
ruled that a car which is lawfully in police possession, and which is
therefore immobilized, may nevertheless be searched without first
obtaining a warrant.' 3 Thus, until Smith v. Slayton, the warrantless
search of an automobile was permitted only in exigent circumstances,
or when the police had a property interest in the automobile. Smith
v. Slayton permitted a lower standard for determining exigence than
that permitted by any cirjcuit court to rule on a similar issue.
In Smith, the Fourth Circuit held that potentially incriminating
evidence on the front seat of an automobile parked in a public place
was lawfully seized without a warrant. Significantly, the Fourth Cir-
cuit did not require the police to show even the possibility that the
evidence might be moved or destroyed. Indeed, the sole exigent cir-
cumstance mentioned by the Smith court was the "exposed" nature
of the car." Because Smith's car was no more "exposed" than any car
normally parked in a public lot, the Fourth Circuit's holding implied
that potentially incriminating evidence in a car parked in a public
place is not protected by the fourth amendment from warrantless
seizure. Although other circuits have accepted increasingly lower
standards for demonstrating the exigence of particular circumstan-
ces, the Fourth Circuit's rule in Smith v. Slayton was novel in requir-
ing no actual showing of facts making the procurement of a warrant
impracticable. 5
The police in Smith had discovered the sexually molested and
murdered body of a young boy. Following a line-up in which he ap-
peared voluntarily, William Raymond Smith was identified as the
person last seen with the victim. He was immediately arrested and
'1 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967).
" 484 F.2d at 1191.
,S Although the standards for determining whether or not circumstances are suffi-
ciently exigent to dispense with the fourth amendment's warrant requirement have
been lowered, no standard has been as low as that used by the Fourth Circuit in Smith
v. Slayton. The Fourth Circuit cited a recent Ninth Circuit case, United States v.
Cohn, 472 F.2d 290 (9th Cir. 1973), to support the proposition that standards for
showing exigence are being lowered. 484 F.2d at 1191. However, Cohn specifically held
that the vehicle "was subject to being moved again without warning." 472 F.2d at 292.
Accord, United States v. Connolly, 479 F.2d 930 (9th Cir. 1973) (inconvenience of
getting a guard found sufficiently exigent); United States v. Ellis, 461 F.2d 962 (2d Cir.
1972) (two robbers in gang still at large); United States v. Castaldi, 453 F.2d 506 (7th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 992 (1972) (seizure of getaway car justified because
two of a gang of robbers were still at large). See also People v. Bukoski, 41 Mich. App.
498, 200 N.W.2d 373 (1972); Stoddard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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put in jail. The next day, a police officer noticed Smith's car in a
parking lot across the street from the station house. The officer re-
turned to the police station and told the detective in charge of
Smith's case about his discovery. After returning to the car, the de-
tective saw a stained seat cover on the front seat. Suspecting that
the stains were blood, the detective opened the door of Smith's un-
locked car and removed the seat cover. Laboratory tests later proved
the stains to be human blood, but of an indeterminable type. The
trial court admitted the bloodstained seat cover as evidence against
Smith, and he was convicted of murder.
The Smith district court relied on Coolidge v. New Hampshire',
in deciding the issue of whether the bloodstained seat cover was
seized in violation of Smith's rights under the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. In Coolidge, the police seized a murder suspect's car
from his driveway pursuant to an invalid warrant, and the Supreme
Court ruled that vacuum sweepings taken from Coolidge's car were
improperly admitted as evidence against him. The rationale of Mr.
Justice Stewart's plurality opinion in Coolidge was that since the
police had ample time to secure a valid warrant, their failure to
obtain one was inexcusable. For the same reasons, the district court
in Smith ordered a new trial in which neither the seat cover nor the
toxicologist's report could be used as evidence.
In reversing the district court's decision, the Fourth Circuit re-
jected Coolidge as controlling, following instead Cady v.
Dom browski,17 a Supreme Court case decided after the district court's
grant of a new trial in Smith. Dombrowski did not overrule Coolidge
and, in fact, the issues presented in the two cases were quite different.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit found Smith more similar to
Dombrowski than to Coolidge. Judge Butzner, writing for the Fourth
Circuit, predicated his preference for Dom browski on its factual simi-
larity to Smith.'"
Is 403 U.S. 443 (1971). Because Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion on the fourth
amendment issues in Coolidge was supported by only a plurality of the Court, several
state courts have refused to treat the case as binding. North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal.
3d 301, 502 P.2d 1305 (1972); People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d 911, 500 P.2d 2005 (1972).
The only original suggestion in Coolidge, however, was Mr. Justice Stewart's idea that
"inadvertency" was the essence of the plain view doctrine. See note 7 supra. Although
at least one state court has given the two-pronged test of probable cause and exigent
circumstance the name "Carroll-Coolidge" test, Scales v. State, 13 Md. App. 474, 284
A.2d 45 (1971), Coolidge neither expanded nor contracted the Carroll doctrine. The
two-pronged test of probable cause and exigent circumstance was entirely a creature
of Carroll. See note 12 supra.
17 413 U.S. 433 (1973).
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In Dombrowski, police officers in rural Wisconsin arrested the
petitioner for drunken driving. Because it was a nuisance on the
roadside, the police towed Dombrowski's rented car some distance
from the police station to a private garage. The police, at this time,
had no reason to suspect Dombrowski of a serious crime. During an
interview with an assistant district attorney; however, Dombrowski
mentioned that he worked as a policeman in Chicago. Shortly after
this, Dombrowski fell into a coma and the police were, therefore,
unable to interrogate him further. Being "under the impression"' 9
that Chicago police officers always carried their service revolvers, the
arresting police decided to search Dombrowski's car."0 While looking
for the gun, the officers found a blood-spattered flashlight and
bloodstained clothes. Over defense counsel's objection, these items
were admitted as evidence against Dombrowski in his subsequent
trial for murder. In justifying the warrantless search, the police offi-
cers maintained that it was "standard procedure"'" in their depart-
ment to search a car suspected of containing a gun. The Court ac-
cepted the argument that the object or motivation for the search was
to protect the public from the danger of Dombrowski's pistol falling
into irresponsible or malicious hands,n and held the search valid.
In ruling that the bloodstained items removed from Dombrowski's
car were properly admitted as evidence, the Supreme Court focused
on two factual points. First, the Court stressed the fact that the
Wisconsin police "exercised a form of custody or control" ' over Dom-
484 F.2d at 1190.
413 U.S. at 437.
The Wisconsin police in fact searched Dombrowski's car twice. When he was
arrested, an officer made a cursory search of the front seat. The extensive search only
occurred after Dombrowski had been incarcerated and his car impounded. 413 U.S. at
436-38.
21 413 U.S. at 437.
22 Id. at 443.
21 Id. at 442-43. Because the Wisconsin police had custody of the car, Dombrowski
was held to fall within the line of cases holding that a police property interest in a car
justifies a warrantless search. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968);
Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967). See also Note, Cady v. Dombrowski: The
Demise of Coolidge, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 712 (1974); Comment, Police Inventories of
the Contents of Vehicles and the Exclusionary Rule, 29 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 197
(1972). However, Dombrowski did not merely fall within this line of precedent-it
actually expanded the earlier cases. See Note, 35 U. Prrr. L. Rv., supra at 718. The
search in Cooper was justified because it was undertaken pursuant to a California
statute, 7 CAL. HEALTH & S.C. § 11611 (1940).
The statute required police to impound and hold for forfeiture every car in which
narcotics had been illegally transported. Because Cooper's car was itself evidence of
the crime, and the police were required by law to impound it pending forfeiture pro-
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browski's car. Second, the Court accepted as fact that the motivation
for the search was to protect the public from the danger of Dom-
browski's pistol falling into irresponsible or malicious hands.,
ceedings, the Court held that a warrantless search was reasonable. 386 U.S. at 61-62.
The case for justifying a warrantless search was not as strong in Harris as in
Cooper. Nevertheless, the warrantless search in Harris was excused because it was
undertaken pursuant to a District of Columbia police regulation which required an
inventory of each car taken into custody. As in Cooper, the car in Harris was itself
evidence of the crime with which petitioner was charged. In both Cooper and Harris,
therefore, the reason for the search was closely related to the reason for the seizure of
the car. This situation was not found in Dombrowski. A further difference between
Harris and Cooper was that the police in Harris were acting pursuant to their own
internal regulation rather than pursuant to a statutory mandate from the state legisla-
ture as in Cooper.
Arguably, the Wisconsin police's "standard procedure" was a less substantial
reason for ignoring the fourth amendment's warrant requirement than those presented
in Harris and Cooper. See Note, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv., supra at 719-20. The Supreme
Court in Dombrowski, however, ruled that it was enough.
24 413 U.S. at 443. Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Dombrowski,
stressed the point that "both the state courts and the District Court found as a fact
that the search of the trunk to retrieve the revolver was 'standard procedure in [that
police] department,' to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would
fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands." 413 U.S. at 443. However, while the
state courts concluded that the police followed "standard procedure," the motive
behind the "standard procedure" was not clear.
The motive of the Wisconsin police in searching Dombrowski's car may well have
been the pivotal point on which the Supreme Court resolved the case. The circuit court
had concluded that Dombrowski's car was searched in order to find "incriminating
evidence of other offenses." 471 F.2d at 283. Mr. Justice Rehnquist disallowed this
possibility. Although he acknowledged that the circuit court was free to use its inde-
pendent judgment, he ruled that it was not free to ignore the district court's findings
of fact. 413 U.S. at 443. The specific finding of fact made by the district court which
Mr. Justice Rehnquist found to be controlling was that the Wisconsin police were
motivated by a desire to protect the public from the police revolver which they antici-
pated finding in Dombrowski's car. A careful reading of the district and circuit court
cases, however, indicates that the police's motive for searching Dombrowski's car was
not as clear as Mr. Justice Rehnquist suggested. In fact, the need to protect the public
was not mentioned in the district court ruling and it was explicitly rejected by the
Seventh Circuit.
In State v. Dombrowski, 44 Wis. 2d 486, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969), the state court
review of Dombrowski's conviction, the Wisconsin Supreme Court justified the search
of Dombrowski's car on an entirely different theory from that finally accepted by the
United States Supreme Court. Specifically, the Wisconsin court concluded that there
was no fourth amendment search of the car at all. Id. at 354. Rather, the Wisconsin
court found justification for the intrusion into Dombrowski's car on the basis of Harris
v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), see note 23 supra, in which the petitioner's car
was impounded and searched pursuant to a police regulation which required an inven-
tory of all impounded cars. The Wisconsin Supreme Court recognized the differences
between Harris and Dombrowski. See note 20 supra. However, in spite of the differ-
ences, the state court rationalized the entry of Dombrowski's car on essentially the
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Before Dombrowski, several Supreme Court cases had established
the proposition that when police have a property interest in a car
there are fewer restrictions on their right to search it.25 The signifi-
cance of the police motivation underlying a search had also been
discussed previously by the Court in evaluating the constitutional
validity of a search, but with inconsistent results .2 Elevating police
Harris theory that a car in police custody was lawfully subject to a warrantless search.
As the court said:
Although here there was no police regulation similar to the one in
Harris, Officer Weiss did testify that it was "standard procedure" in
his department to look in a car, being held like the appellant's, for the
service revolver. This would be a reasonable precaution taken to pro-
tect the suspect's property which might be in the car.
171 N.W.2d at 354. Thus the police motive accepted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
was that the police were protecting Dombrowski's property, not that the police were
attempting to neutralize a danger to the public.
In Dombrowski v. Cady, 319 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Wis. 1970), Judge Gordon in
ruling on Dombrowski's habeas corpus petition did not mention that the public inter-
est was the motive for entering Dombrowski's car. On the contrary, he expressly ac-
cepted the argument that the police were protecting Dombrowski's property: "I con-
clude that the examination of the car was not a search . . . . , but rather it was an
inspection designed to locate an article of value, to be protected by those responsible
for its custody." 319 F. Supp. at 532.
The argument that the protection of the public demanded the search of Dom-
browski's car was evidently not formulated until the case reached the Seventh Circuit.
There, the argument was rejected. Dombrowski v. Cady, 471 F.2d 280, 283 (7th Cir.
1972). How the United States Supreme Court determined that the state and federal
district courts found as a matter of fact that the police motive in Dombrowski was to
protect the public is, therefore, not altogether clear.
1 Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967). See note 23 supra.
21 See generally Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87
HARv. L. REv. 835, 851 (1974). The "inadvertency" test developed by Mr. Justice
Stewart in Coolidge was essentially an evaluation of the searching officer's intentions.
This, however, was not accepted by a majority of the Court. See note 16 supra. Gener-
ally, the Court has not let the intentions of police officers determine the constitutional
validity of a search or seizure. As Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out: "If subjective
good faith alone were the test, the protections of the Fourth Amendment would evapo-
rate . .. " Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1967) quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97
(1964). However, some cases have drawn a line between a "search" and an "inspec-
tion" on the ground that a "search" entails an intention to find incriminating evidence
of some kind. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1958) (ovdrruled on other grounds, 367 U.S. 643). Since the fourth amendment only
protects one from unreasonable searches, an inspection would, by this argument, be
acceptable without a warrant. Dombrowski v. Cady, 471 F.2d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 1972).
In the context of administrative searches, on the other hand, this difference be-
tween a "search" and an "inspection" has been discounted for constitutional purposes.
In two cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that the warrant requirement applies to
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motivation to a position of central importance in fourth amendment
analysis was, therefore, a primary innovation of Dombrowski.
Dombrowski's central argument was premised on a statement
from a previous Supreme Court decision, Preston v. United States,
27
to the effect that a warrantless search "remote in time or place from
the arrest ' 28 violates the constitution. However, the importance
which the Dombrowski Court placed on the fact that the police were
not looking for evidence of a crime when they searched the car over-
came this argument. 2 The rule which emerged from Dombrowski,
then, was that when police lawfully have custody of a car, they may
search it pursuant to standard police procedure without a warrant as
long as the purpose of the search is not to find evidence of a crime.
In addition to the motive of the police for searching a car, the
Dombrowski Court announced different standards for state and fed-
eral law enforcement officers." The Court reasoned that because state
officials enforce motor vehicle laws, they come into contact with cars
more frequently than federal officers and therefore the context in
which state officers confront automobiles is fundamentally different
purely administrative searches. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See
v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967). See Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory
and the Fourth Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since
Camara and See, 61 CALIF. L. Rav. 1011 (1973).
Although Dombrowski did not resolve the issue of whether there is a distinction
of constitutional significance between a "search" and an "inspection," the emphasis
the Court placed on the issue of police motivation might indicate a tendency to recog-
nize the validity of such a distinction. See Note, Cady v. Dombrowski: The Demise of
Coolidge, 35 U. Prrr. L. REv. 712 (1974); Note, The Automobile Inventory: An End
Run Around the Fourth Amendment, 9 TuLSA L.J. 286 (1973). If the Court is moving
in that direction, an anomaly could develop between Camara on the one hand, and
Dombrowski and its progeny on the other.
21 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
2 Id. at 367.
" In Preston, police arrested a group of men for vagrancy. After these men were
jailed, the police made a thorough search of their car and discovered burglar's tools.
In ruling that the tools were obtaihed in violation of Preston's rights under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments, the Preston Court stressed the fact that the police were
specifically looking for incriminating evidence beyond the scope of the crime for which
the men were arrested.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court in Dombrowski, distinguished
Preston on the basis of police motivation. He noted that the police in Preston were
looking for evidence of a crime while the officers in Dombrowski were not. As long as
the search of Dombrowski's car was a routine check for weapons, it could not be a
general attempt to find evidence of a crime. Thus, Dombrowski restricted Preston to
its facts. In so doing, the Supreme Court established police motivation as a new factor
to determine the reasonableness of a search and seizure under the fourth amendment.
413 U.S. at 440-41.
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from that normally involving federal agents.
Because state and local police officers are responsible for enforcing
motor vehicle laws, they are likely to be in a situation where misuse
of the car itself, such as speeding or reckless driving, constitutes the
entire crime. In contrast, federal officers generally come into contact
with automobiles only when the car is merely an instrumentality of
a larger criminal scheme, such as the use of a car for the interstate
transportation of drugs. When they approach a car, therefore, federal
officers will generally have a fairly precise idea of what evidence they
will find. On the other hand, when state and local police stop a car
for speeding or reckless driving, they generally do not expect to find
further evidence of a crime, and the probability is therefore great that
their discovering evidence of another crime in "plain view"3' will be
inadvertent. For this reason, the Court in Dombrowski granted a
broader power to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles to
state and local police than to federal officials."
Thus, Dombrowski announced several major changes in the law
of search and seizure as it related to automobiles. The Fourth Circuit
quite accurately perceived that Dombrowski, decided between the
district court order that Smith be given a new trial and its own review
of the case, delineated relevant legal changes which required careful
consideration. A point the Fourth Circuit apparently overlooked,
however, was that Dombrowski was decided on an issue not actually
found in Smith. The question in Dombrowski was whether the police
could lawfully enter a car for the general purpose of searching for a
gun. The nature of the evidence discovered by the police when they
, Id. at 441-42.
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's description of the effect which the distinction between
the rights of federal and state officials to search cars without first obtaining a warrant
will have on future fourth amendment search and seizure cases was vague. It would
seem important, however, that the distinction was closely tied to the "plain view"
exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. If this is to be the full
extent of the distinction between state and federal police for fourth amendment pur-
poses, it seems to signify no more than a presumption that a warrantless search of an
automobile by state police is not likely to be motivated by a desire to find evidence of
a crime. This seems to be the only effect of Mr. Justice Rehnquist's distinction as he
actually applied it in Dombrowski. On the other hand, an expansion of the difference
Dombrowski drew between state and federal law enforcement officers could erode the
uniform application of the fourth amendment mandated by the Court in Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
The Fourth Circuit has taken cognizance of the distinction between state and
federal officers articulated in Dombrowski, but has not actually applied it. See United
States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097 (4th Cir. 1974), discussed in Note, 32 WASH. & LEE
L. Rxv. 449 (1975).
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searched Dombrowski's car clearly demanded immediate seizure
under the exigent circumstances doctrine. The human blood per-
meating Dombrowski's clothes would have deteriorated if the clothes
had not been seized promptly.3 In contrast, the issue in Smith was
whether the police could lawfully seize what they saw through the
window of a parked car. The difference between the issues may indi-
cate that the Fourth Circuit misapplied Dombrowski to the facts in
the Smith case.
The constitutional problem presented by Smith was simplified by
the fact that there was no search within the technical meaning of the
fourth amendment. When police officers have an undisputed right to
be in a place from which they see incriminating evidence, they have
not, for fourth amendment purposes, made a search.3 4 The officer who
saw the stained seat cover in Smith's car was acting lawfully. Thus,
the only real issue in Smith was whether the detective was justified
in opening Smith's car and removing the seat cover before obtaining
a warrant. Two considerations are relevant to an analysis of this
question. First, the detective only "suspected" that the stains were
blood. Indeed, nearly a month had passed between the commission
of the crime and the discovery of the seat cover." Therefore, it could
not have been entirely obvious to the detective that the seat cover was
evidence of a murder. 37 Under the "plain view" doctrine, the criminal
nature of what the officer sees must be clear.3 8 That the detective's
observation in Smith lacked the degree of certainty found in other
"plain view" cases was a relevant consideration which the Fourth
Circuit did not address.
The second consideration relevant to the validity of the warrant-
"1 See Cupp. v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973).
3 Gil v. Beto, 440 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1971); Walker v. Beto, 437 F.2d 1018 (5th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Wright, 449 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Marshall v. United
States, 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1969);
Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965). Cf. United States v. Hanahan,
442 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1971).
484 F.2d at 1189.
'Id.
17 It has been suggested that mere knowledge that a blood-spattered garment is
in a dwelling would not necessarily constitute sufficient probable cause for the issuance
of a warrant. Kaplan, Search and Seizure: A No-man's Land in the Criminal Law, 49
CALmF. L. REV. 474, 477-78 (1961).
3 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S.
253 (1960); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v.
United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925); Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
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less seizure in Smith was whether the requisite exigent circumstances
existed to justify such a seizure. Granting that what the detective had
seen in plain view was evidence of a crime, the next traditional step
of analysis should have been to apply the exigent circumstances test
as set out in Carroll and followed in Coolidge to determine if it would
have been practical to obtain a warrant at the time. However, this
again was a question the Fourth Circuit did not ask. Had the Smith
court raised this question, the police would have been hard pressed
to show the circumstances which made procuring a warrant imprac-
ticable. Indeed, the facts strongly indicate that Smith's car was not
likely to be moved. Smith evidently drove to the police station,
parked in a lot across the street and went in. Before he was able to
return to his car, he was arrested and taken to jail. The unlocked car
stayed in the public parking lot overnight in an unlocked condition,
and anyone with a key to the car could easily have removed it. There
was no evidence that Smith was at any time less than cooperative.
The car was identified during business hours when a magistrate could
readily have been found, and a police guard could easily have been
summoned from the station. There was little reason, therefore, to
think that Smith's car was in imminent danger of being moved.',
That the Fourth Circuit did not pose either of the questions con-
sidered above underscores the novelty of Smith v. Slayton, for under
the standards of Carroll and Coolidge the police would probably have
lost their case. Smith v. Slayton appears to give police the benefit of
a per se rule: when items suspected of being evidence are seen in a
car which is parked in a public place, they may be seized without a
warrant and without a showing of exigent circumstances. Only future
decisions can indicate whether the holding in Smith will be followed.
Nevertheless, Smith brought about a significant change in the law:
" There were similarities between the situation of Smith's car and that of the
petitioner in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In Coolidge, the Court
found that there were no exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search:
In this case, the police had known for some time of the probable
role of the Pontiac car in the crime. Coolidge was aware that he was a
suspect in the Mason murder, but he had been extremely cooperative
throughout the investigation, and there was no indication that he
meant to flee. He had already had ample opportunity to destroy any
evidence he thought incriminating. There is no suggestion that, on the
night in question, the car was being used for any illegal purpose, and
it was regularly parked in the driveway of his house. The opportunity
for search was thus hardly "fleeting." The objects that the police are
assumed to have had probable cause to search for in the car were
neither stolen nor contraband nor dangerous.
403 U.S. at 460.
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in the Fourth Circuit, at least, the doctrine of exigent circumstances
no longer applies to potential evidence which is in plain view and
located in a publicly parked car.
L.C.M.
3. Third Party Tip as Basis for Providing Reasonable Appre-
hension of Danger to Justify Warrantless Stop and Frisk-United
States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973).
The case of United States v. Poms' presented the Fourth Circuit
with an opportunity to expand the "stop and frisk" exception to the
fourth amendment's warrant requirement. 2 The traditional rule is
that a policeman may conduct a superficial search for weapons when
he has a reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot and that the sus-
pected criminal is armed and presents an imminent possibility of
injury either to the policeman himself or to others.3 The Poms case
presented the more complex issue of whether information from an
undisclosed third-party can supply the reasonable apprehension of
imminent danger necessary to justify a warrantless search.
The Supreme Court recently held, in Adams v. Williams,4 that
third party information can justify a warrantless frisk if it bears suffi-
cient "indicia of reliability."5 Chief among the "indicia of reliability"
in Williams was the officer's knowledge of the informant's truthful-
ness based on prior experience with him. In contrast, the officers in
Poms had disclosed to the court no prior contact with their inform-
ant. Thus, unlike the Court in Adams v. Williams, the Fourth Circuit
was faced with the problem of determining the reasonableness of the
officer's apprehension of imminent danger solely upon the nature of
the information itself, rather than the reputation of the informant.
Specifically, the issue before the Poms court was whether confronta-
tion with the suspect sufficiently verified the particular information
available to the federal officers to justify their warrantless search of
the suspect's effects. In ruling that the agents were entitled to frisk
484 F.2d 919 (4th Cir. 1973).
The standard for this exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement
was first articulated in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and elaborated in Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), and Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See notes
19, 20, 23 and accompanying text infra.
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27-30.
407 U.S.. 143 (1972).
1 Id. at 147.
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E oms, the Fourth Circuit has apparently expanded the "stop and
frisk" doctrine.
The information given the agents and the circumstances sur-
rounding Poms' arrest were highly significant to the result of the case.
Two weeks before Poms' arrest, the agents received several tips from
a confidential informant that one Gabriel D. Bobrow, with whom
Poms shared an apartment, was trafficking in drugs. The same in-
formant claimed that Poms participated in Bobrow's drug business
and that he habitually carried a pistol in a shoulder bag. On the basis
of this information, the federal agents obtained a warrant to search
Bobrow's apartment. As the narcotics agents entered the lobby of the
apartment building, Bobrow and his son emerged carrying "a large
plastic garbage bag filled with marijuana."' While the agents were
arresting Bobrow, Poms stepped into view carrying a shoulder bag.
When Poms noticed his friends being taken into custody, the agents
observed that he moved his hand to the zipper of his shoulder bag.
Having first ascertained Poms' identity, a federal agent took posses-
sion of his bag, opened it, and found the expected pistol. The shoulder
bag also contained a powder which proved to be cocaine.
Tried without a jury, Poms was convicted of possession of cocaine.
On appeal, Poms argued that the warrantless intrusion into his hand-
bag was unjustified. He contended that his contact with the officers
was entirely fortuitous, and that the police information concerning
him did not meet the standards of Spinelli v. United States7 or
Aguilar v. Texas,' United States Supreme Court cases dealing with
the amount and quality of third party information required to justify
issuing a search warrant. Poms argued that the sufficiency of the
information relied upon to justify a search must be judged as if the
information were presented to a magistrate to support an application
for a search warrant.
The Fourth Circuit did not accept Poms' attempt to define the
issue in terms of Spinelli and Aguilar.' In a per curiam decision, the
court ruled that if the federal agents were justified in searching Poms
for weapons, then the cocaine was admissible as evidence under the
"plain view" doctrine." For the Fourth Circuit, the issue was not
1 484 F.2d at 920 n.1. Bobrow's conviction was reviewed and affirmed in United
States v. Bobrow, 474 F.2d 1343 (4th Cir. 1973).
7 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
9 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
484 F.2d at 920.
"Id. at 922. In Poms, the Fourth Circuit accepted Mr. Justice Stewart's delinea-
tion of the "plain view" doctrine in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
Mr. Justice Stewart's position was that "inadvertency" is the essence of the "plain
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whether police information would have justified issuing a search war-
rant, but whether the initial intrusion into the petitioner's bag was
justified under the stop and frisk rule announced by the Supreme
Court in Terry v. Ohio.'
In Terry, the Court expanded the rights of policemen to stop and
frisk a person suspected of carrying weapons. Writing for the Court
in Terry, Mr. Chief Justice Warren established a "narrowly drawn
authority' '1 2 to permit an officer to protect himself from people whom
he reasonably suspects are armed and dangerous. The rule enunci-
ated in Terry was a complex one which the Court largely restricted
to the facts of the case. 3 Terry held that when a police officer observes
unusual behavior which reasonably leads him to conclude in the light
of his experience that the person with whom he is dealing is armed
and dangerous, and he identifies himself to the suspect, and nothing
in his initial inquiry dispells his reasonable fear, then he is entitled
to conduct a carefully limited search of the suspect's outer clothing
for the purpose of discovering weapons. 4
The authority of the police to make a warrantless search is care-
fully circumscribed by Terry since the reasonableness of an on-the-
street frisk may not be predicated upon the officer's "hunch," but
must rather be based upon "specific reasonable inferences" which the
officer was entitled to draw under the circumstances. 5 In Terry the
Court most heavily relied upon the following elements to establish
the reasonableness of the search: the reasonableness of the officer's
perception in light of his long police experience; 6 the suspicious reac-
tion of the suspect upon being confronted; 7 and the officer's restric-
tion of his initial search to outside clothing. 8 Furthermore, the type
view" exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. The Fourth Circuit
ruled that the agents were entitled to conduct a protective search of Poms. In the
course of the protective search, they discovered cocaine. The Cocaine was admissible
against Poms because it was discovered inadvertently. The protective search gave the
agents the right to open Poms's bag, and once the bag was lawfully opened, the agents
did not have to ignore other incriminating evidence. 484 F.2d at 922.
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
Id. at 27.
'3 Id. at 30.
Id.
'5 Id. at 27.
, Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
" Mr. Chief Justice Warren particularly emphasized the restricted nature of the
initial search:
The officer testified that he only patted the men down to see whether
they had weapons, and that he did not put his hands beneath the
outer garments of either Terry or Chilton until he felt their guns. So
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of crime which the officer in Terry suspected was of a violent nature. 19
While Chief Justice Warren emphasized many different facts in Terry
which justified that particular search, he also stated that every stop
and frisk case must be decided on its own facts. 2 Nevertheless, Terry
announced a generally applicable test of permissible on-the-street
protective frisks, one element of which is the reasonableness of the
police officer's fear of bodily injury.
The problem, however, is to devise standards for evaluating the
reasonableness of the officer's perceptions and fears. Terry does re-
quire that the officer must articulate the reasons for his suspicion to
the satisfaction of a reasonably prudent man."' Ultimately, therefore,
the doctrine rests upon the subjective perception of the individual
arresting officer and his ability to express the reasonableness of his
perception in cogent terms. Though the Court anticipated some flexi-
bility in the Terry rule,2 this aspect seems relatively immutable:
frisking on mere suspicion of a crime is not enough; the officer who
stops and frisks without a warrant must do so on the basis of a
reasonable apprehension of imminent danger to himself or others
far as appears from the record, he never placed his hands beneath
Katz' outer garments.
Id. at 7. That a search permitted by Terry must be restricted to the suspect's outer
garments has important consequences for Poms. In Poins the federal agents went
further than a mere pat-down. The bag was one-third open when the agents took it
from Poms. The pistol and the cocaine were not found until the bag was completely
opened. 484 F.2d at 920. Since the informant told the agents that Poms' gun was
always in his bag, the police could have protected themselves by simply taking posses-
sion of the bag. If Terry stands for the proposition that a protective search must be
limited to a pat-down of outside clothing, then the Fourth Circuit allowed the narcotics
agents in Porns to exceed that limit. This point was not raised in Pors. In failing to
do so, the Fourth Circuit appears to have glossed over an important aspect of the Terry
holding.
11 The Court considered the reasonableness of the officer's conclusions in light of
his suspicions: "The actions of Terry and Chilton were consistent with McFadden's
hypothesis that these men were contemplating a daylight robbery-which, it is reason-
able to assume, would be likely to involve the use of weapons. . . ." 392 U.S. at 28.
2* Id. at 30. That the Court expected Terry's case-by-case approach to the reasona-
bleness of protective searches to produce a flurry of parallel cases is clear:
We need not develop at length in this case, however, the limita-
tions which the Fourth Amendment places upon a protective seizure
and search for weapons. These limitations will have to be developed
in the concrete factual circumstances of individual cases.
392 U.S. at 29.
21 Id. at 27.
2 392 U.S. at 15. The Court's intention to express only a protean standard in Terry
can also be inferred from its treatment of similar issues in Sibron v. New York, 392
U.S. 40 (1968). See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron,
Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 40, 46 (1968). See also note 23 supra.
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which he can articulate to the satisfaction of a reasonable man.2 The
application of this element of the Terry rule was the issue facing the
Fourth Circuit in Poms.
Although the policy underlying both Poms and Terry was the
same-protection of the police from foreseeable danger-they never-
theless differed substantially on their facts in three respects. First,
the federal agents in Poms had penetrated the suspect's handbag
n The ambiguity in Terry was partly resolved in its companion case, Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), where the Supreme Court applied Terry to two diverse
fact situations. A police officer had observed petitioner Sibron standing on a street
corner with known narcotics users for eight hours. As the officer finally approached
him, Sibron moved his hand toward his pocket. At this moment, the officer put his
own hand into the petitioner's coat and extracted an envelope of heroin.
In attempting to justify searching Sibron, the State of New York argued that the
extensive observation constituted probable cause that Sibron possessed narcotics,
which in turn justified his arrest. This argument was predicated upon New York's
"stop and frisk" law. N.Y. CaIM. PRo. § 140.50 (1971). The state thus tried to introduce
a variable not found in Terry. Nevertheless, the Court declined to consider the rele-
vancy or constitutionality of the New York statute. Instead, the Terry approach of
deciding stop and frisk cases on their facts was applied. 392 U.S at 59.
In reversing Sibron's conviction for narcotics possession, the Supreme Court seized
upon analytical points which in turn help to clarify the rule announced in Terry. The
Court found it important that the arresting officer was not acquainted with Sibron by
either reputation or experience. The patrolman knew that Sibron had conversed with
known addicts during the eight hour period, but he had overheard nothing of the
dialogue. However, the Supreme Court did not permit the justification for the search
to rest upon the inference that those who speak with addicts are dealing in drugs. In
the Sibron Court's view, if the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Sibron was
armed and endangering the police or others, the case would have fallen under the Terry
rule. Thus, whether Terry applies depends on the nature of the suspected crime. The
Court in Terry permitted the officer to infer that one who seems to be preparing for a
daytime robbery is armed. The Court in Sibron did not permit the inference that one
who sells drugs on the street is likely to be armed. In fact, the patrolman in Sibron
had testified that he was never in fear of bodily harm. Additionally, the Sibron Court
ruled that even if the patrolman had reasonable grounds to suspect that Sibron was
armed, he had exceeded the amount of searching necessary to locate and remove a
lethal weapon. Hence, the superficial nature of the search permitted by Terry was also
important to the holding in Sibron. For these reasons, the seach of Sibron was declared
unreasonable under the fourth amendment.
Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968), provided yet another touchstone for
applying the Terry standard. The essential elements of Terry and Sibron were also
found in Peters. An off-duty policeman chased two suspected burglars and caught one
of them. In the course of a preliminary pat-down, the officer felt a suspicious long thin
object which he thought could have been a knife. The Supreme Court ruled that the
officer had a reasonable suspicion that Peters was armed and that therefore the burglar
tools which were found during the protective search were properly admitted against
him under the plain view doctrine. 392 U.S. at 66. The fact situations in Sibron and
Peters complement Terry and help define the parameters of reasonableness as applied
in the Terry doctrine.
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while the search in Terry was merely a superficial patdown. Second,
the federal agents did not inform Poms of their identity before search-
ing him. Third, the reasonable apprehension of danger in Poms was
founded on third-party information while in Terry it was predicated
upon the officer's direct observations.
The extent of the agents' search presented the first factual dis-
crepancy between Poms and Terry. Mr. Chief Justice Warren explic-
itly limited Terry's holding to a pat down of the suspect's outer clo-
thing.24 In its companion case, Sibron v. New York, 25 the Court clari-
fied Terry, specifically stating that reaching into the suspect's pocket
was beyond the limits of an authorized search.26 However, Sibron can
be distinguished from Poms on this point: the officer in Sibron ex-
pected only to find drugs in the suspect's pocket, while in Poms a
deadly weapon was the object of the intrusion. In this respect, the
agents' motive in Poms was closer to the policy of police protection
articulated by Terry, thereby surmounting the limitation on the
Terry doctrine announced in Sibron.
The second factual variation between Poms and Terry was not
difficult to overcome in light of Poms' special facts. Although the
federal agents did not identify themselves to Poms prior to searching
him, as Terry requires,2 the greater exigency of the Poms situation
would seem to obviate the lack of an actual introduction. The federal
agents were in a position of great urgency; observing formalities could
have been fatal. Terry's requirement that an officer identify himself
to the suspect would seem unreasonable where its observance would
contravene the police protection purpose of the Terry doctrine. Mr.
Justice Harlan, concurring with the Terry majority, recognized this
point, saying: "There is no reason why an officer. . . should have to
ask one question and take the risk that the answer might be a bul-
let."2
The third factual difference between Poms and Terry, the basis
of the officer's apprehension, was the most significant. In Terry, the
officer had actually seen the suspect acting in a manner indicating
that criminal activity was afoot. Thus the information upon which
the reasonableness of the Terry search was predicated was first-hand.
In contrast, the federal agents in Poms had not observed the suspect
in the context of suspicious circumstances; the information which led
them to believe that Poms was armed came entirely from a confiden-
24 392 U.S. at 29.
392 U.S. 40 (1968).
26 Id. at 65.
2 392 U.S. at 30.
2 Id. at 33.
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tial third party informant. In Sibron v. New York the Supreme Court
ruled a warrantless search unreasonable because the patrolman was
unacquainted with the suspect and "had no information concerning
him. '29 However, information from a third party informer such as
that possessed by the federal agents in Poms would seem to qualify
as sufficient information to meet the Terry standard. Indeed, in
Adams v. Williams the Supreme Court specifically allowed an in-
formant's information to justify a frisk so long as it bore sufficient
"indicia of reliability. '3 Although this term was left substantially
undefined in Williams, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that the agents
in Poms were justified in relying on the informant's tip. Most impor-
tant in the court's view was the fact that the informant's story had
been corroborated, at least in part, by the events immediately pre-
ceding the search of Poms. The informant's veracity was confirmed
when Bobrow was in fact found with a large quantity of proscribed
drugs. Knowing that what the informant had said about Bobrow was
true, the agents had every reason to trust his account of Poms. At
least by the time that Poms started to unzip the very bag reported
to contain a pistol, the informant's story bore rather pronounced
"indicia of reliability."'"
Beyond the purely factual differences between Poms and Terry,
the petitioner's strongest argument in Poms was that because federal
agents were not "dealing ' 3 with him, they were not entitled to stop
and frisk him. Terry requires that an officer be "dealing" with a
person before his suspicion of imminent danger may result in a
search. The theory underlying this requirement would seem to be that
there must be a legitimate contact between the officer and the sus-
pect before a frisk may commence. A policeman, like anyone else, can
avoid people whom he suspects are dangerous, and therefore, as Mr.
Justice Harlan phrased it, before a police officer may stop and frisk
a person suspected of carrying weapons he "must first have a right
not to avoid him but to be in his presence."' Poms' argument was
that the federal agents did not have such a right to be in his presence.
392 U.S. at 62.
407 U.S. at 147.
" The Fourth Circuit seemed to be applying Mr. Justice White's "tenth fact"
analysis announced in Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 427 (1969) (White, J.,
concurring). The gist of this method of analysis is that the reliability and accuracy of
one element of a third party informant's tip may be inferred from the fact that other
elements of his tip are verified by the police officer's personal observations; the "tenth
fact" may legitimately be accepted as true if its reliability can be inferred from the
preceding nine facts. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
32 392 U.S. at 30.
392 U.S. at 32 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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Clearly, the agents were not entitled to frisk every inhabitant of
the building merely because they happened to walk into the base-
ment where the agents were searching Bobrow. Arguably, then, Poms
was a total outsider to the events transpiring between Bobrow and the
narcotics agents, and hence the agents were privileged to treat Poms
only as they would any other occupant of the apartment building who
stumbled innocently onto the scene following Bobrow's arrest. How-
ever, in the Poms court's view this argument ran afoul of the subjec-
tive nature of the Terry standard, which requires only that the police-
man's apprehensions in a particular set of.circumstances must be
understandable by a reasonably prudent person. Although one may
say that Poms was not actually connected with Bobrow's arrest, in
the federal agents' minds his presence was entirely comprehensible,
if not expected. Poms and Bobrow were both implicated in the in-
formant's story. Events preceding-Poms' entry had only confirmed
the informant's veracity. Considering the agents' information, and
the grounds they had for thinking it true, the Fourth Circuit had no
difficulty in determining the course of a reasonably prudent man.
That the Fourth Circuit conceived of the reasonableness of the
agents' frisk in this manner was entirely consistent with Terry v.
Ohio.
It has been held that "all companions" of a person constitution-
ally subjected to a protective patdown may also be searched. 4 In
Pores, the Fourth Circuit expanded this view to include not only
actual companions at the time of the stop and frisk, but reputed
associates who enter the area where a lawful arrest and search are in
progress. In the Fourth Circuit at least, a third party informant may
provide the reasonable apprehension of danger for a Terry search. By
accepting the informant's description of Poms as a basis for allowing
a warrantless search and seizure, the Fourth Circuit added a new
variable to Terry's flexible equation. The formula's resilience, how-
ever, remains untouched.
L.C.M.
B. Effect of Adverse Publicity Before and During Trial Upon
Accused's Right to Fair Trial-Wansley v. Slayton, 487 F.2d 90
(4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hankish, No. 73-1926 (4th Cir. July
17, 1974).
" United States v. Berryhill, 445 F.2d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 1971).
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In the cases of Wansley v. Slayton' and United States v. Hankish,
2
the Fourth Circuit considered the effect of adverse publicity, both
before and during a trial, on an accused's right to a fair trial.3 Nor-
mally, the issue of whether publicity which is adverse to the defen-
dant prejudices his chances of obtaining a fair trial is raised on a
motion for change of venue.4 If the publicity is found by the court to
be prejudicial, the situation may be remedied by ordering a change
of venue,5 a continuance,6 or by dismissing the indictment.7 Before
considering remedies, however, a court must first determine whether
the adverse publicity was prejudicial.
There are two grounds upon which a finding of prejudice may be
predicated. A court may determine that certain publicity which oc-
curred before or during the trial in fact caused the prejudice of a
particular juror. On the other hand, a court may forego the require-
ment of showing particular prejudice in fact and rule instead that the
adverse publicity was inherently prejudicial.'
1 487 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1973).
2 No. 73-1926 (4th Cir. July 17, 1974).
1 The classic statement of the fourteenth amendment right to a fair trial is that
of Mr. Justice Holmes in Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907):
The theory of our system is that the conclusions to be reached in a
case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and
not by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.
CODE OF VIRGINIA § 19.1-224 (1950) (1960 Replacement Vol.); FED. R. CRIM. P.
21; 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 341 (1969).
5 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
6Id.
I Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963). This remedy was suggested as a possi-
bility for use in only the most extreme circumstances. See United States v. Abbott
Laboratories, No. 74-1230 (4th Cir. Oct. 2, 1974) which is discussed in note 36 infra.
I A number of cases have indicated that adverse publicity should result in a new
trial only if it is shown to be the specific cause of jury prejudice. See, e.g., Beck v.
Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1962); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 727-28 (1961);
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 195 (1952); Rosenberg v. Mancusi, 445 F.2d 613,
618 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 956 (1972).
On the other hand, a number of cases have held that publicity adverse to the
defendant may be so intrinsically prejudicial that a specific showing of prejudice on
the part of individual jurors is unnecessary. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S.
333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 550-51 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
723 (1963); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959); Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d
1, 5-6 (5th Cir. 1966).
The difference between these groups of cases was one of degree. While the public-
ity during the Sheppard and Estes cases was highly adverse to the defendants and
nationwide in scope, Beck and Irvin presented cases of more restrained media activity.
The problem in cases like Wansley arises where there is some adverse publicity but
not as much as in the extreme examples of Sheppard, Estes, and Rideau. For a discus-
sion of the problem, see Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against
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Both of these arguments were raised by the defendant in Wansley
in an effort to obtain a new trial with a change of venue. More pre-
cisely, the two issues presented in Wansley were: (1) whether inher-
ently prejudicial pretrial publicity lost its effect after nearly five
years, and (2) whether a newspaper's prejudicial pre-trial treatment
of an attorney representing Wansley could prejudice the jury's atti-
tude toward the defendant himself. On these issues, the Fourth Cir-
cuit ruled that five years ameliorated the effect of prejudicial pretrial
publicity and, further, that opprobrious labels attached to an attor-
ney do not influence a jury's attitude towards his client.
While Wansley dealt with the potentially prejudicial effect of
publicity that occurred before the jury was selected, in Hankish the
Fourth Circuit considered the effect of adverse publicity that oc-
curred once the jury was picked and the trial was in progress.
Hankish was, therefore, analytically simpler than Wansley. Whether
the publicity was inherently prejudicial was not the issue in Hankish.
Rather, the court was concerned only with the issue of whether partic-
ular jurors were in fact prejudiced against the defendant. On this
issue, the Fourth Circuit held that when there is a possibility that the
jury has been exposed to highly prejudicial publicity, the judge is
obliged to determine if the jurors are in fact familiar with the infor-
mation. If the judge so finds, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Hankish
requires that he then take steps to insure that the defendant gets a
fair trial.
The prejudicial nature of publicity which occurs either before or
during a trial is inextricably bound up with the particular nature of
the alleged crime, the characteristics of the defendant, and the type
of publicity. In Wansley, the defendant had been convicted of rape
and robbery in February of 1963. The Virginia Supreme Court re-
versed Wansley's conviction because of inadequate transcription pro-
cedures and failure to grant a continuance so that more adequate
transcription arrangements could be made The case was remanded
for a new trial. In October of 1966, Wansley's second trial resulted in
a mistrial. In March, 1967, a third trial in the Corporation Court of
Lynchburg, held almost five years after Wansley's alleged crime,
again resulted in conviction. This time the Virginia Supreme Court
Adverse Press Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1971). In most cases, circuit courts
have required evidence of actual jury prejudice in the voir dire record. Only in truly
extreme cases where the intensity and scope of the publicity has tainted a whole
population of potential jurors do the circuit courts forego an examination of the voir
dire record. See Note, Prejudicial Pretrial and Trial Publicity, 45 TuL. L. REv. 1043,
1048 (1971).
1 Wansley v. Commonwealth, 205 Va. 419, 137 S.E.2d 870 (1964).
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affirmed, 0 and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari."
Wansley next filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district
court. In granting Wansley's petition, the district court ruled that on
the basis of a previous Supreme Court decision, Irvin v. Dow d,
2
petitioner's motion for change of venue due to adverse publicity
should have been granted. The Fourth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling. In reinstating Wansley's conviction, the Fourth Circuit
followed a line of cases which hold that the effects of prejudicial
publicity may dissipate over time.
3
There were, basically, two instances of prejudicial publicity in
Wansley. The first related to newspaper articles published before
Wansley's first trial in 1963. Within two weeks of Wansley's arrest in
1962, a Lynchburg, Virginia newspaper printed two articles in which
Wansley was called a "rapist," and which erroneously reported his
confession. In considering Wansley's habeas corpus petition following
his March, 1967, conviction, the federal district court ruled that the
1962 publicity was prejudicial to Wansley's ability to obtain a fair
trial in the Lynchburg area in 1967. The Commonwealth of Virginia
appealed the federal district court's ruling. The Fourth Circuit agreed
that the pre-trial publicity was inherently prejudicial at the time it
was published. However, the Fourth Circuit disagreed on the signifi-
cance of this admittedly prejudicial publicity that was nearly five
years old. 4
Wansley v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 462, 171 S.E. 2d 678 (1970).
399 U.S. 931 (1970).
366 U.S. 717 (1961).
'3 The landmark cases of Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966) and Estes v.
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965), dealt with publicity adverse to the defendant that began
before and continued for the duration of the trial. The reversal of the defendant's
conviction in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961), was due to publicity occurring six or
seven months before trial. In Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963), only two
months passed between the defendant's televised confession and his trial, and due
process was held to be violated. In Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 556 (1962), the
Court held that the nine and one half months between petitioner's testimony before a
Senate Committee and his trial was enough to overcome the deleterious effects of that
spectacle. Finally, in Rosenberg v. Mancusi, 445 F.2d 613 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 956 (1972), where eight months passed between the publication of admittedly
improper and prejudicial police accounts of the crime and the petitioner's trial, the
prejudicial effect was found to have disappeared for due process purposes. Id. at 617-
18.
" According to the Fourth Circuit, the prejudicial character of the 1962 publicity
was not the issue in Wansley's final habeas corpus petition. In the court's view, the
question was not whether the publicity was prejudicial, but whether the adverse effect
of the damaging publicity had diminished through the years. The court noted that the
effect of any prejudice caused by the initial publicity was obviated by the Virginia
Supreme Court's reversal of Wansley's first conviction, even though this was due to
inadequate transcription facilities rather than the effect of prejudicial publicity. 487
F.2d at 92-96.
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In deciding Wansley, the Fourth Circuit did not indicate how
much time must pass before adverse publicity loses its prejudicial
character. Rather, the Fourth Circuit adhered to the "totality of sur-
rounding facts" approach of the United States Supreme Court in
Irvin v. Dowd.'5 In considering the amount of adverse publicity, the
extent of its damage, and the scope of its publication, the Fourth
Circuit concluded that nearly five years after his indictment, Wan-
sley was able to obtain a fair trial in Lynchburg, Virginia. This con-
clusion seems consistent with the traditional approach taken by the
Supreme Court toward prejudicial publicity.
In Sheppard v. Maxwell,'6 which was decided before Irvin, the
Is 366 U.S. 717 (1961). In stating that the necessity for transfer depends upon the
totality of the surrounding facts, id. at 721, the Court in Irvin established a new
criterion for evaluating the prejudicial effect of publicity. Before Irvin, the Court
required the "actual existence of such [a prejudicial] opinion in the mind of the
juror." Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878). Prior to Irvin, the Supreme
Court had also held that if a juror could set his impression aside when confronted with
the evidence actually presented in court, he could still serve. Holt v. United States,
218 U.S. 245 (1910); Spies v. Illinois,.123 U.S. 131 (1887). Although Irvin did not
specifically overrule these older cases, it did qualify the doctrines they expressed. In
particular, Irvin reiterated the principle that application of the rules previously ex-
pressed in Reynolds and Holt "cannot foreclose inquiry as to whether, in a given case,
the application of that rule works a deprivation of the prisoner's life or liberty without
due process of law." 366 U.S. at 723, quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236
(1941). Irvin thus permitted case by case exceptions to the rule that specific prejudice
in the mind of a particular juror must be shown before a motion for change of venue
should be granted. The Court's attitude in Irvin was that probable, as well as actual,
jury prejudice should be the basis for a change of venue. This was clearly an applica-
tion of the principle that "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
On Irvin's facts, the Court could have remanded the case for a new trial purely
on the basis of a conventional analysis, since eight of the twelve jurors thought the
petitioner was guilty before the trial. 366 U.S. at 727. Nevertheless, the Court admitted
the relevance of more general considerations. In deciding that the atmosphere sur-
rounding Irvin's trial was hopelessly poisoned by adverse publicity, the Supreme Court
considered the amount and quality of newspaper articles, television and radio reports,
and attitudes expressed by 370 prospective jurors in a 2,783 page voir dire record. Even
though the twelve jurors said they could render an impartial verdict, the degree to
which damaging publicity had permeated the community belied their good intentions.
Id. at 727-28. The rule in Irvin, then, is that prejudice in the mind of a particular juror
need not be shown where the totality of surrounding circumstances raises the probabil-
ity of prejudice. This rule was later followed in Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965),
where the Court set aside a conviction despite the absence of any showing of prejudice.
In Wansley, the Fourth Circuit view of the "total circumstances" indicated that
the effect of the adverse publicity had disappeared. 487 F.2d at 95-96. Although the
result in Wansley was different from that in Irvin, the analytical approach was the
same.
19 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
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Court announced that the reasonable likelihood that pre-trial public-
ity will prevent a fair trial should be countered either by continuing
the case until the threat abates, or by transferring the trial to another
county or district. 7 Sheppard did not, however, indicate the proper
length of a continuance. Twelve years had passed between Dr. Sam
Sheppard's conviction and the Supreme Court's order that he be
given a new trial. The Court assumed that after such a long time, the
prejudice which had poisoned Sheppard's first trial had vanished. In
an earlier case, Beck v. Washington," the Supreme Court had ruled
that nine and one half months were enough to counteract highly
prejudicial and inflamatory remarks made about the defendant by
several United States Senators. The only rule to emerge from
Sheppard, Beck and Irvin, is that dissipation of the effect of prejudi-
cial publicity over time must be judged in light of all facts surround-
ing the original publicity and also those events which followed it.
Judge Russell, writing for the Wansley court, in effect adopted this
broad standard." In ruling that the prejudicial effect of the publicity
concerning Wansley had vanished by the time of the 1967 trial, Judge
Russell emphasized one salient fact: the newspaper which had first
prejudiced Wansley's right to a fair trial in 1962 had refrained from
making similar remarks during the 1967 trial. 0
The second type of prejudicial publicity of which Wansley com-
plained was that which was directed against his attorney, Mr. Wil-
liam Kunstler. This issue was the more problematical of the two
because the alleged prejudicial publicity had occurred shortly before
Wansley's final trial in March of 1967. On many occasions, a Lynch-
burg newspaper had alleged connections between Mr. Kunstler and
"communist-front" organizations.' The Fourth Circuit rejected the
argument that pre-trial publicity which is adverse to an attorney may
be prejudicial to his client.
2 2
11 Id. at 363.
" 369 U.S. 541 (1962).
" 487 F.2d at 93.
Id. at 94-95.
21 Id. at 95.
2 487 F.2d at 95. The Fourth Circuit here referred to United States v. Barber, 297
F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1971). In Barber, the Delaware
District Court discounted the possibility of journalistic abuse being transferred from
an organization to its members. See 297 F. Supp. at 920-21. "Guilt by association" is
not a meaningless phrase, however, and one wishes the Fourth Circuit had not'given
this issue such short shrift.
An example of prejudicial remarks about a defense attorney affecting his client's
right to a fair trial may be found in Sheppard v. Maxwell. One of the prejudicial
remarks which a Cleveland, Ohio, radio station made about Dr. Sam Sheppard was
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In contrast to Wansley, United States v. Hankish 3 dealt with
problems arising when adverse publicity occurs during the trial. More
precisely, the issue in Hankish was whether the district judge should
have ascertained if individual jurors had been exposed to prejudicial
publicity. In Hankish, the jury was empaneled before the publication
of the prejudicial newspaper articles. Therefore, whether the articles
had biased the community from which the jurors were drawn was not
the relevant issue. Rather, the issue in Hankish was whether the
jurors had in fact been exposed to the information in question. 4
The rule adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Hankish is that when
publicity is prejudicial, the district court judge is obliged to deter-
mine if the jurors have been exposed to it and, if so, whether they
have become prejudiced by it. Determining whether the publicity is
prejudicial is left largely to the discretion of the district judge under
the rule announced in Hankish. Only if there is a "substantial reason
to fear prejudice"" is the judge required to take remedial action.
Further, the remedy to be applied in the event that a jury has been
exposed to potentially prejudicial publicity is also left to the trial
judge's discretion. Thus, in deciding Hankish the Fourth Circuit
adopted a standard first articulated by the Seventh Circuit in
Margoles v. United States,26 and rejected the American Bar Associa-
tion's suggested remedy of compulsory change of venue.Y
"that Sheppard conceded his guilt by hiring a prominent criminal lawyer." Sheppard
v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 346. In ruling on the same issue in Wansley the Fourth Circuit
seemed to ignore the realities of public opinion. That "communist" is a shibboleth
associated with unspeakable evil is an unfortunate but inescapable aspect of post-war
American life. The Fourth Circuit's answer to Wansley's argument was thus not alto-
gether convincing.
13 No. 73-1926 (4th Cir. July 17, 1974).
24 That the true issue in Wansley was one of fact becomes clearer in light of the
Fourth Circuit's application of Wansley in the later case of Wood v. Superintendent,
No. 72-2513 (4th Cir. Oct. 3, 1974). In Wood, the Fourth Circuit cited Wansley for the
proposition that in order to justify a change of venue because of adverse publicity, the
defendant must show that, as a matter of fact, prejudice resulted from the publicity,
or that some juror was influenced. No. 72-2513 at 3.
2 No. 73-1926 at 18.
- 407 F.2d 727 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969).
21 Section 3.5(f) of the AMERicAN BAR AssOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR
TRIAL AND FREE PREss (Final Draft 1968) provides:
If it is determined that material disseminated during the trial
raises serious questions of possible prejudice, the court may on its own
motion or shall on motion of either party question each juror, out of
the presence of the others, about his exposure to that material. [A]
juror who has seen or heard reports of potentially prejudicial material
shall be excused if the material in question would furnish grounds for
a mistrial if referred to in the trial itself.
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In Hankish, the appellant was convicted in the Southern District
of West Virginia for crimes related to a stolen interstate shipment of
beer. On the second day of the trial, a newspaper in Charleston, West
Virginia, where the trial was being held, published an article which
called Hankish a "Wheeling rackets figure." 8 After the noon recess
of the same day, the defendant's lawyer asked the judge to question
the jurors in order to determine whether any of the individual jurors
had read the newspaper article. The district judge declined to do so.
The Fourth Circuit ruled that the newspaper's description of the
defendant was so prejudicial that the trial judge was obliged to ob-
viate the possibility of prejudice among the jurors exposed to this
publicity. Since the landmark cases of Estes v. Texas" and Sheppard
v. Maxwell,3" considerable energy has been devoted to formulating
guidelines with which the trial judge may accomplish this .3 Rather
than the strict rule proposed by the American Bar Association, which
allows a judge no discretion when knowledge of prejudicial publicity
is discovered among the jurors,32 the Fourth Circuit adopted a rule
which leaves the remedy within the judge's discretion.
The Fourth Circuit directed the trial judge to determine if jurors
had in fact been exposed to the prejudicial publicity. The policy
which underlies requiring this determination is to eliminate even the
possibility of publicity prejudicing a jury.3 Beyond this instruction,
The Fourth Circuit quoted the following newspaper passages:
The theft was one of many instances stemming from a multistate theft
ring that operated during the late 1960s. At the time the theft ring was
broken up in 1969 by FBI agents, Hankish was described as having
directed operations despite the loss of both legs five years earlier when
his car was blown up in gangland fashion.
United States v. Hankish, No. 73-1926 at 14.
- 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
10 384 U.S. 333 (1966). See text accompanying notes 16 and 17 supra.
11 See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND
FREE PRESS (Final Draft 1968); Reardon, The Fair Trial - Free Press Controversy -
Where We Have Been and Where We Should Be Going, 4 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 255 (1967);
Stanga, Judicial Protection of the Criminal Defendant Against Adverse Press
Coverage, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (1971).
32 See note 27 supra.
3 No. 73-1926 at 17. With one change of emphasis, this is a verbatim adoption of
the standard expressed in Margoles v. United States, 407 F.2d 727 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 833 (1969):
Thus, the procedure required by this Circuit where prejudicial
publicity is brought to the court's attention during a trial is that the
court must ascertain if any jurors who had been exposed to such
publicity had read or heard the same. Such jurors who respond affirm-
atively must then be examined, individually and outside the presence
of the other jurors, to determine the effect of the publicity. However,
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Hankish leaves the conduct of the trial in the judge's hands. Having
found that a particular juror has been exposed to publicity which the
judge in his discretion has decided was unfair to the defendant, the
judge must then decide if the juror has in fact become prejudiced.
Once the trial judge has determined that a juror has been influenced
by prejudicial publicity, the remedy is still discretionary. The Fourth
Circuit ruled that the remedy may vary from a cautionary instruction
to the declaration of a mistrial,34 although the Hankish court encour-
aged trial judges to exhaust all possibilities before aborting a trial. 5
In Wansley and Hankish the Fourth Circuit addressed two sepa-
rate problems which can arise when the news media dispense unfair
or misleading information about a defendant. The problem in cases
like Wansley is that inherently prejudicial publicity poisons the mind
of an entire community against the defendant. The issue, then, is
whether the defendant can be given a fair trial more than five years
after publication of the false and opprobrious articles in the judicial
district which was first prejudiced by their publication. On the basis
of the Supreme Court decisions in Sheppard v. Maxwell, Beck v.
Washington, and Irvin v. Dowd, the Fourth Circuit recognized in
Wansley that the deleterious effects of prejudicial publicity may in
time wane to the extent that a fair trial is possible without a change
of venue. 6 In addition, the Wansley court ruled that newspaper arti-
if no juror indicates, upon inquiry made to the jury collectively, that
he has read or heard any of the publicity in question, the judge is not
required to proceed further.
United States v. Hankish, No. 73-1926 at 16, quoting Margoles v. United States, 407
F.2d at 735. (Emphasis added by the Fourth Circuit).
-" No. 73-1926 at 17.
3 Id.
11 Following Wansley, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Abbott
Laboratories, No. 74-1230 (4th Cir. October 2, 1974). Abbott Laboratories was charged
with introducing adulterated and misbranded intravenous solutions into interstate
commerce in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 331(a) (1970). Before Abbott Laboratories was
indicted, the United Press International had released a statement that nine deaths had
resulted from Abbott's products. Later, the Food and Drug Administration announced
that fifty deaths had resulted from Abbott's allegedly illegal behavior. The grand jury
was exposed to this publicity.
The district court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment on
three grounds: (1) prejudicial publicity had so infected the community that voir dire
could not guarantee the defendant's right to a fair trial; (2) a continuance would not
protect the defendant's rights because the prejudicial publicity was likely to recur;
and, (3) the prejudicial information was published over such a large area that a change
of venue would'not protect the defendant. No. 74-1230 at 10.
The Fourth Circuit overruled the district court on the ground that the indictment
should not have been dismissed without employing voir dire. As a foundation of this
opinion, the Fourth Circuit gave a precis of each Supreme Court case dealing with
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cles which unfairly portray a defendant's lawyer do not affect the
defendant's chances of getting a fair trial. The court's somewhat
cursory treatment of this second issue, however, may have left room
for new and possibly convincing arguments on the prejudicial effects
of publicity adverse to defendant's attorney.7
The problem which faced the Fourth Circuit in Hankish was more
clearly delineated than that in Wansley. Rather than a necessarily
vague and general evaluation of the effect of certain prejudicial pub-
licity on an entire population, the Hankish court had only to define
the measures which a trial judge must take to determine whether
particular jurors have been exposed to and prejudiced by unfair news
accounts which were disseminated during the trial. 8 The rule in
inherently prejudicial publicity. To have the Fourth Circuit's own gloss on these cases
is a valuable tool for predicting the court's handling of prejudicial publicity cases in
the future.
In Abbott Laboratories, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Rideau, Irvin and
Sheppard in the light of one overriding policy: if at all possible, an indictment should
not be dismissed because of prejudicial publicity. Id. at 17. In accord with this policy,
the Fourth Circuit read Rideau as implying that a defendant might obtain a fair trial
by a change of venue. Id. at 14. The court admitted, however, that Rideau may indicate
that if publicity is so widespread that a change of venue would be ineffective, then the
indictment should be quashed. Yet, even the facts in Rideau did not reach that point.
Rideau's confession was broadcast over a Lake Charles, Louisiana, television station.
The Supreme Court ruled that voir dire examination could not protect his right to be
tried before an impartial jury. The Court did, however, permit a change of venue to
an area where the damaging publicity was not seen. Even on the basis of Rideau, then,
the Fourth Circuit found the district court's conclusion to quash the prosecution
against Abbott premature.
The Fourth Circuit read Irvin as standing for the proposition that when voir dire
discloses that the jurors have forgotten or discounted the prejudicial publicity, the trial
may go forth without continuation or change of venue. Id. at 15.
The Abbott Laboratories court construed Sheppard v. Maxwell as demonstrating
the broad powers of the court which can be used to protect a jury. Id. at 15-16. The
lesson taken by the Fourth Circuit from Sheppard was that the trial court should use
all powers available to it to protect the jury and to preserve the trial.
The point of Abbott Laboratories is clear. In the Fourth Circuit, an indictment
cannot be dismissed because of prejudicial publicity without a showing from the voir
dire record that prejudice has in fact infected the people actually empaneled as jurors.
7 See note 22 supra.
Before United States v. Hankish, the Fourth Circuit had not dealt with the trial
publicity issue since United States v. Wenzel, 311 F.2d 164 (4th Cir. 1962). Decided
before Rideau, Estes, and Sheppard, Wenzel was firmly in the Stroble-Reynolds tradi-
tion of requiring evidence that publicity did in fact prejudice a juror. Hankish did not
overrule Wenzel any more than Irvin overruled Stroble or Reynolds. Judge Wisdom has
noted that Rideau, Estes and Sheppard are but a "gloss" on the earlier line of cases
demanding a specific showing of prejudice. Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir.
1966). The same may accurately be said of the relation between Hankish and Wenzel.
In Wenzel, the Fourth Circuit had said that when the jury has been instructed
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Hankish, then, is that when there is a possibility that information
prejudicial to the defendant has reached the jurors, the trial judge
must determine if the jurors have actually lost their ability to render
an impartial verdict. The determination of whether the information
is prejudicial is within the trial judge's discretion, as is the choice of
remedy if the information has in fact prejudiced a juror.
In Wansley, the Fourth Circuit affirmed a conviction in spite of
admittedly prejudicial publicity, and in Hankish it reversed a convic-
tion solely because prejudicial publicity might have influenced the
jury. Thus, the Fourth Circuit neither expanded nor contracted the
rights of criminal defendants. Rather, the court seemed solely con-
cerned with protection and definition of an accused's right to trial by
an impartial jury.
L.C.M.
C. Application of Presumption that Venue for Forgery Prosecu-
tion Lies in District Where Forged Instrument Was Uttered
-United States v. Lee, 485 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1973).
One of the safeguards which the sixth amendment guarantees an
accused in a federal criminal prosecution is "the right to . . .trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed."' The "crime committed" venue formula of
"at length and repeatedly regarding its duties," a request to quiz jurors about whether
they saw a particular newspaper article was properly denied. 311 F.2d 164, 170. After
Hankish, one suspects that this decision would generally be overruled. Nevertheless,
the impression from reading Wenzel is that defense counsel was merely badgering the
court. In such circumstances, Hankish does not change the law due to the broad
discretion retained by the trial judges under Hankish.
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 also
provides that: "Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed . . . ." Read literally, the article III provision describes the place where
the trial shall be held, and the sixth amendment refers to the district from which the
jurors shall be drawn. It has been determined, however, that the sixth amendment has
the impact of a venue provision. Comment, 46 MICH. L. REV. 964, 966 (1948).
The wording of the sixth amendment contains a logical fallacy which, although
not important in itself, has a significant implication for the trial of federal crimes, The
sixth amendment provides that venue is proper where the crime was committed. Yet,
whether a crime was committed or not is one fact which the jury must decide. In other
words, in order to establish proper venue, a court must assume the corpus delecti in
order to determine the locus delecti. As a practical matter, federal procedure has
circumvented this problem. An indictment is sufficient as long as it alleges that the
19751
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the sixth amendment, which is also expressed in Rule 18 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure,2 establishes the fundamental stan-
dard for determining where an accused in a federal criminal case can
be tried. In federal prosecutions, the constitutional standard is sup-
plemented by congressional authority3 to provide alternative venue
sites for violation of a specific statute.4 In many cases, then, the
proper venue for a federal criminal trial may be determined by refer-
ence to the statute under which the defendant is charged.' However,
crime was committed in the same district as the trial. See, e.g., United States v.
Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946). One must remember, however, that the court only
assumes that venue, as it is alleged in an indictment, is proper. The burden of proving
venue as a matter of fact is still upon the prosecutor. Thus, the propriety of venue in
a federal criminal prosecution is ultimately a jury question.
2 Rule 18 provides: "Except as otherwise permitted by statute or by these rules,
the prosecution shall be had in a district in which the offense was committed .
FED. R. CraM. P. 18.
The policy underlying the constitutional and Federal Rule provisions concerning
venue is intimately related to American colonial history. In reaction to Parliament's
revival in 1769 of a statute providing that colonials could be tried for treason in
England, the drafters of the Declaration of Independence objected to "transporting us
beyond the Seas for pretended offenses." Professor Blume has suggested that the
framers of the Constitution insisted on the wording of the venue provisions only to
preclude such gross discrepancy between the place of the crime and the place of the
trial, and not to forbid the more limited ones to which they have been applied. Blume,
The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L.
REv. 59, 67-68 (1944). If one assumes that the forum non conveniens doctrine is the
rationale of the "crime committed" formula, then Professor Blume's point is well
taken. If the Constitution aims to insure criminal defendants a trial near their home
and within easy access of potentially important witnesses, it does not do so by requiring
strict adherence to the "crime committed" formula. The commission of a crime may
often be far from the defendant's home. On the premise that the defendant's conveni-
ence should be an important consideration, both the courts and some commentators
have argued that the "crime committed" formula is wooden and more often produces
hardship than convenience for criminal defendants. See Travis v. United States, 364
U.S. 631 (1961); United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405 (1958); Johnston v. United
States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956); United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944); Abrams,
Conspiracy and Multi-Venue In Federal Criminal Prosecutions: The Crime Committed
Formula, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 751 (1962); Barber, Venue in Federal Criminal Cases: A
Plea for Return to Principle, 42 TEXAs L. REv. 39 (1963).
' U.S. CONST. art. Ifi, § 2, cl. 3. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3238 (1970).
Orfield, Venue of Federal Criminal Cases, 17 U. Prrr. L. REv. 375 (1956).
Professor Dobie addressed this point precisely:
All federal crimes are statutory, and these crimes are often defined,
hidden away amid pompous verbosity, in terms of a single verb. That
essential verb usually contains the key to the solution of the question:
in what district was the crime committed.
Dobie, Venue in Criminal Cases in the United States District Court, 12 VA. L. Rv.
287, 289 (1926).
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where this is not the case, the Supreme Court has held that "the locus
delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and
the location of the act or acts constituting it."' In other words, in the
absence of an express congressional declaration, the sixth amend-
ment "crime committed" standard determines venue for a federal
criminal prosecution.
As a practical matter, the sixth amendment venue requirement
places two burdens on federal prosecutors.' First, the indictment
must allege that the defendant committed the crime in the district
where he is tried.' Second, as with other elements of the indictment,
venue must be proven as a matter of fact. Thus, only after the prose-
cution has presented its case can the defense properly object to its
failure to prove venue. Further, venue is not proven and established
as a fact until the jury returns its verdict.
In United States v. Lee,'" the Fourth Circuit considered whether
federal prosecutors could rely on a presumption, or inference, to prove
the fact of venue in a forgery case. Forgery has long presented courts
with a difficult venue problem. Congress has not decided by statute
where the propek'venue for a forgery trial lies and, since the crime is
virtually always committed in secret, the sixth amendment "crime
committed" standard is difficult to apply. Therefore, a judicial infer-
ence, or presumption," has devel6ped that, unless evidence is shown
United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946). Cf. United States v. Bow-
man, 260 U.S. 94, 97-98 (1922).
1 For a discussion of the policy considerations underlying these requirements see
United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 (1944).
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224, 232-33 (1924).
Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1960). While most courts
instruct the jury that they must find proof of venue beyond a reasonable doubt, other
courts have permitted a lower standard of evidence. Id. at 305; United States v.
Karavias, 170 F.2d 968, 970 (7th Cir. 1948).
" 485 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1973).
" Although one usually speaks of this as a presumption, it is more accurately
characterized as a permissible inference from proven facts. 2 C. WIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 404 (1969); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2513 (3d ed. 1940).
In United States v. Britton, 24 F. Cas. 1239 (No. 14,650) (C.D. Mass. 1822),
Judge Storey described the nature, operational properties and underlying policies of
this presumption:
If a forged instrument is found or uttered in one place, and there is
no evidence to show, that it was forged elsewhere, what ground is there
to presume, that it was not forged, where it was found, or uttered? If
its existence in a forged state is not proved in any other place, it must,
from the necessity of the case, be presumed to have been forged, where
its existence in such state is first made known. And there is no hard-
ship in such a presumption, for the prisoner, if he thinks the fact in
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to the contrary, venue for a forgery trial is proper in the district where
the forged instrument was uttered' 2 or first found in a forged condi-
tion.'3 By permitting such a presumption to operate in the govern-
ment's favor in Lee, the Fourth Circuit expressly reaffirmed its posi-
tion taken forty-five years earlier in Conley v. United States.'4 In
Conley, the Fourth Circuit had ruled that, in the absence of evidence
to the contrary, a court may presume that the act of forgery was
committed in the same judicial district in which the forged document
was uttered or first found in a forged condition. While the law applied
may be old,' 5 the fact situation seems to be increasingly common,'"
and therefore deserves close scrutiny.
The appellant Lee, an attorney with the Labor Department in
Washington, D.C., was convicted in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia of forging Government Transportation Requests
his favour, can shew, where it was forged, for he has cognizance of the
time and place, or at least can shew, what was its state, when it first
came into his possession. If the law were otherwise, it would be almost
impossible to convict any person of a forgery, for such acts are done
in retirement and concealment, far from the sight of all persons but
confederates in guilt.
Id. at 1241. Accord, United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Di Pietroantonio, 289 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1961); Conley v. United States,
23 F.2d 226, 228 (4th Cir. 1928); Read v. United States, 299 F. 918, 922 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 267 U.S. 596 (1924). The venue provisions for state trials are governed by
the state constitutions, which are quite varied. See Blume, The Place of Trial of
Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43 MICH. L. REv. 59, 78-94 (1944).
Nevertheless, a number of states have adopted the judicial presumption that, unless
evidence to the contrary is presented, venue for a forgery trial is proper where the
instrument was either uttered or found in an altered condition. McCoy v. State, 161
Ark. 658, 257 S.W. 386, 388 (1924); Heard v. State, 121 Ga. 138, 48 S.E. 905, 906 (1904);
State v. Phares, 243 P. 266, 267 (Kan. 1926); Bafford v. State, 235 Md. App. 41, 200
A.2d 142, 144 (1964); State v. Forbes, 75 N.H. 306, 73 A. 929 (1909); Spencer v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. (2 Leigh 751) (1830).
,1 The crime of uttering has been defined as "offering of the [forged] instrument
with intent to defraud." United States v. Jenkins, 347 F.2d 345, 347 (4th Cir. 1965).
" An instrument can be found in a forged or altered condition without its actually
having been uttered. Conley v. United States, 23 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1928) (after peti-
tioner was arrested, stolen bonds with the payee's name erased were found on his
person; the bonds were found in an altered condition even though no attempt had been
made to utter them).
" 23 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1928).
, See note 11 supra.
" This phenomenon is no doubt related to increased mobility and the extent to
which modem urban areas have expanded to encompass traditionally discrete jurisdic-
tional boundaries. A significant number of cases involving the presumption have oc-
curred in the Washington, D.C. area. See Note, 46 TExAs L. REv. 279 (1967).
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(GTR's) and of aiding and abetting the uttering" of these GTR's.'5
The government introduced the testimony of a handwriting expert to
show that Lee had forged the authorizing signatures on the GTR's.
Evidence was also introduced to show that the documents were ut-
tered at Washington's National Airport in the Eastern District of
Virginia. However, the federal prosecutors introduced no evidence to
indicate where Lee had, in fact, forged the GTR's. Rather, the gov-
ernment relied on the presumption that the forging and the uttering
occurred in the same district.
At the close of the government's case, Lee moved for a judgment
of acquittal on the forgery charge on the ground that the prosecution
had not proven that he had committed the forgery in the Eastern
District of Virginia and, therefore, had not proven venue as a fact.
The United States countered with the argument that because evi-
dence showed that Lee had forged the GTR's, and that they were
uttered at National Airport, the jury could infer that the forgery itself
took place in the Eastern District of Virginia. The trial judge ac-
cepted the government's argument and instructed the jury that in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, it could infer that venue was
proper in the Eastern District of Virginia.'" On the basis of this in-
[' Venue for trying a person accused of aiding and abetting the uttering of forged
instruments is proper in the district where the instruments were uttered even if the
defendant's presence in that district cannot be proved. United States v. Lee, 485 F.2d
41 (4th Cir. 1973); Serio v. United States, 377 F.2d 936, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Callahan
v. United States, 53 F.2d 467, 468 (3d Cir.), aff'd, 285 U.S. 515 (1931). See Eley v.
United States, 117 F.2d 526, 528 (6th Cir. 1941) (determination of venue in a conspir-
acy trial).
' Both the forging and uttering of GTR's are proscribed in the same statute:
Whoever falsely makes, forges, or counterfeits in whole or in part,
any form or request in similitude of the form or request provided by
the Government for requesting a common carrier to furnish transpor-
tation on account of the United States or any department or agency
thereof, or knowingly alters any form or request provided by the Gov-
ernment for requesting a common carrier to furnish transportation on
account of the United States or any department or agency thereof; or
Whoever knowingly passes, utters, publishes, or sells, or attempts
to pass, utter, publish, or sell, any such false, forged, counterfeited,
or altered form or request-
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than
ten years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 508 (1970).
" The trial court instructed the jury:
The burden is also on the United States to prove, beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, that the forgery was committed within the Eastern
District of Virginia in order to give jurisdiction to this Court. In this
connection, you are told that in the absence of evidence to the
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struction, the jury inferred that Lee had forged the GTR's in Virginia
and therefore convicted him of forgery, as well as aiding and abetting
the uttering of forged instruments.
In attacking his forgery conviction, Lee relied solely on a recent
District of Columbia Circuit case, Serio v. United States,0 in which
the court ruled the venue presumption inoperative. As the Fourth
Circuit pointed out, however, Serio was an entirely different case
from Lee. Although both cases involved prosecution for forging, and
aiding and abetting the uttering of forged instruments, two facts
distinguish them. First, Serio had an accomplice who was actually
caught uttering the instruments. Therefore, in Serio there was no
possibility that the defendant had come into the District of Columbia
to utter the instruments.2' However, because there was evidence that
he forged the payee's name on stolen postal money orders, Serio was
properly convicted of the aiding and abetting charge.
The second distinction which the Fourth Circuit found between
Serio and Lee was that in Serio there was evidence which indicated
that the forgery took place in a judicial district other than the one in
which the instrument was uttered. Serio lived in Baltimore, Mary-
land. The address of the payee, whose name Serio signed, was also
in Baltimore. The District of Columbia Circuit concluded that this
evidence obviated the inference that Serio had committed the act of
forgery in the District of Columbia merely because Serio's accomplice
LaShine had uttered the instruments there.2 2 Thus, as the Fourth
contrary the presumption is that the forgery was committed where the
travel requests were first found in a forged state. That is, the finding
of the forged instrument at the National Airport is itself sufficient to
warrant the inference that the forgery was committed there and was,
therefore, within the jurisdiction of this Court.
485 F.2d at 43.
377 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
21 Because the evidence established conclusively that Serio's accomplice, not
Serio, had uttered the instruments, the court could not allow use of the presumption
since the federal prosecutor did not prove the existence of a single additional fact which
would have permitted the jury to infer that Serio had forged the money orders in the
District of Columbia. Some courts have even permitted use of the presumption when
circumstantial evidence indicates that the forger at least possessed the instruments in
the district where they were uttered. United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 467, 470 (5th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Di Pietroantonio, 289 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1961); Conley v.
United States, 23 F.2d 226 (4th Cir. 1928). If the federal prosecutors had been able to
show that Serio was in the District of Columbia on the day when LaShine, Serio's
accomplice, attempted to utter the instruments, that might have been enough to
permit use of the presumption. Such evidence, however, was not available, and what
evidence there was pointed to the opposite conclusion.
377 F.2d at 939.
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Circuit correctly noted in Lee, the Serio court had two grounds for
holding the presumption inoperative: first, Serio, the forger, did not
utter the forged instruments; and second, the evidence indicated that
the forgery took place in Baltimore. Faced with these obstacles,3 the
District of Columbia Circuit held that the venue inference could not
be applied.
21
The Fourth Circuit recognized the differences between Lee and
Serio. Lee had worked alone to effect his criminal purpose. The testi-
mony of a handwriting expert permitted the conclusion that Lee had
forged the GTR's. The stamps of the ticket clerks at the National
Airport indicated that the instruments were uttered there. In the
absence of any evidence that a second party was involved,2 the
Fourth Circuit permitted the inference that Lee had both aided and
abetted the uttering and had forged the instruments in Virginia.
Thus, the Fourth Circuit rule has not changed since Conley. The
decision in Lee makes it clear that a jury may presume, for purposes
of establishing venue, that the act of forgery was committed where
the forged instrument was uttered or first found in a forged condition,
unless there is evidence to the contrary.
L.C.M.
2 The standard applied by the District of Columbia Circuit in Serio to determine
the applicability of the judicial presumption in that case was the one articulated for
statutory presumptions by the United States Supreme Court in Tot v. United States,
319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943):
[A] statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there be no rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed,
if the inference of the one from proof of the other is arbitrary because
of lack of connection between the two in common experience.
See also Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 32-36 (1969).
24 Judge Burger, now Mr. Chief Justice Burger of the United States Supreme
Court, dissented from the District of Columbia Circuit's ruling in Serio. 377 F.2d at
941. Judge Burger's opinion was based on the inconvenience both to Serio and the
government of splitting the actions. Proof that Serio forged the postal money orders
was submitted to prove he was guilty of aiding and abetting LaShine's uttering. The
same proof would have to be used in Maryland to prove that Serio was guilty of forgery.
Considering the need to expedite matters in the federal courts, Judge Burger's argu-
ment was convincing. His opinion, however, ran into fatal constitutional difficulties.
See notes 1 and 2 supra.
2 None of the airline's employees were able to identify the person who had uttered
the forged GTR's. 485 F.2d at 46. Lee was charged with uttering, but was convicted of
aiding and abetting the crime of uttering on the basis of the trial judge's instruction
to the jury. This was proper since the Fourth Circuit had previously ruled that the
prosecution is entitled to an aiding and abetting instruction even though the defendant
is charged solely with the principal offense. United States v. Duke, 409 F.2d 669, 671
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969); United States v. Harris, 346 F.2d 182, 185
(4th Cir. 1965). Thus, there was nothing irregular in the fact that Lee was indicted for
uttering and found guilty of aiding and abetting the uttering. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2
(1970).
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D. Insufficiency of Silence to Invoke Fifth Amendment Privi-
lege After Valid Waiver-United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284
(4th Cir. 1973).
Prior to commencing interrogation, an arresting officer must
clearly inform a suspect of his constitutional right to remain silent.,
A "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent" waiver2 of this right by a
suspect permits both his replies to an interrogator's questions and the
questions themselves to become admissible evidence in court.3 Other-
wise, prosecutorial comment in court concerning any unanswered
questions constitutes a violation of the accused's fifth amendment
protection against self-incrimination.'
However, a problem occurs when the accused initially waives his
right to remain silent and begins to answer questions, only to discon-
tinue comment to police officials later in the interrogation. The ques-
tion arises as to whether, after a waiver of the accused's rights pur-
suant to Miranda v. Arizona,5 testimony concerning the unanswered
questions and the accused's resulting lack of response constitutes
admissible evidence for the jury's consideration pusuant to the tacit
admission rule.' In United States v. Moore,7 the United States Court
The Review acknowledges the contribution of research in the preparation of this Note
by Thomas L. Sansonetti, student at the Washington & Lee University School of Law.
I In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court specified proce-
dural safeguards required to secure the fifth amendment right against compelled self-
incrimination:
[The accused] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has
the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to presence of an attorney,
and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires.
Id. at 479.
2 384 U.S. at 475.
3 United States v. Sharpe, 452 F.2d 1117, 1120 (1st Cir. 1971); VI, J. WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERIcAN SYSTEM OF EvmENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§
1772, 1781 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
I Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n. 37 (1966); accord, United States v.
Nolan, 416 F.2d 588, 594 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 912 (1969).
5 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
6 Originating from the maxim "Qui facet consentire videtur" (He who is silent
consents), the tacit admissions rule is predicated upon the "natural" reaction of a
person to deny an untrue inculpatory statement about him made in his presence and
hearing. WIGMORE, § 1071 (Chadbourne rev. 1972); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE,
§ 270 (2d ed. 1972). As the answered inculpatory statements are admissible into evi-
dence, an inference of acquiescence from a failure to deny the statements is created.
See, e.g., Sparf and Hanson v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895). Accord, MODEL CODE
OF EVIDENcE rule 507(b)(1942); RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES, Rule 801 reads in pertinent part:
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit determined that such testimony was
admissible. Centering on the sufficiency of the act of silence to invoke
an accused's Miranda rights, the Moore litigation illustrates the
problems inherent in determining the extent of intended protection
under the Miranda warning.
FBI agents arrested James Ronald Moore in the state of Maryland
for knowingly receiving a stolen motor vehicle. The defendant, having
been read the Miranda warnings after his arrest, voluntarily agreed
to answer questions. During the trial, Agent Nelson testified that
Moore claimed the car had come into his possession four months
earlier as payment for a $4,500 gambling debt owed him by one Ron-
ald Harris.' Moore further stated that he expected to see Harris,
described as being approximately thirty-two years old and from New
York City, in about a week. However, upon being pressed for specific
details of his story, Moore refused to reply.
Agent Nelson proceeded to repeat to the jury the exact questions
Moore left unanswered. These included requests from Moore for a
better description of Harris, for the date on which he had last seen
(d) . . . A statement is not hearsay if...
(2) The statement is offered against a party and is
(B) a statement of which he has manifested his adoption or belief in
its truth ....
• . . Advisory Committee's Note...
Subdivision (d).
(2) Admissions...
(B) Under established principles an admission may be made by
adopting or acquiescing in the statement of another. . . . Adoption
or acquiescience may be manifested in any appropriate manner. When
silence is relied upon, the theory is that the person would, under the
circumstances, protest the statement made in his presence, if untrue.
The decision in each case calls for an evaluation in terms of probable
human behavior. In civil cases, the results have generally been satis-
factory. In criminal cases, however, troublesome questions have been
raised by decisions holding that failure to deny is an admission: the
inference is a fairly weak one, to begin with; silence may be motivated
by advice of counsel or realization that "anything you say may be used
against you"; unusual opportunity is afforded to manufacture evi-
dence; and encroachment upon the privilege against self-
incrimination seems inescapably to be involved. However, recent deci-
sions of the Supreme Court relating to custodial interrogation and the
right to counsel appear to resolve these difficulties. Hence the rule
contains no special provisions concerning failure to deny in criminal
cases.
484 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir. 1973).
' 484 F.2d at 1285.
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Harris, and for the reason why Harris would repay a $4,500 debt with
a car worth more than that amount.' The district court, holding that
Moore never invoked the fifth amendment"° or relied on his Miranda
warning," admitted the agent's testimony. Moore's subsequent con-
viction resulted in a four-year term of imprisonment.
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit Moore contended that his silence
when asked a specific question was sufficient to invoke his fifth
amendment privilege as to that question.2 In substance, Moore was
asking the court to treat each question separately. The Fourth Cir-
cuit, however, agreed with the government that the defendant's fail-
ure to respond was an integral part of his initial statement. There-
fore, the court viewed Moore's inability to supply the requested de-
tails as a tacit admission that he could not give a better explanation
for his conduct. 4 The court added that if Moore, having begun to
talk, had indicated that he was basing his subsequent silence on his
rights under the fifth amendment or his understanding of the
Miranda warnings,'-' then the testimony would have been inadmissi-
ble.1 Thus, the Fourth Circuit's holding in Moore was based upon the
ground that the defendant's fifth amendment privilege is inexorably
linked to his ability to express verbally his reliance upon his constitu-
tional rights. A comparison of Moore with two other decisions of the
Fourth Circuit reveals the subtle distinction which the court has
drawn between the minimum act necessary to invoke the fifth
amendment privilege and the sufficiency of silence itself.
In Boeckenhaupt v. United States,T a pre-Moore decision, the
defendant freely conversed with interrogators until the arrival of his
attorney." The Fourth Circuit held improper the testimony of a gov-
ernment agent who detailed the defendant's refusals to comment on
'Id.
U0 .S. CONsT. amend. V reads in pertinent part: "No person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...
1" See note 1 supra.
12 484 F.2d at 1285.
13 Id.
" In failing to equate Moore's silence with a reliance on his Miranda warning, the
Fourth Circuit determined Moore's unresponsiveness indicative of his inability to sub-
stantiate factually his story. Therefore, the court ruled Moore's inaction a tacit admis-
sion that he either did not know Harris or knew the car was stolen. Moore argued that
each statement should be viewed separately. However, the Fourth Circuit agreed with
the government that the defendant's failure to respond was an integral part of his
initial statement. Id. at 1286.
" See note 1 supra.
" 484 F.2d at 1286.
17 392 F.2d 24 (4th Cir. 1968).
," 392 F.2d at 27-28.
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certain matters and answer questions on the advice of counsel during
custodial interrogation. In finding the agent's testimony to be in-
valid," the court indicated that the act of consulting with one's attor-
ney during interrogation is enough to invoke the fifth amendment and
link his silence to the Miranda warning."
The Boeckenhaupt decision represents a similar situation with
that presented in Moore. Both defendants had previously waived
their Miranda warnings before refusing to answer particular ques-
tions. Boeckenhaupt did so on the advice of counsel. Moore remained
silent on his own accord. Yet, the Fourth Circuit found an FBI agent's
testimony improper as to Beockenhaupt's failure to answer, while the
identical type of testimony prevailed as part of the prosecution's case
against Moore. The sole difference in the cases appears to be the
presence and advice of counsel as an acceptable act allowing reasser-
tion of Boeckenhaupt's right to silence.
Less than five months after the Moore decision, the Fourth Circuit
held in United States v. Ghiz2' that "if, in declining to answer certain
questions a criminal accused invokes his fifth amendment privilege
or in any other manner indicates he is relying on his understanding
of the Miranda warning, evidence of his silence or of his refusal to
answer specific questions is inadmissible. ' 2  In Ghiz the court re-
garded the initially garrulous defendant's brief statement expressing
his preference not to undergo further interrogation as sufficient reli-
ance on his Miranda warning to reassert his privilege against self-
incrimination.2 Yet his only affirmative action was a statement that
he was reluctant to answer any additional questions concerning a
vehicle he had allegedly stolen.24 Thus, the defendant never made a
I Id.
21 Id. Boeckenhaupt's conviction was not overturned due to a finding of harmless
error in light of the voluminous length of the agent's testimony and the judge's instruc-
tion to the witness to refrain from repeating his error.
21 491 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1974).
= Id. at 600.
23 Id.
24 A number of FBI agents had interviewed Ghiz on two occasions. The offending
testimony by Agent Knott concerning one of those conversations centered on this
exchange:
Q. Mr. Knott, did you have any further conversation with Mr. Ghiz
on that occasion?
A. Yes sir. We started to ask him some questions about the Mack
tractor that he purchased from Mr. Pauley, at which time he stated
that he did not desire to answer any questions concerning that tractor
and the interview was terminated.
Id. The court specifically noted that the jury might well have found significance in
Ghiz's refusal to talk about the tractor. Id. For decisions similar to Ghiz, see State v.
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direct reference to either the fifth amendment or Miranda as the
Moore decision by implication required.
2
1
The Fourth Circuit's rationale in Ghiz, therefore, seems to repre-
sent a retraction from the standards it established in Moore concern-
ing the re-invocation of the Miranda right to silence after waiver. In
Moore the court instituted the requirement that an accused must
show overtly either his reliance on his Miranda warning or an invoca-
tion of his fifth amendment privilege in order to make his refusal to
answer questions inadmissible. Nevertheless, in Ghiz, the defen-
dant's simple "desire [not] to answer any questions" counted as
sufficient reliance on his understanding of the Miranda warning. The
words spoken by Ghiz appear to be nothing more than the verbal
equivalent of the defendant's silence in Moore, since both defendants
were intending to avoid any further opportunities to incriminate
themselves.
In light of the Ghiz decision, it would seem appropriate to note
that the Moore decision will not have the broad ramifications it could
have had. The Moore court held the tacit admission rule applicable,
despite the fifth amendment, because the defendant had failed to
state affirmatively that he was relying on his fifth amendment
rights.26 However, the Ghiz decision establishes that the defendant
need assert verbally only that he desires to stop answering questions
in order to invoke these rights.2 7 Certainly, this move away from the
formality implicit in Moore is justified in light of the sensitivity
courts have traditionally shown for protecting an individual's fifth
amendment rights .18
Adams, 76 Wash. 2d 650, 458 P.2d 558 (1969) and People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. 2d 699,
712, 172 P.2d 18, 25 (1946). In the latter the accused's statement "I have told you all I
am going to tell you, I have nothing more to say" was held to be the exercise of his
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Id. Consequently, the statement
precluded evidence of his silence in the face of an accusatory statement made by the
arresting officer.
2 In Moore the court gave every indication that the invocation by the defendant
of his fifth amendment protection was to be a formal one:
[I]f in declining to answer certain questions he had invoked his fifth
amendment privilege, or if in any other way he had indicated he was
relying on his understanding of the Miranda warning, evidence of his
silence would have been inadmissible.
484 F.2d at 1286.
26 Id.
2 See text accompanying notes 21-25 supra.
28 See e.g., Commonwealth v. Fisher, 398 Pa. 237, 157 A.2d 207 (1960) where the
court made the following statement concerning the fifth amendment:
The constitutional privilege [against self-incrimination] is not like a
coat which may be taken off and thrown away. It is as much a part of
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However, one aspect of Moore has unfortunately remained un-
changed. The Fourth Circuit has chosen to make silence alone insuffi-
cient to invoke the fifth amendment after a valid waiver. Apparently,
the Fourth Circuit reasoned that silence immediately subsequent to
a voluntary answer has such a high degree of probative value as a
tacit admission that it is far more likely an attempt by the defendant
to protect his story rather than an assertion of fifth amendment
rights."5 In essence, the court would seem to have based its decision
as to when an individual has invoked his right against self incrimina-
tion on a determination as to the motive for the silence. This type of
reasoning with respect to the propriety of the tacit admission rule as
applied to a silent criminal defendant is novel. In fact, it arguably
runs directly counter to the traditional view that the tacit admission
rule must fall before the fifth amendment regardless of the degree of
probative value presented by the particular circumstances."
T.K.W.
B.C.T.
the accused as his skin and may not be stripped away by himself or
by others .... [A]nd the fact that he has willingly admitted circum-
stances adverse to his own interests can never be made the basis for
compelling him to make further admissions.
157 A.2d at 210-11.
2 Consider the following language by the Fourth Circuit in Moore: "His omission
of details, in the face of questions that he had voluntarily agreed to answer, was an
indicia of the reliability of the information he was offering. . . ." 484 F.2d at 1286.
Additionally, the court pointed out that the defendant never gave any indication that
he desired to involve the fifth amendment. Id.
" In determining that a defendant's silence after arrest but prior to trial cannot
be admissible evidence per the tacit admission rule, most courts have long relied on
the principle that silence is sufficient to invoke the fifth amendment privilege. See,
e.g., United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259 (6th Cir. 1967); Ivey v. United States,
344 F.2d 770 (5th Cir. 1965); People v. Giscondi, 9 Mich. App. 289, 156 N.W. 2d 601
(1967); Messier v. State, 428 P.2d 338 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967). However, the courts
base their decisions on a variety of legal theories. The foremost of these declares that
use of a defendant's prior silence nullifies his privilege against self-incrimination.
Fowle v. United States, 410 F.2d 48 (9th Cir. 1969). A second theory contends that use
of such silence would constitute a penalty upon the exercise of a constitutional right.
Id. Galasso v. State, 207 So. 2d 45 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968). A final theory focuses
on the similarities between the defendant's right to remain silent and his right not to
testify at his trial. In 1893, the Supreme Court decided in Wilson v. United States,
149 U.S. 60 (1893), that there can be no comment as to a defendant's failure to testify
in federal prosecutions. This rule of law expanded to encompass state prosecutions in
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Therefore, based on the fact that there is no
distinction between these two forms of silence, the courts have held that prior silence
cannot be brought before the jury. United States v. Nolan, 416 F.2d 588 (10th Cir.
1969); Fagundes v. United States, 340 F.2d 673 (1st Cir. 1965); State v. Dearman, 198
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E. Sentencing
1. Comment: United States v. Maples: Appellate Review of Sent-
encing Based Upon Sex
In 1930 the Eighth Circuit in Gurera v. United States' offered the
now famous proposition: "If there is one rule in the federal criminal
practice which is firmly established, it is that the appellate court has
no control over a sentence which is within the limits allowed by a
statute."'2 In the ensuing half century countless federal courts have
agreed that they lack the power to review statutorily legal sentences.
3
Kan. 44, 422 P.2d 573 (1967). The basis of all these decisions would seem to be that
the importance of the constitutional privilege negates use of the tacit admission rule
to admit prosecutorial comment at trial on a defendant's silence prior to trial.
As a matter of strict evidence law, the tacit admission rule has been attacked as
applied to prosecutorial comment on a defendant's silence during accusatory investiga-
tion. The tacit admission doctrine relies on the assumption that when accusations are
made in a defendant's presence, it is reasonable to expect him to deny those accusa-
tions if he is innocent. See note 6 supra. Though once firmly established in both state
and federal criminal prosecutions, the doctrine has come under increased attack in
recent years. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex. rel. Staino v. Cavell, 207 Pa. Super, 274,
217 A.2d 824, 825-33 (1966) (dissenting opinion analyzing both constitutionality and
probative value of tacit admissions); see also, Commonwealth v. Dravecz, 424 Pa. 582,
227 A.2d 904 (1967). Objections to the doctrine center on the fact that some accusations
by their very nature provide insufficient pressure to make a suspect admit anything
aloud. As one noted legal scholar explains:
[T]he inquiry into the motive of silence, since silence is inaction, is
so difficult that no accurate results can be expected ...
In view of the high probability that silence is, in these situations, in
fact motivated by a desire not to communicate any reaction to the
assertion (and thus in effect to assert the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination), a blanket rule of exclusion might well be most
appropriate.
C. McCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 161 at 355 (2d ed. 1972).
The Fourth Circuit may have been proper in its apparent reasoning that it was
more likely that Moore's silence was a tacit admission than it would have been had
he not begun to answer questions. However, the increased evidentiary value of the
defendant's silence should not have provided a justification for a denial of the constitu-
tional right to remain silent. The fifth amendment is an outright proscription against
self-incrimination and since Miranda, silence has been a sufficient invocation of that
proscription..
1 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1930).
2 Id. at 340-41.
See, e.g., United States v. MacKay, 491 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 972 (1974); United States v. Dudley, 436 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Pruitt, 341 F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1965); Epperson v. Anderson, 326 F.2d 665 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Russell v. United States, 288 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v.
DeMarie, 261 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1958). Several courts have slightly qualified the rule,
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This unqualified rule, however, has been increasingly criticized as an
incongruous exception to appellate courts' normal function of safe-
guarding the rights of defendants in criminal trials.4 In other, less
significant areas appellate courts can review actions taken by lower
courts. Yet, in a part of the trial as crucial as sentencing, the deci-
sions of the trial judges have not been reviewable on the appellate
level. 5
Recognizing this inflexibility, appellate courts have begun in the
last decade to erode the doctrine of nonreviewability of trial sent-
ences. The courts have accomplished this erosion by focusing on the
methods by which trial judges have decided upon particular sent-
ences.' A recent decision of the Fourth Circuit provides an interesting
example of the interaction between increasing appellate scrutiny of
the sentencing process and the general evolution of judicial attitudes
toward gender as a relevant legal consideration.
In United States v. Maples,' appellant Monroe Clinton Maples
and his co-defendant, Lynn Ellen Morrow, pleaded guilty to the rob-
bery of a federally insured bank' and received respective sentences of
fifteen and ten years. A third defendant, Edward Rivers, pleaded not
guilty to the same offense, but was tried and convicted and received
a sentence of twelve years. The evidence showed that Rivers had
operated the getaway car while Maples and Morrow, who were
stating that the sentence could be modified upon a showing of "manifest" or "gross"
abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Adcock, 487 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Lowe, 482 F.2d 1357 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Hetherington,
279 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1960).
'See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING To APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES (Approved
Draft, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Approved Draft]; Burr, Appellate Review as a
Means of Controlling Criminal Sentencing Discretion-A Workable Alternative?, 33
U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Burr]; Sobeloff, The Sentence of the
Court: Should There Be Appellate Review? 41 A.B.A.J. 13 (1955) [hereinafter cited
as Sobeloff).
I Judge Sobeloff has long been a forceful advocate of appellate review of trial court
sentences. In his words, "[w]hy appellate judges should be bound and gagged with
respect to the sentence poses something of a mystery. They can examine the indict-
ment to see whether a comma is misplaced; they can review any order; any ruling on
the evidence. But the really important question is shielded against review." Appellate
Review of Sentences, 32 F.R.D. 249, 271 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Appellate
Review].
See notes 57-67 infra and accompanying text.
501 F.2d 985 (4th Cir. 1974).
Maples and Morrow pleaded guilty to violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970),
under which the maximum punishment allowable is an imprisonment of twenty years
and a fine of $5,000.
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armed, entered the bank.' The evidence also indicated that Morrow
had suggested the robbery.10
The fact that Maples was twenty-one at the time of the robbery
while Morrow was only seventeen apparently influenced the trial
court in its determination of sentences." However, when sentencing
Morrow, the trial judge also remarked:
Well, these modern philosophies that have come forward lately
about women's liberation [are] such that I reckon legally I
can't make a distinction between your sentence and your co-
defendants, but I'm old fashioned enough I just don't believe
in punishing women who participate in a crime with the men
on the same basis as a man. Ordinarily, I think the man takes
the lead and persuades the female, the woman. . . .I'm going
to give you the benefit of that although the evidence seems to
indicate that might not be the case here. But because of your
age and the fact that you are a woman, the Court will not
incarcerate you for quite as long as I did your co-defendant.
2
Maples then asked the trial court to reduce his sentence to ten years. 3
The court refused his request, adverting to some of the factors justify-
ing the disparity in the sentences such as Maples' prior criminal
record and the difference in the defendants' ages, but making no
further reference to their sexes. Based on the trial court's refusal to
reduce his sentence, Maples appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
A divided court vacated Maples' punishment and remanded for
resentencing. The Fourth Circuit reaffirmed, as a general proposition,
the invulnerability from appellate review of a trial judge's exercise of
discretion in the determination of a sentence. The court'also acknowl-
edged the existence of factors which justified some disparity in the
sentences of Maples and Morrow. 4 Nevertheless, the majority con-
cluded that on the basis of two recent Supreme Court cases, 5 "and
1 501 F.2d at 985-86.
I0 d.
1Id. at 988. The trial judge told Maples' attorney after he had pointed out the
differences in their respective sentences: "Mr. Tepper, do you think the Court must
treat a 17-year old the same way as a 21 year old? She was 17 when the crime was
committed; he's 22 now, I assume he was 21. Yet the Court must treat a 17-year old
on the same basis as a 21-year old in the commission of a crime?" Id.
12 Id. at 986 (emphasis added).
" See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35, which provides in part: "The court may correct an
illegal sentence at any time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner
within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence. The court may reduce a
sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed.
11 501 F.2d at 987.
15 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
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absent any proof that rehabilitation or deterence are more easily
accomplished in the case of females rather than males, we deem the
factor of sex an impermissible one to justify a disparity in sent-
ences.""6
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Bryan protested that the majority
had ignored the nonreviewability doctrine set forth in Gurera. ,7 The
dissent reasoned that even if appellate courts possessed the power to
review statutorily allowable sentences, such scrutiny was not appro-
priate in Maples since other factors, most notably age, provided
ample justification for the disparity in the defendants' sentences.'8
The dissent's advocacy of unfettered trial court discretion in set-
ting punishment implicitly relied on several historical and pragmatic
considerations. The old federal circuit courts had interpreted the
Judicature Act of 187911 as empowering them to modify sentences
,1 501 F.2d at 987. The Fourth Circuit noted that to some extent the proscribed
discrimination involved unduly favorable consideration for Morrow rather than unfa-
vorable treatment of Maples. If the court had determined that Maples was not the
recipient of any unfavorable consideration, he would not have been an aggrieved party
and thus would not have had standing to challenge either his or Morrow's sentence.
Judge Winter in his opinion for the majority concluded, however, that: "[W]hatever
is an undue preference to Morrow is necessarily an undue discrimination to Maples
because he did not receive as favorable a consideration as Morrow." Id.
Additionally, Judge Winter cited North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969),
as effectively obviating the alternative solution of increasing the ten-year sentence
imposed on Morrow. The court's reliance on Pearce, however, seems misplaced. That
case involved a defendant who had been convicted, had his original conviction over-
turned, received a new trial, and then received a harsher punishment. Maples, on the
other hand, concerned only the question of whether or not a court could increase the
sentence of one who had not appealed so as to remove any improper considerations
from the sentencing process. As the Supreme Court said in Pearce: "[W]e deal here,
not with increases in existing sentences, but with the imposition of wholly new sent-
ences after wholly new trials." Id. at 722.
Other Supreme Court decisions indicate that the majority in Maples was correct
in its assumption that it lacked the authority to increase Morrow's punishment. See
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931); and Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163, 168
(1873).
, 501 F.2d at 988. See notes 1-3 supra.
, In effect, the dissent argued that even if sex was an improper consideration,
other factors provided justification for the sentences imposed by the trial court, and
therefore the punishments should not be overturned. A recent Supreme Court decision,
however, rejected an argument by the prosecution which was essentially the same as
that propounded by Judge Bryan. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443 (1972),
in which the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Appeals was correct in remanding
for reconsideration of a sentence based in part on an improper factor. The Court
rejected the government's contention that a remand would be "artificial" since in view
of other damaging information about the defendant known to the trial judge at the
time of sentencing, a different sentence was not likely to be imposed. Id. at 447.
," Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 2, 20 Stat. 354.
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imposed by trial courts.2 The 1879 Act stated that "[iln case of an
affirmance of the judgement of the district court, the circuit court
shall proceed to pronounce final sentence and to award execution
thereon. ' 21 When the 1891 Act,2 2 which established the current Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals, failed to incorporate similar language, appel-
late courts assumed by implication that they could no longer exercise
review over sentences. 21 The first case to adopt such an interpretation
was Freeman v. United States.2 4 In that case, the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the defendant's argument that his sentence could be modified
and stated that "a [trial judge's] discretion. . . will not be reviewed
. . . in any case where the punishment is within the statutory lim-
its."2
However, the exclusion from the 1891 Act of the reviewability
provision in the earlier Act does not seem as critical a deletion as
indicated in the Freeman decision. Under a federal statue governing
judicial procedure the Supreme Court and other courts of appellate
jurisdiction have, among other powers, the authority to modify judg-
ments of trial courts. 2 Nevertheless, despite the statute's general
applicability to criminal cases27 and despite the obligation of appel-
late courts to correct errors substantially affecting the rights of the
accused,2 the statute has not been interpreted to allow appellate
modification of statutorily legal sentences.2 9 Because the Supreme
21 See United States v. Wynn, 11 F.57 (C.C.E.D. Mo. 1882); Bates v. United
States, 10 F. 92 (C.C.N.D. Ill. 1881).
21 Act of March 3, 1879, ch. 176, § 2, 20 Stat. 354.
2 Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826.
2 See Beckett v. United States, 84 F.2d 731, 732-33 (6th Cir. 1936); Gurera v.
United States, 40 F.2d 338, 340-41 (8th Cir. 1930); Freeman v. United States, 243 F.
353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919).
21 243 F. 353, 357 (9th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 600 (1919).
22 243 F. at 357.
26 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (1970) provides that:
The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction
may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree,
or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review, and may
remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment,
decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may
be just under the circumstances.
21 See Saldana v. United States, 365 U.S. 646 (1961) (three convictions under five-
count indictment set aside); McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967)
(conviction set aside and case remanded with instructions to determine adequacy of
attorney's representation of defendant); Dancy v. United States, 361 F.2d 75 (D.C. Cir.
1965) (new trial ordered because of question as to defendant's mental capacity).
28 United States v. Morales, 477 F.2d 1309 (5th Cir. 1973); Ladakis v. United
States, 283 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1960).
" See United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
McElreath, 412 F.2d 847 (10th Cir. 1969).
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Court has failed to utilize the statute to effect sentence modifica-
tion,"° federal appellate courts have felt constrained to eschew any
such statutory power.3 ' As the Second Circuit has said, "[lit is clear
that the Supreme Court alone is in a position to hold that [the
specific federal statute] confers authority to reduce a sentence which
is not outside the bounds set by a valid statute." 2
Although never directly confronted with the issue of the validity
of the Freeman court's determination that the 1891 Act precluded
appellate review of legal sentences, the Supreme Court in dicta has
affirmed the conclusion of appellate courts that they lack the author-
ity to revise statutorily permissible punishments. In Gore v. United
States, 1 in which the issue was the authority of Congress to establish
multiple criminal penalties for a single sale of drugs, Mr. Justice
Frankfurter remarked:
In effect, we are asked to enter the domain of penology, and
more particularly that tantalizing aspect of it, the proper ap-
The Supreme Court did, however, affirm on the basis of § 2106 the decision of
a circuit court to vacate a conviction and remand for a new trial in Bryan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950). The circuit court had concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to support the conviction of the defendant for tax evasion. The Supreme
Court agreed with the circuit court that § 2106 was an appropriate mechanism for
ordering a new trial to ensure that "justice was served. . . ." Id. at 559.
3' See Smith v. United States, 273 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S.
846 (1960); United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
838 (1952).
Two other potential means of effecting appellate review of sentencing also have
not been employed by appellate courts. First, the Supreme Court and circuit courts
have generally not interpreted their supervisory powers over lower federal courts as a
mechanism for reviewing sentences of lower courts. But see Yates v. United States, 356
U.S. 363 (1958); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d'500 (7th Cir. 1960).
Second, arguably implicit within the eighth amendment's sanction against cruel
and unusual punishment is a general appellate power to review all trial court sent-
ences, irrespective of whether they are statutorily legal. Most courts, however, have
agreed "that the fixing of penalties for criminal offenses is a legislative function, and
ordinarily a sentence which is within the limits of the applicable statute will not be
disturbed on appeal upon the ground of being unusual, excessive, or cruel." Adam v.
United States, 266 F.2d 819, 820 (10th Cir. 1959). See also United States v. Williams,
446 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Kellerman, 432 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Lloyd, 431 F.2d 160 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 911 (1972).
But see Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 938 (1974)
(mandatory life sentence imposed upon defendant under West Virginia recidivist stat-
ute was so disproportionate to gravity of crimes committed that it constituted cruel
and unusual punishment). Cf. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
12 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583, 606-07 (2d Cir.) (footnote omitted),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
357 U.S. 386 (1958).
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portionment of punishment. Whatever views may be enter-
tained regarding severity of punishment ... these are pecu-
liarly questions of legislative policy. Equally so are the much
mooted problems relating to the power of the judiciary to re-
view sentences. First the English and then the Scottish Courts
of Criminal Appeal were given power to revise sentences, the
power to increase as well as the power to reduce them ...
This Court has no such power.
3 4
In addition to these historical considerations, three basic justifica-
tions have been offered by courts and commentators for granting trial
judges unfettered discretion in imposing sentences. The first justifi-
cation is that only trial court judges, who have had the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the defendant during the course of the
trial, are in a position to determine accurately a proper punishment."
Appellate judges, on the other hand, are confronted with only the
"cold" record. The second theory propounded is that appellate review
of sentences will result in a flood of frivolous appeals filed in hopes
of obtaining a sentence modification. 6 Direct appellate review would
thus place an unnecessary burden upon the judicial resources of fed-
eral appellate courts. A third argument is that trial judges, fearing
appellate modification of sentences, will react with the imposition of
standardized penalties, thereby precipitating a trend toward sterile
unformity in sentences. 7
The soundness of each of these premises is questionable. With
respect to the contention that trial judges can evaluate more properly
the behavior of the accused during the trial, available empirical data
indicate that a defendant's demeanor is an unreliable guide for the
trial judge. 3 In addition, the trial judge may often be emotionally
influenced by extraneous factors. 9
3, Id. at 393.
See Appellate Review, supra note 5, at 262.
See Burr, supra note 4, at 20.
3' See Appellate Review, supra note 5, at 262.
3' See Burr, supra note 4, at 21. Additionally, even assuming that the demeanor
of the defendant is a reliable indicator of an appropriate punishment, the great number
of guilty pleas obtained as a result of plea bargaining minimize the opportunity for trial
judges to make such personal evaluations. Id.
3' Judge Sobeloff has observed: "On appeal, there is less likelihood of emotional
overtones from which even a conscientious trial judge may find it difficult to escape
when he imposes sentence shortly after hearing of the defendant's outrageous conduct.
The appellate court also has the advantage of a wider perspective of cases." Sobeloff,
supra note 4, at 17.
A study of the sentencing patterns of various trial judges in the state of Washing-
ton indicated that many legally irrelevant considerations greatly influenced the state
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The fear that direct appellate review of sentences will lead to a
squandering of limited judicial resources through frivolous appeals
also appears to be without substantial merit. The disclaimer of au-
thority to review sentences may in fact indirectly result in the evil
sought to be avoided. It has been estimated that almost one-half of a
federal circuit court's time is consumed in considering appeals of
sentences perceived by defendants to be overly harsh." As Judge
Sobeloff has stated: "There is scarcely a court of appeals. . . whose
calendars are not already congested with thinly veiled entreaties im-
ploring it to find a loophole in the law so that a Draconian sentence
may be upset."4 In too many instances it seems that appellate courts
have tried to achieve the mutually exclusive goals of ritualistically
affirming the doctrine of nonreviewability of sentences while at the
same time meting out more reasonable terms of imprisonment. As a
consequence, appeals courts have been compelled to seize upon minor
or technical defects to justify what in effect are reviews of sentences .42
This circuitous method of effectuating sentence review appears only
to have added to the strain on appellate courts' judicial resources and
has forced appellate courts to provide highly dubious explanations for
their decisions to overturn sentences.
3
Implicit within the third justification f6r allowing trial judges
unfettered discretion in sentencing-that appellate review will en-
courage trial court imposition of standardized sentences to avoid ap-
judges in their determination of sentences. These factors included the race of the
defendant, the educational background of the judge, the length of time the judge had
been a lawyer and had served on the court, and the number of the defendant's prior
arrests. Comment, Discretion in Felony Sentencing-A Study of Influencing Factors,
48 WASH. L. REv. 857, 870 (1973). See also Comment, Texas Sentencing Practices: A
Statistical Study, 45 TExAS L. REv. 471 (1967).
,0 Bennett, The Sentence-Its Relation to Crime and Rehabilitation, OF PRISONS
AND JUSTICE, S. Doc. No. 70, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 307, 311 (1964), cited in Approved
Draft, supra note 4, at 30-31.
In contrast to their American counterparts, English appellate courts have the
statutory power to exercise direct review of sentences. The grant of such authority has
apparently not strained the resources of the English judiciary. One study indicated
that less than five percent of those convicted in English trial courts sought to appeal
their sentences. Sobeloff, A Recommendation for Appellate Review of Criminal
Sentences, 21 BROOK. L. REv. 2, 9 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Recommendation].
" Appellate Review, supra note 5, at 271.
" See Recommendation, supra note 40, at 8.
,3 See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1971). In that case the
Fourth Circuit vacated a seemingly harsh punishment and remanded for resentencing
on the ground that sentencing of the defendant several weeks after his conviction may
have caused the trial judge to confuse the case with another. The court offered no other
explanation for the disparity between the crime and the punishment but remanded
even as it affirmed its lack of authority to review the trial court's sentence. Id. at 498.
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pellate modification-is the view that individualization of sentences
is desirable.44 Many legitimate and desirable sentencing goals, such
as deterrence, isolation, and rehabilitation, confront the trial judge."
In weighing these objectives trial judges should attempt "to make the
1 The Supreme Court has approved the goal of sentence individualization on
several occasions. See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576, 584 (1959); Pennsyl-
vania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937); Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932).
In Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), the Court stated: "The belief no longer
prevails that every offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment
without regard to the past life and habits of a particular offender. . . .Today's philos-
ophy of individualizing sentences makes sharp distinctions for example between first
and repeated offenders." Id. at 247-48 (footnote omitted).
While sentence individualization may be a desirable objective, problems may arise
in determining the extent to which punishments should be individualized or how
much discretion should be granted to the sentencing judge. In Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972), the Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion held that the imposition
of the death sentence on several men convicted of assorted violent crimes constituted
cruel and unusual punishment. Since the majority consisted of five concurring opinions
Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and Marshall, only two of which chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the death penalty per se (Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall), the particular rationale for the decision is uncertain. However, Mr. Justice
Douglas's opinion is relevant to a consideration of sentence individualization.
Under the sentencing schemes involved in Furman, the judge or jury had the
discretionary power to impose the death penalty. Noting that members of politically
feeble groups, such as the poor, the young, and blacks, received the death penalty at
a disproportionately high rate, Mr. Justice Douglas concluded: "The high service
rendered by the 'cruel and unusual punishment' clause of the Eighth Amendment is
to require legislatures to write penal laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and
nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general laws are not applied
sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups." Id. at 256.
A recent New York decision, People v. Mosley, 43 U.S.L.W. 2105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
Monroe County, Sept. 20, 1974), presents precisely the opposite defect-a law granting
too little discretion to the trial judge. New York's new drug law mandated the imposi-
tion of a sentence of life imprisonment for persons convicted of selling illegal drugs.
The law also afforded no opportunity for probation, discharge, sentencing as a youthful
offender, plea bargaining, or civil commitment for drug addiction. The New York
Supreme Court for Monroe County struck down the law, stating:
It is a fundamental precept of our system of justice that the
punishment should not only fit the offense, but the offender. ...
Moreover, rehabilitation has been recognized as the major objective
of criminal punishment. . . . [However, with the law before the
Court, no allowance for this fundamental precept is made. The Court
is not allowed to consider the status of the buyer, whether addict or
non-addict. Nor may it consider the qualities of the offender, whether
young or old, family man or not, high or low rehabilitative potential,
value or potential value to society.
Id. at 2105.
11 See Burr supra note 4, at 2; Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing
Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YAmx L.J. 1453, 1455 (1960).
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punishment fit not only the crime but also the character and needs
of the individual and the requirements of the community."4 The
result may often be that two defendants convicted of the same offense
will receive unequal punishments. Such dissimilarity in sentences
has received widespread legal approbation. As one commentator ob-
served: "the basic objective in the sentencing field is not uniformity
of sentence . . . [but] rather uniformity in the procedures to be
followed and in the considerations to be applied in the course of the
sentencing process." 7 In view of the judicial support for individual-
ized penalties, uniform punishments would seem no less vulnerable
to appellate modification than otherwise unconstitutional sent-
ences. Therefore, trial judges would have no motivation to impose
standardized sentences. Under a formal system of appellate review,
trial judges would still have the discretion, indeed, the duty, to im-
pose disparate sentences, subject to appellate modification only in
egregious cases.49
Thus, each of the justifications for absolute trial court determina-
tion of sentences appears to be without substantial validity. At the
very least, empirical analyses have failed to verify that trial judges
can most accurately evaluate a defendant's demeanor, or that direct
appellate review of sentences will needlessly waste judicial resources.
Legal acceptance of the theory of sentence individualization necessi-
tates disparate sentences based on constitutional considerations.
However, despite the lack of empirical and legal support for the
finality of trial court sentences, in recent years the Supreme Court
and federal courts of appeals have adopted only an intermediate
approach between the nonreviewability doctrine enunciated by
Gurera and Freeman and direct appellate review of sentences. 5 The
Supreme Court has not expressly overruled the principles of nonre-
viewability of statutorily permissible penalties. Yet, in apparent rec-
ognition of the potential inequities inherent in a rule which if applied
inflexibly affords no control over wholly arbitrary or capricious trial
, United States v. Vita, 209 F. Supp. 172, 174 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
Appellate Review, supra note 5, at 295. Those convicted of criminal charges
appear to appreciate the distinction between equal consideration and equal sentences.
The perception of a convict regarding the fairness accorded to him by the trial judge
in his determination of sentence can greatly influence the likelihood of a successful
rehabilitation while in prison. See generally Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sent-
encing Decisions: A Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960). Cf. Shepard v.
United States, 257 F.2d 293, 294 (5th Cir. 1958) (Stewart, J.).
" See notes 55-56 infra and accompanying text.
" See Appellate Review, supra note 5, at 273.
See note 5 supra.
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judges, the Supreme Court" and federal appellate courts12 in an in-
creasing number of cases have distinguished between a review of the
sentence itself and an examination of the process by which the sent-
ence was determined. The Fifth Circuit offered a concise description
of this dichotomy when it stated:
Appellate modification of a statutorily-authorized sentence
. . . is an entirely different matter than the careful scrutiny
of the judicial process by which the particular punishment was
determined. Rather than an unjustified incursion into the
province of the sentencing judge, this latter responsibility is,
on the contrary, a necessary incident of what has always been
appropriate appellate review of criminal cases. 3
Two aspects appear to be involved in appellate scrutiny of the
sentencing process. First, noting Supreme Court language supporting
the individualization of punishment, 54 appellate courts examine the
record to determine whether trial courts, when imposing sentence,
failed to exercise discretion by sentencing defendants "on a mechani-
cal basis."55 Thus, if a trial judge on the basis of a predetermined
policy automatically imposes the maximum sentence on a defendant
convicted of a certain crime, he has failed to exercise his discretion. 6
Because he did not consider the particular circumstances of the case,
the sentence is improper and should be vacated. Second, appellate
courts scrutinize the sentencing process to ensure that punishments
are not founded upon improper considerations57 or inaccurate infor-
5 See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 42 U.S.L.W. 5156, 5161-62 (U.S. June
26, 1974); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-48 (1972); Townsend v. Burke,
334 U.S. 736, 741 (1948).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 469 F.2d 1377 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 989 (1973); United States v. Latimer, 415 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1969); Smith v.
United States, 223 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1955), aff'd, 360 U.S. 1 (1959).
11 United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 654 (5th Cir. 1974).
5' See note 44 supra.
Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 143 (8th Cir. 1973).
5' The most common illustration of such an analysis has occurred in cases involv-
ing various violations of the Selective Service Act. See Woosley v. United States, 478
F.2d 139 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Daniels, 446 F.2d 967 (6th Cir., rehearing denied, 446 F.2d 973 (1971).
" See, e.g., United States v. Rollerson, 491 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir. 1974) (reliance by
trial judge on allegedly incorrect information about defendant's prior arrests); United
States v. Powell, 487 F.2d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 1973) ("failure of the record to support
material factors on which the severity of the punishment rested" and defendant's lack
of opportunity to refute or explain the damaging information upon which the judge
relied); United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971) (lack of persuasive
evidence in pre-sentence report which depicted defendant as a large-scale drug dealer).
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mation.5 5 Although a trial judge is not generally restricted by exclu-
sionary rules of evidence in determining an appropriate sentence,59 if
he has been influenced by impermissible factors, the sentence should
be vacated as an "abuse of discretion."
0
The heightened scrutiny exercised by appellate courts examining
the method by which a particular punishment was derived appears
to be a desirable safeguard of the rights of the defendant in a criminal
trial. Yet the conclusion seems irresistible that examination of the
sentencing process has been employed by frustrated circuit courts as
a means of circumventing the rule of appellate nonreviewability.6 '
While courts often assert that the severity of a sentence is not an issue
and then overturn the sentence because of a flaw in the sentencing
process,"2 it appears than an appellate court engaged in review of that
process utilizes essentially the same analysis associated with a review
of the sentence itself. Logically, a court evaluating the propriety of a
specific punishment is compelled to scan the record to ascertain the
existence of factors sustaining the judgment of a trial judge." The
alleged dichotomy between review of a sentence and review of the
sentencing process is therefore in practice a chimera. 4 But given the
reluctance of appellate courts to revise sentences directly, the in-
creasing focus upon the sentencing process is a technique likely to be
applied with even greater frequency in the future.
Much of the majority's analysis in Maples typified this new ap-
proach; the court scrutinized the sentencing process and simultane-
53 See, e.g., United States v. Stumpf, 476 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1973) (post-sentencing
discovery of evidence of defendant's psychiatric problems); United States v. Sidella,
469 F.2d 1079 (4th Cir. 1972) (possible misreading of statute which persuaded trial
judge to assume erroneously that he could not place the defendant on probation);
Crowe v. State, 194 N.W.2d 234 (S.D. 1972) (trial judge's mistaken belief that defen-
dant had four prior convictions when in fact he had only one).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Majors, 490 F.2d 1321, 1322 (10th Cir. 1974).
" See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972) (original
sentence of five years modified to one year by circuit court after failure of district court
on two successive remands to modify sentence and after district court's comment in
such remands that it had uncontrollable discretion in imposing statutorily legal sent-
ences). Cf. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736 (1948) (writ of habeas corpus granted
because sentence was determined on the mistaken assumption that the defendant had
been previously found guilty of several larcenies).
" See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text; Note, Appellate Review of Sent-
ences and the Need for a Reviewable Record, 1973 DuKE L.J. 1357, 1361 (1973).
n See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 450 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1971).
61 See, e.g., United States v. McKinney, 466 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1972), in which
the sentence was vacated as an abuse of discretion because the particular circumstan-
ces of the case failed to support the judgment of the trial judge.
64 See notes 41-42 supra and accompanying text.
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ously disclaimed any authority to exercise direct review of sentences.
But if the majority's methodlogy was not a departure from recent
standards of appellate review, its conclusion that sex cannot legiti-
mately be considered by the trial court in its sentencing evaluation
marked a significant divergence from past judicial attitudes toward
sex-based legal distinctions. The probable impact of the Maples rul-
ing will be the addition of a new element to the emerging judicial rule
that sex-based legal differentiations are constitutionally impermissi-
ble.
Historically, courts have upheld laws which differentiated on the
basis of gender. 5 In recent years, however, federal courts have demon-
strated great uncertainty over the proper standard of review to be
utilized when considering challenges to laws which allegedly discrim-
inate on the basis of sex. 6 The two factors which contribute to the
confusion are the apparent shift of the Supreme Court away from its
traditional "two-tiered"" equal protection analysis and the Court's
own inability to formulate a consistent and uniform standard to be
applied when statutes which allegedly discriminate on the basis of
gender are challenged."8
"' Mr. Justice Bradley's concurring opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 130 (1873), while extreme in tone, was indicative of the Supreme Court's atti-
tude for much of the last century toward sex-related statutory classifications. In up-
holding the refusal by the Supreme Court of Illinois to order licensing of women to
practice law in Illinois, Mr. Justice Bradley observed:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natu-
ral and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life .... The
harmony, not to say identity, of interests and views which belong, or
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband.
Id. at 141.
See also Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in which an Oregon statute which
provided that no female could work in certain establishments more than ten hours a
day was upheld; and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), in which the Court
affirmed a Michigan law under which no woman could be a bartender unless she was
the wife or daughter of the male owner of a licensed liquor establishment. Even as late
as 1948, Mr. Justice Frankfurter could casually state: "Michigan could, beyond ques-
tion, forbid all women from working behind a bar." Id. at 465.
66 See note 97 infra.
,7 See Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther].
68 See Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the "Heightened Rationality Test:" Is the Su-
preme Court Promoting a Double Standard in Sex Discrimination Cases?, 32 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. - (1974).
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The Supreme Court has employed two different tests" when ex-
amining legislation challenged under the equal protection clause. 0 If
a statute is based on a "suspect" classification,71 such as national
origin," race,7" or alienage,4 or if it infringes upon a "fundamental
interest" such as the right to vote 5 or the right to appeal a criminal
conviction," the "most rigid scrutiny"" has been applied. Under this
test, a statute will be upheld only if necessary to the achievement of
a "compelling state interest."" Conversely, social or economic classi-
fications are validated merely on the showing of a "rational relation-
ship" to a legitimate state interest." This standard usually involves
minimal scrutiny."
In an analysis of the factors that are adjudged proper bases for
disparate sentences, the choice of which standard of review is applic-
able is critical. In weighing the needs of the individual against the
protection of the community, courts perceive such non-suspect con-
siderations as the defendant's prior criminal record," the nature and
extent of his participation in the crime, 2 and his personal back-
ground as relevant to a determination of a proper sentence. All of
" See Gunther, supra note 67; Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of H.E.W., 367 F. Supp.
981, 987-89 (D.N.J. 1973).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part: "No state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws."
71 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S., 214, 216 (1944).
72 Id.
" Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
71 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
15 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966).
7' Griffin v. illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13 (1956).
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
78 See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1065 (1969).
1' See, e.g., Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
" See Gunther, supra note 67, at 8.
" See, e.g., Costner v. United States, 271 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1959), cert.
denied, 362 U.S. 952 (1960); Parker v. United States, 248 F.2d 803, 804 (4th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 963 (1958).
8 See, e.g., Williams v. Oklahoma, 358 U.S. 576 (1959).
83 See, e.g., United States v. Majors, 490 F.2d 1321, 1322 (10th Cir. 1974). One
national handbook listed the following factors as relevant to a determination of an
appropriate sentence: the nature and the circumstances of the offense; the defendant's
family background and relationships; his educational and military records; his marital
status; his previous criminal record; his physical, emotional, and mental condition;
and the community's attitude toward the offense and the criminal. Race and national
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these factors are acceptable under the "rational relationship" test.
Conversely, a suspect classification such as race84 cannot be relied
upon by a trial judge in imposing punishment unless a "compelling
interest" demonstrates the relevancy of the factor.
Sex, however, does not fall precisely into either of these extremes.
On the one hand, it, "like race and national origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth."85 -Yet the
Supreme Court has failed to declare gender a suspect classification,8
perhaps in recognition of the historic disparity between the socio-
economic roles of men and of women as well as the physical differ-
ences between the sexes.
Noting the Supreme Court's apparent disenchantment87 with the
"two-tiered" approach, both courts8 and commentators89 have theo-
rized that the Court is in a transitional period, the result of which will
be the articulation of a single standard for all equal protection chal-
lenges. The new inquiry, as depicted by Mr. Justice Marshall, is not
likely to be initiated
by the a priori definition of a "right," fundamental or other-
wise. Rather, concentration [will] be placed upon the charac-
ter of the classification in question, the relative importance to
individuals in the class discriminated against of the govern-
mental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted state
interests in support of the classification.
This balancing test, while not as vigorous as the "compelling state
interest" approach, will nevertheless almost certainly require a
higher degree of scrutiny of legal classifications than the relatively
impotent "rational relationship" standard."
origin were specifically listed as irrelevant factors. NATIONAL PROBATION & PAROLE
AssOCIATION, GumE FOR SENTENCING (1957).
, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970).
u See Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1973).
" See Gunther, supra note 67.
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). See also San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 98-103 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
11 Typical of the attitude of the Court when applying the "rational relationship"
standard of review was its statement in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961):
[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits the States a wide scope of
discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differ-
ently than others. The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the
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The uncertainties of this transitional period in equal protection
standards of review are nowhere more evident than in recent Supreme
Court decisions dealing with challenges to statutes based on sexual
classifications. 2 In Reed v. Reed93 and Frontiero v. Richardson," both
of which were relied upon by the Fourth Circuit in Maples, the Su-
preme Court seemed close to declaring either that sex was among the
categories depicted as "suspect," or, at the very least, that greater
justification for sex-related legal classifications than was necessary
under the "rational relationship" standard would be required. 5 How-
ever, the Supreme Court in its recent decision in Kahn v. Shevin"
classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of
the State's objective. . . . A statutory discrimination will not be set
aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.
Id. at 425-26.
The Court's decision in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974), indi-
cates, however, that it is not yet prepared to utilize the hypothesized new equal protec-
tion model with the frequency suggested by some commentators. The Second Circuit
had employed such an intermediate model to strike down a village zoning ordinance
which limited occupancy of one-family homes to traditional families or to groups of
no more than two unrelated persons. The circuit court concluded that the ordinance
was not "supported by any rational basis that is consistent with permissible zoning
objectives." 476 F.2d 806, 818 (2d Cir. 1973).
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Second Circuit's decision. Writing for
the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas appeared to revive the two-tier approach. He stated
that the case involved "economic and social legislation where legislatures have histori-
cally drawn lines which we respect against the charge of violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause if the law be 'reasonable, not arbitrary' . . . and bears a 'rational relation-
ship to a [permissible] state objective.'" 416 U.S. at 8 (brackets in the original).
12 For a fuller treatment of recent Supreme Court decisions dealing with statutes
allegedly discriminating on the basis of sex, see Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the "Height-
ened Rationality Test". Is the Supreme Court Promoting a Double Standard in Sex
Discrimination Cases?, 32 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. - (1974).
,3 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause an Idaho statutory scheme in which parents were considered to be members of
the same entitlement class, yet the father, solely by virtue of his sex, was to be given
a mandatory preference when competing letters of administration were filed.
" 411 U.S. 677 (1973). A plurality of the Court, declaring sex to be an inherently
suspect classification, held unconstitutional certain federal statutory provisions.
Under these statutes, spouses of males in the armed services were presumed to be
dependents for purposes of receiving increased medical benefits and quarters allow-
ances. A servicewoman, in contrast, could not claim her husband as a dependent unless
she could demonstrate that he was in fact dependent upon her for more than one-half
of his support.
"1 See notes 88-91 supra and accompanying text.
91 416 U.S. 351 (1974). In Kahn, a Florida statute under which widows, but not
widowers, were granted $500 property tax exemptions, was challenged by a widower.
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision. Writing for the majority, Mr.
Justice Douglas concluded that Florida had legitimately recognized that widows were
likely to suffer more economic hardships than widowers because they generally pos-
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apparently retreated from those holdings, thereby obfuscating the
Court's current attitude toward laws discriminating on the basis of
sex.97
The Reed, Frontiero, and Kahn decisions may help to resolve the
issue, addressed in Maples, of whether sex is a legitimate basis for
disparity in punishment. Unfortunately, the Fourth Circuit's abso-
lute reliance on Reed and Frontiero, without any discussion of Kahn
and its possible implications on the Supreme Court's present general
viewpoint toward sex discrimination, 8 constituted an inadequate
analysis of the particular problem presented. The majority in Maples
seemingly failed to analyze the three Supreme Court decisions in
terms of an aspect crucial to a determination of whether sex can
justify disparate sentences: the equal protection standard of review
applicable in challenges to gender-based statutory classifications.
Because the two tiers of the traditional equal protection model
sessed fewer job skills and thus were more likely to encounter difficulty in locating
suitable employment.
" Because the Supreme Court has failed to define in a conclusive manner the legal
relevance of sex, lower courts have differed sharply in their approach to statutes chal-
lenged on the basis of alleged sexual discrimination. Cases that utilized the "strict
scrutiny" test include Johnston v. Hodges, 372 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. Ky. 1974) (driver's
license application for minor required to be signed by father); Stem v. Massachusetts
Indem. and Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (different disability insur-
ance provisions offered according to buyer's sex); State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc.
2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973) (presumption that custody of children should be
awarded to mother rather than father after a divorce).
Other courts, however, have employed the "rational basis" standard: Kohr v.
Weinberger, 43 U.S.L.W. 2066 (E.D. Pa. July 26, 1974) (provisions allowing more
favorable Social Security computations for women); Edwards v. Schlesinger, 43
U.S.L.W. 2009 (D.D.C. June 19, 1974) (exclusion of women from service academies);
Ritacco v. Norvin School Dist., 361 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (separate male and
female teams required in interscholastic sports).
Unfortunately, the lower courts' dilemma may well be exacerbated by two recent
Supreme Court decisions. In Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974),
the Court struck down the mandatory maternity leave rules of several school boards.
Under these schemes, a pregnant school teacher was required to leave her job at a fixed
date prior to the expected childbirth. The majority concluded that the mandatory
termination provisions violated due process.
A second decision Geduldig v. Aiello, - U.S. - ,94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974) may
also have an impact upon cases alleging sex discrimination. In Aiello, the plaintiff,
attacked the constitutionality of a provision of the California Unemployment Code.
Under the statute, California paid benefits to people in private employment who were
temporarily unable to work because of some disability not within the scope of work-
men's compensation. The Court agreed with the state's contention that normal preg-
nancies could be excluded from the statute's list of allowable temporary disabilities.
1S See Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the "Heightened Rationality Test": Is the Su-
preme Court Promoting a Double Standard in Sex Discrimination Cases?, 32 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. - (1974).
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impose dissimilar burdens on the state to provide justification for its
legal classifications," determination of whether sexual differences are
legitimate grounds for allowing lesser sentences for women has been
basically a function of the equal protection standard utilized. Under
the traditional two-tiered analysis, the choice of whether the "ra-
tional relationship" test or .the "compelling state interest" standard
is applicable has normally determined the result in a given case.' 0
Under the hypothesized intermediate test,'"' as implicitly applied in
Kahn, ,12 the result is not as predictable. This newer model is likely
to necessitate a greater empirical inquiry than either tier of the tradi-
tional approach.' 3
The empirical analysis utilized in attempting to resolve whether
sex can justify unequal punishments would logically involve a search
for demonstrable evidence that some physical or physiological sexual
dissimilarities have manifested themselves in more successful reha-
bilitation of females and lower rates of parole violations and recidiv-
ism among women. The Fourth Circuit in Maples seemed to acknowl-
edge the need for such information when it stated that sex was an
irrelevant factor "absent any proof that rehabilitation or deterrence
are more easily accomplished in the case of females rather than
males." 0'
For mainly historical reasons, however, definite conclusions about
See notes 69-80 supra and accompanying text.
IN See Gunther, supra note 67, at 8.
,o See notes 88-91 supra and accompanying text.
"1 See Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the "Heightened Rationality Test". Is the Su-
preme Court Promoting a Double Standard in Sex Discrimination Cases?, 32 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. - (1974).
10 The use of this theorized standard would mean that the Court
would be less willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its
imagination. It would have the Court assess the means in terms of
legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not
merely in conjecture. Moreover, it would have the Justices gauge the
reasonableness of questionable means on the basis of materials that
are offered to the Court, rather than resorting to rationalizations cre-
ated by perfunctory judicial hypothesizing.
Gunther, supra note 67, at 21.
The Supreme Court seemed to acknowledge the need for the state to articulate
more precisely the purposes underlying a proposed classification in McGinnis v. Roys-
ter, 410 U.S. 263 (1973). The Court stated that it did not "wish to inhibit state
experimental classifications in a practical and troublesome area, but [would] inquire
only whether the challenged distinction rationally furthers some legitimate,
articulated state purpose." 410 U.S. at 270 (emphasis added). At the end of its analy-
sis, the Court added that it had "supplied no imaginary basis or purpose for [the]
statutory scheme." Id. at 277.
,*1 501 F.2d at 987.
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the relative susceptibility of women to successful rehabilitation are
difficult. Because of the general assumptions regarding the alleged
innate distinctions between men and women,"5 in the latter part of
the nineteenth century many states established a dual system of
detention under which males were confined in state penitentiaries
while females were sent to reformatories.'0 ' This dichotomized sys-
tem was designed to implement the societal belief that women were
the gentler, less corrupt sex and thus were more amenable to rehabili-
tation. Under this system, women typically were given indeterminate
sentences while men were sentenced to specific minimum-maximum
punishments. The practical result was that women often served
longer sentences than men who had committed similar crimes. 7 The
few challenges to this procedure were rejected.' In a 1919 decision,
a Kansas court articulated the rationale for maintaining separate
systems of incarceration:
It is a patent and deep-lying fact that these fundamental ana-
tomical and physiological differences affect the whole psychic
organization. They create the differences in personality be-
tween men and women, and personality is the predominating
factor in delinquent careers. . . . Woman enters spheres of
sensation, perception, emotion, desire, knowledge, and experi-
ence, of an intensity and of a kind which man cannot
know. . . . [T]he result is a feminine type radically different
from the masculine type, which demands special consideration
in the study and treatment of nonconformity to law.0 9
Recent decisions, however, have challenged the validity of the facile
premises underlying this sentencing dichotomy.
The first case to declare that an indeterminate sentencing struc-
ture which applied only to women was a violation of equal protection
was United States ex rel. Robinson v. York. 10 Under Connecticut law,
women could be sentenced to indeterminate punishments of up to
three years or for the length designated for the specific crime, which-
ever was greater. No comparable provision existed for males. The
petitioner, a female, had been sentenced to an indefinite term not to
'"5 See note 65 supra.
'1 See E. LEKKERKERKER, REFORMATORIES FOR WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 131-
81(1931).
107 See Comment, Sex and Sentencing, 26 Sw. L. J. 890, 895 (1972).
"0 See, e.g., Ex parte Carey, 57 Cal. App. 297, 207 P. 271 (1922); State v. Heitman,
105 Kan. 139, 181 P. 630 (1919).
'o State v. Heitman, 105 Kan. 139, 181 P. 630, 633-34 (1919).
110 281 F. Supp. 8 (D. Conn. 1968).
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exceed three years. She contended that in practice females were in-
carcerated for greater periods of time than were men who had com-
mitted similar offenses. The district court apparently utilized an in-
termediate equal protection standard in requiring the state to show
only "a reasonable or just relation"'' between the crimes involved in
the case and the potentially disparate punishments allowed by the
statute, yet voiding the provision. The court concluded that women
did not require greater lengths of incarceration to effectuate success-
ful rehabilitation.
2
Since the landmark York ruling, other courts have similarly
struck down indeterminate sentencing statutes for females."' Though
the courts have seemingly recognized that available data do not con-
clusively determine whether women are more amenable to rehabilita-
tion,"' they have disagreed on whether the state or the individual
should bear the burden of proof in establishing or refuting the conten-
tion."5 Allocation of that burden, which is essentially a reflection of
the equal protection standard employed, is critical to the outcome.,,
For example, in State v. Chambers, " 7 the female defendant chal-
lenged the constitutionality of an indeterminate sentence she had
received following her conviction for a gambling offense. A full adver-
sary hearing was conducted in which the state of New Jersey was
" Id. at 16.
The court stated:
Nor is there any support for the claim that women require a longer
time to become rehabilitated .... While it might not be impossible
to conjure up special circumstances where less onerous conditions of
restraint could be argued by some to compensate for a lengthier im-
prisonment, such an argument would be as applicable to men as to
women.
... That there are differences between women and men cannot
be denied, but that these differences justify a longer imprisonment of
women cannot be sustained.
Id.
.3 See State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973); Commonwealth v.
Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d-400 (1968). Cf. State v. Costello, 59 N.J. 334, 282 A.2d
748 (1971).
" See State v. Costello, 59 N.J. 334, 282 A.2d 748, 754 (1971).
. See id. (burden on state). In Commonwealth v. Daniel, 210 Pa. Super. 156, 232
A.2d 247, 251 (1967), the court, in upholding Pennsylvania's indeterminate sentencing
statute for women, placed the burden on the individual to overcome the presumptive
validity given to the legislature's statute. The lower court's decision was overruled in
Commonwealth v. Daniel, 430 Pa. 642, 243 A.2d 400 (1968), although the court did not
expressly address itself to the question whether the burden of proof should be placed
upon the state or the individual.
16 See note 100 supra and accompanying text.
117 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973).
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required to present its formal proof in support of the thesis that
women were more susceptible to rehabilitation. At the end of the
hearing, the trial court concluded that there was a lack of empirical
data to support the state's argument. While evidence was presented
indicating a lower rate of recidivism for females, most witnesses
stated that there was no rational penological basis justifying
minimum-maximum sentences for males and indeterminate'sent-
ences for females for similar crimes.' The Supreme Court of New
Jersey affirmed the ruling and stated that "[t]he rationale for the
classification and the different sentencing procedure-that females
are better subjests for rehabilitation, thereby justifying a potentially
longer period of detention for that purpose-finds little or no support,
empirical or otherwise.""'
The Chambers decision illustrates a basic handicap courts have
faced in examining the permissibility of dissimilar sentences based
on sex: the relative lack of empirical data relating to the experiences
of men and women in prison and their behavioral patterns after their
releases.2 0 Without such information, meaningful evaluation of the
alleged greater female susceptibility to rehabilitation is difficult.
Moreover, even if future research indicates lower parole violations
and lower recidivism rates in women, such a finding should not in
itself be decisive. Men and women receive strikingly different prison
treatment in terms of number of fellow inmates, staff-inmate ratios,
physical surroundings, and available rehabilitative programs.' In
I's Id. at 82.
11 Id.
' The little information that exists tends to be inconclusive. Also, much of the
available literature is of limited value because it is not written from an empirical
perspective. See generally R. GiALLOmBARDO, SOCITY OF WOMEN: A STUDY OF A
WOMAN'S PRSON (1966); L. KANowrrz, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969); 0. POLAK, THE
CRiMINALITY OF WOMEN (1950); WARD AND KAsSEBAUM, WOMEN'S PUSON-SEX AND SO-
cLAL STRuCruRE (1965); Comment, Texas Sentencing Practices: A Statistical Study, 45
TExAs L. Rxv. 471, 496 (1967).
2I For an excellent study of the divergent male and female experiences within
American prisons, see Comment, The Sexual Segregation of American Prisons, 82 YALE
L.J. 1229 (1973). There, the author summarized the different experiences in prison for
men and women as follows:
In sum, male and female inmates face markedly different prison
experiences: Neither has an exclusive claim to "better" treatment.
Women are undoubtedly disadvantaged by the remoteness of their
prisons, the heterogeneity of their populations, and the lower level of
institutional services and rehabilitative programs available to them.
Men are generally disadvantaged by the nature of their physical sur-
roundings, their staff/inmate ratios, and the relatively stricter regime
of their institutions. Finally, many inmates of both sexes are disad-
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view of the dissimilar nature of the respective confinements, more
successful rehabilitation for females might reasonably be described
as nothing more than the predictable consequence of a self-fulfilling
prophecy. As one observer has stated: "Institutions which house
members of only one sex can be structured and operated in accord-
ance with these perceived [sexual] differences."'2 Thus, as long as
men and women inmates are dealt with in dissimilar fashion, it
should not be surprising if they manifest divergent behavioral pat-
terns once outside of correctional institutions.
The present dearth of data pertinent to a consideration of whether
sex can justify disparate sentences is in itself an indication that the
result reached by the Fourth Circuit in Maples was correct. Only the
"rational relationship" standard, which is typified by imposition of
the burden of proof upon the individual contesting the classifica-
tion,'1 could uphold the reasoning of the Maples trial judge. While
Kahn indicates that the Supreme Court is not yet willing to label
sex a suspect category, Reed and Frontiero make it clear that a
significant burden will be imposed on a state to justify any classifica-
tions based on gender. 12 Under the intermediate equal protection
model, which seems especially appropriate for a consideration of sex-
based statutory provisions, the fact that so little relevant research has
been conducted should ensure that the state cannot meet its empiri-
cal burden of proof.
Conclusion
The analysis of the Fourth Circuit in Maples can be criticized as
incomplete because of its failure to consider the possible retrench-
ment taken by the Supreme Court in regard to sexual classifications.
However, the result reached by the Fourth Circuit was a proper one.
The court recognized the practical discrimination that Maples had
suffered and thus opted for the only viable alternative-a vacation
of Maples's punishment.
Contrary to the objections of the dissent, much of the majority's
approach was orthodox in its scrutiny of the sentencing process. Ap-
vantaged by being treated according to stereotypes applied to all the
members of their sex in a segregated correctional system.
Id. at 1244.
" Id. at 1231 (footnote omitted).
223 See notes 79-80 supra and accompanying text.
"I See Note, Kahn v. Shevin and the "Heightened Rationality Test". Is the
Supreme Court Promoting a Double Standard in Sex Discrimination Cases?; 32 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. . (1974).
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pellate courts are obligated to review this process to ensure that de-
fendants receive individualized and constitutional sentences. Such
individualization can occur only when legally relevant factors alone
are considered by the trial court. Significantly, states have not been
able to demonstrate the materiality of sex as a variable in the sent-
encing process.25
In one respect, however, Maples was far from orthodox. The
Fourth Circuit's conclusion that sex is a legally immaterial considera-
tion was a continuation of the recent judicial trend that has resulted
in the abandoment of many of the ancient stereotypes about the
sexes. If, as has been suggested by some commentators,' 28 the new
intermediate equal protection standard of review being developed by
the Supreme Court demands an empirical inquiry, such a model
would be particularly apt for the question posed by Maples. More
research should be made available to courts which will allow them
to evaluate with greater certainty the contention that sex does influ-
ence an inmate's rehabilitation. In the future, the burden of produc-
ing such data should be placed upon the state since it has at its
disposal much greater fact-finding resources and analytical tools than
does an individual defendant. Until this evidence is provided, courts
should proceed on the assumption that sex may not legitimately be
considered by a sentencing judge. In other words, men and women
should be presumed to be equal unless a state can present informa-
tion which conclusively proves the contrary.
R.H.A.
2. Increased Sentence Based Upon Trial Judge's Personal
Conclusion that Defendant Had Perjured Himself at Trial Not
Subject to Review Where Sentence is Within Statutory
Maximum-United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Baker, Civil No. 73-1771 (4th Cir. May 2, 1974).
In United States v. Moore,' a three judge panel of the Fourth
Circuit considered the problem of whether a trial judge may increase
the severity of a defendant's sentence because of his personal convic-
tion that the defendant had perjured himself. The identical issue was
' See, e.g., State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78 (1973).
'' See notes 101-03 supra and accompanying text.
1 484 F.2d 1284 (4th Cir. 1973).
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presented in United States v. Baker,2 which the Fourth Circuit de-
cided in a per curiam opinion simply by referring to Moore.
To punish a defendant for perjury when he has neither been in-
dicted nor had a chance to defend himself would seem to violate the
fifth amendment right to be indicted by a grand jury,3 and the sixth
amendment right to be confronted by one's accusors.1 These constitu-
tional arguments notwithstanding, the Fourth Circuit ruled in Moore
that so long as a sentence is within the statutory maximum and is
otherwise constitutional, the trial judge's decision is unreviewable. In
reaching this conclusion, the three judge panel in Moore followed the
earlier ruling in Peterson v. United States,5 a 1917 decision by the
Fourth Circuit. Thus, stare decisis rather than policy determined the
outcome of these cases, a fact which led Judge Craven to disagree
with the majority view in Moore and to outline what he thought
might be a persuasive argument should Moore or a similar case come
before the Fourth Circuit en banc. In essence, Judge Craven deplored
the fact that the trial judge's discretion in the sentencing process
could operate to circumvent the guarantees of the fifth and sixth
amendments.
That Moore and Baker presented the Fourth Circuit with similar
facts and identical issues within a one year period indicates some
2 No. 73-1771 (4th Cir. May 2, 1974).
3 The relevant portion of the fifth amendment reads: "No person shall be held to
answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The relevant portion of the sixth amendment reads: "In all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him . "U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
5 246 F. 118 (4th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 246 U.S. 661 (1918). The facts in Peterson
were very similar to those in Moore. In Peterson, the defendant was given the statutory
maximum sentence for stealing a postal money order stamp. Evidence of the judge's
motive for the harsh sentence came from a letter written by the judge four months after
trial, which stated:
Concerning the sentence in the A. T. Peterson case I see no impro-
priety in my stating to you the fact that the offense for which the
defendant was formally found guilty by the jury was and is in my
opinion rather trifling, and for it a moderate punishment would have
been amply sufficient. However, I became firmly convinced during the
trial and believe now that Peterson was guilty of subornation of per-
jury of the most glaring character, and I further took into considera-
tion the fact that the theft of the post office stamp was committed for
an ulterior and decidedly criminal purpose. The main reason for the
severe sentence imposed, however, was the subornation of perjury.
246 F. at 118-19.
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ferment in the law of sentencing. The court's disposition of Moore
would seem to confirm this conclusion.
James Ronald Moore was convicted by a jury of knowingly receiv-
ing a stolen automobile. Moore's defense consisted largely of his own
testimony. In the course of the trial, Judge Harvey of the District of
Maryland became personally convinced that the defendant had lied
under oath. Therefore, in sentencing Moore, Judge Harvey expressed
his view that although Moore's crime was not serious, his apparent
perjury should affect the severity of his punishment.' Moore's appeal
was based primarily on the argument that he should not be sentenced
for a crime which was beyond the scope of the indictment and the
jury's verdict. He further argued that such activity by a judge dis-
courages criminal defendants from testifying in their own behalf.
Judge Butzner, writing for the majority, acknowledged that the cir-
cuits have varied in treating this issue,7 but adhered to the rule of the
Before sentencing, Judge Harvey made this comment:
The jury was out for less than an hour and a half yesterday, Mr.
Moore, and found you guilty as charged. I would agree completely
with the jury verdict. Were it only a case of your being convicted of
this offense, I would impose some sort of a sentence but not a very long
one. But we have more than that here. You took the stand in your own
defense, as you have every right to do, but you testified falsely under
oath in an attempt to exculpate yourself from this crime. The Court
should take that into account in deciding what is the proper sentence
in a case of this sort.
United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d at 1286-87.
1 Only three of the circuits have dealt with the issue of whether a judge's own
opinion that a defendant committed perjury should result in a longer sentence. In
United States v. Cluchette, 465 F.2d 749, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1972), the Ninth Circuit
approved a judge's using his own opinion of the defendant's veracity to determine the
length of a convict's sentence; accord, Pependrea v. United States, 275 F.2d 325, 329-
30 (9th Cir. 1960). In United States v. Wallace, 418 F.2d 876, 878 (6th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 955 (1970), the Sixth Circuit did the same. In fact, the Sixth Circuit
went so far as to say that a conclusion that the defendant perjured himself may be "a
circumstance a sentencing judge might well be censored for ignoring." 418 F.2d at 878.
Although the Second Circuit has not ruled on the issue specifically, in United States
v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 889 (1952), the trial judge's
sentence, which was based in part on his own conclusion of the defendants' perjury,
was sustained. 195 F.2d at 605 n.28. Accord, United States v. Sohnen, 280 F.2d 109
(2d Cir. 1960). While the remaining circuits have not considered the perjury issue in
detail, virtually all have ruled that there is no appellate review of sentences as long as
they are within the statutory maximum. First Circuit: Crespo v. United States, 151
F.2d 44 (1st Cir., 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 758 (1946); Third Circuit: United States
v. Williams, 254 F.2d 253 (3d Cir. 1958); Fifth Circuit: Granger v. United States, 275
F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1960); Eighth Circuit: Gurera v. United States, 40 F.2d 338 (8th Cir.
1930); Tenth Circuit: Adam v. United States, 266 F.2d 819 (10th Cir. 1959).
The District of Columbia Circuit, however, has denied the judge's prerogative to
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lengthen a sentence on the basis of his own evaluation of perjury. Scott v. United
States, 419 F.2d 264 (D:C. Cir. 1969). Scott is the only circuit court case to hold that
a judge may not consider perjury in fashioning a sentence. In general, the District of
Columbia Circuit seems to have assumed a greater degree of appellate control over
sentences than other federal appellate courts. In Leach v. United States, 334 F.2d 945
(D.C. Cir. 1964), the District of Columbia Circuit considered the trial court's refusal
to refer a prisoner for mental examination an abuse of discretion. Likewise, in Peters
v. United States, 307 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the case was remanded where the trial
judge had sentenced without awaiting a pre-sentence report.
Outside the District of Columbia Circuit, the most dramatic departures from the
traditional view that sentences are not reviewable have come from the Seventh and
Second Circuits. In United States-v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960), the court ruled
that a judge could not sentence a defendant more severly than his compatriots in crime
simply because he decided to stand trial rather than plead guilty. Nevertheless, in
remanding the defendant for resentencing, the court in Wiley was not purporting to
exercise its power of appellate review. Rather, the remand was ordered pursuant to the
circuit court's power to administer law in the district courts. La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1957).
Likewise, in McGee v. United States, 462 F.2d 243 (2d Cir. 1972), the court
remanded the case for resentencing. The defendant McGee was convicted of several
counts, but only one of these was of a serious nature. McGee's indictment was later
determined to be invalid. The court considered it probable that conviction of the
serious but invalid charge iffected the length of the sentence given for the lesser
offenses. For that reason, McGee was remanded for resentencing.
In McGee, the Second Circuit followed the reasoning of the Supreme Court in
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1971). Like McGee, Tucker had been
convicted of several counts of varying gravity. Two of Tucker's convictions were found
unconstitutional under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1962). In ruling that the
Ninth Circuit had properly remanded the case for resentencing, the Tucker Court
reaffirmed the general proposition that a trial judge's sentence is unreviewable if
within the statutory maximum, but at the same time the Court enunciated the princi-
ple that "a sentence founded at least in part upon misinformaton of constitutional
magnitude" cannot stand. 404 U.S. at 447.
The standard at the present time seems to be that appellate review of sentencing
is permitted in the federal courts only when the trial judge's discretion violates consti-
tutional principles. Considering the fifth and sixth amendment implications of a
judge's concluding that a defendant perjured himself, Scott and Moore are, at least
arguably, within even the cautious approach to appellate review of sentencing taken
by the Court in Tucker. The scope of appellate review in Scott was limited to matters
of constitutional importance. In light of Tucker, the rule in Scott was not totally novel.
Moore was concerned with the constitutionality of a sentence. Since Tucker, the
reviewability of a sentence is permitted when constitutional issues are presented. 404
U.S. at 447. Generally, however, pressure is mounting to establish appellate review of
sentencing as a right in all circumstances. See United States v. Martell, 335 F.2d 764
(4th Cir. 1964); ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEw oF SENTENcES (Ap-
proved Draft 1968); Burr, Appellate Review as a Means of Controlling Criminal Sent-
encing Discretion-a Workable Alternative, 33 U. Prrw. L. REv. 1 (1971); Mueller,
Penology on Appeal: Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L.
REv. 671 (1962); Mueller & Poole, Appellate Review of Legal but Excessive Sentences:
A Comparative Study, 21 VAND. L. REv. 411 (1968); Sobeloff, The Sentence of the
Court: Should There be Appellate Review?, 41 A.B.A.J. 13 (1955); Wyzanski, A Trial
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Fourth Circuit as expresssed in Peterson v. United States.' While
relying on Peterson, which was virtually identical on its facts to both
Moore and Baker, Judge Butzner cautioned trial judges against
equating a conviction with the existence of perjury when the defen-
dant testified on his own behalf. The right to testify on one's own
behalf is well settled.' Judge Butzner virtually acknowledged that if
courts equated every guilty verdict with a perjury conviction, the risk
of increased punishment resulting from testifying on one's own behalf
would discourage a defendant from exercising that right. 0
While Judge Butzner's warning reflected his appreciation of the
possibility of abuse which could result from investing the sentencing
judge with total discretion, Judge Craven's concurring opinion ac-
tively encouraged further attacks on Peterson. In so doing, Judge
Craven specifically adopted arguments made by the District of Col-
umbia Circuit in a case similar to Peterson, Scott v. United States. "
In Scott it was held that a judge's belief that the defendant had
committed perjury in denying participation in a robbery with which
he was charged should not be considered in determining the sentence
to be imposed. Following the District of Columbia Circuit's lead,
Judge Craven found an affirmative reason for overruling Peterson:
preservation of a defendant's right to testify in his own defense. 2 At
the same time, Judge Craven attacked the two justifications often
given for a judge's increasing the severity of a sentence when he feels
that the defendant has committed perjury.
The first of these justifications for letting a judge's own impression
of a defendant's veracity affect the sentence is that if the defendant
did commit perjury, he should be punished for it. Advocates of the
position argue that while the right to testify on one's own behalf must
be protected, there is "no constitutional right to lie."' 3 Judge Craven
emphatically rejected this reasoning, premising his argument on the
fact that perjury is a criminal offense in and of itself. Those who must
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. Rav. 1281 (1952); Note, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 422 (1961); Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Con-
necticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960); Comment, Criminal Law-Judicial
Review-Appellate Modification of Excessive Sentence, 46 IOWA L. Rav. 159 (1960).
1 246 F. 118 (4th Cir. 1917). Although not mentioned by the Fourth Circuit in
Moore, Tincher v. United States, 11 F.2d 18, 21 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 664
(1926), addressed the same issue concerning the trial court's discretion and reached
the same result as Peterson.
Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 269 (1969).
484 F.2d at 1287.
419 F.2d 264 (1969).
12 484 F.2d at 1288.
13 Id. at 1289.
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answer for a crime are guaranteed both a grand jury hearing'4 and an
indictment so that they may prepare a defense. Permitting apparent
perjury to increase the punishment for conviction of another crime
has the effect of denying these fundamental rights. Judge Craven
called the rationale "judgment by hunch-without accusation and
without opportunity to defend."' 5
The second justification urged for increasing the severity of pun-
ishment when the judge believes that perjury has been committed is
that a defendant who lies under oath has the character of a hardened
criminal. The argument continues that hardened criminals are poor
prospects for rehabilitation and should therefore receive severe sent-
ences. Judge Craven rejected this argument as well; in his view, psy-
chiatrists, not judges, should determine whether a particular criminal
can be rehabilitated.'
6
Finally, Judge Craven pointed out that juries can be wrong. This
fact alone, he argued, should prohibit a judge from accepting a jury's
disbelief of the defendant's testimony implicit in a guilty verdict as
the equivalent of a perjury conviction. Although Judge Craven recog-
nized that the three judge panel which decided Moore was bound by
Peterson, he expressed hope that Peterson would be overruled by the
Fourth Circuit en banc.
Thus Judge Craven expressed even more discontent with
Peterson's authority than did Judge Butzner in the majority opinion.
Although Judge Craven was certainly more explicit than Judge Butz-
ner, both indicated that a chance to overrule Peterson and adopt the
Scott position might be welcome and successful. Should the issue
presented in Moore and Baker appear before the Fourth Circuit
again, Judge Craven's opinion in Moore could well persuade the court
to forsake its previous position, and adopt the view expressed by the
District of Columbia Circuit in Scott. 17
L.C.M.
"U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
484 F.2d at 1288.
I d.
'7 For a discussion of the law on this issue outside the Fourth Circuit, see note 7
supra.
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